Presentation Essay on \"Li as Cultural Grammar\"

On "Li as cultural grammar"
Zhou Kun

"Li as Cultural Grammar" is an article written by Professor Chenyang Li discussing and presenting new ideas on the topic of the fundamental nature of li and how it relates to ren in traditional Confucian philosophy. The main thesis of the paper is to introduce the analogy between li and linguistic grammar, establish it as a kind of cultural grammar while establishing ren as the mastery of culture which is in turn analogous to mastery of a type of language. From this analogy, the author believes that a more coherent and suitable interpretation of the nature of ren, li as well as their relationships can be derived.
The main idea of the author is to establish an interpretation by analogizing the relationship between ren and li to that of grammar in a language and mastery of the language, except that ren and li are in cultural terms instead of linguistic. Thus in his explanations, Li is then given the title of "cultural grammar" while ren the "mastery of culture". From here he derives many characteristics of ren, li, how the two interact and how this interpretation is different from other alternatives. One main problem I have with this explanation is that the author at a point refers to li as "in the sense of syntax; it means the rules whereby words or other elements of sentence structure are combined to form acceptable sentences and phrases". At a later point in the article, the author points out that "As the basic rules and norms of human behaviour in a society, li is embedded in people's everyday behaviour as grammar is embedded in everyday expressions." Syntax of a language refers to the formal rules used in a language to express semantics, syntax by itself is meaningless and an abstract set of rules. However, the basic rules and norms in human behaviour is less like grammar and more like commonly-used phrases. This is because basic social norms have semantic content and are not simply meaningless syntax. For example, if a social norm for receiving help from a stranger is to say "thank you", this is not a good analogy to grammar because there is meaning in it and is not a mere meaningless rule. The author later also talks about how this new interpretation of the relationship between the two concepts allow for revisions of li to occur like how grammar changes and evolves throughout the times. I think that this is where the analogy breaks down because while you can establish the same sentence using incredibly different syntaxes or grammars in different languages (provided the semantics of the vocabulary of those languages are commensurable), when basic social norms change drastically it seems that li is no longer being observed. The author specifically presents the idea that different cultures can have different li, unlike what traditional Confucians thought. However this allows for radical situations such as say for example, there is a civilization where it is considered proper and a social norm for human beings to kill each other if they have any form of conflict with each other and even cannibalize their own parents if they wish to. Is this still a legitimate form of li? There is some mention of Confucius believing that li was an indicator of the health of a society but he only mentions situations where li experiences a negative change that suggests the bad health of the society. But if we envision a society where li starts off as what I mentioned above, there is no "deterioration" of li yet it is clear that such behaviour of cannibalism and commonplace murder is not an acceptable civilized social norm, unless the author does believe it to be so.
This article does present an alternative view on the issue, which is Kwong-loi Shun's Constitution Thesis on ren and li. The author also explains the earlier theories held by instrumentalists and definitionalists on the issue, which are theories that Kwong-loi Shun attempted to replace with his more coherent Constitution Thesis. The definitionalists held that ren is defined by the observance of li and vice versa. Their main reason for believing mainly stems from Confucius' obvious conservative attitude towards li as shown in Analects 12.1, 3.1, 3.17, 9.3, 16.2 and 17.21. The instrumentalists on the other hand, believe that li is fundamentally separate from ren, which is a concept in Confucianism. They hold the view that li is but a behavioural instrument used to cultivate and express the concepts of ren. Their view is construed from Analects 3.3, 5.18 and 9.3 where it seemed possible to edit and revise li but not ren. In light of these 2 major interpretations, the author then explains Kwong-loi Shun's attempt at correcting both with his Constitution Thesis. The Constitution Thesis asserts that li, which are behavioural rituals, is a means of cultivating and expressing ren, which is a mental state of sagehood. The main point of the thesis is that li constitutes, hence necessitates and is sufficient for becoming ren, hence the name Constitution Thesis. This solves the problem of the instrumentalists and definitionalists since small changes and revisions of li become possible without changing the mental sagehood of ren yet these changes are only justified with constraints, reflecting the general conservative attitude of Confucius towards li.
Once the author fully establishes the background of Kwong-loi Shun's Constitution Thesis, he then attempts to highlight some problems that he has identified in Shun's interpretation. The first is the problem of the quantifier "within this community" or as I interpret it, "of certain unique kinds". The contradiction occurs when Shun defines ren as the performance of general and non-unique li, but at the same time asserting that the performance of li that is specific to this community or li of certain unique kinds is necessary and sufficient for being ren. Thus there is an unjustified change between usage of "li" and "li specific to the community". The second problem comes from the textual evidence in the Analects suggesting that performing li does not always result in the performer being ren and also cases of those who are ren not performing li in some situations. This contradicts directly with Shun's idea of the general practice of li directly constitutes ren. Here the author utilizes Analects 13.19 to suggest that Confucius believed that it was possible for one to practice li without jing (respectfulness) and since it is also clear that someone who is ren must have a sense of jing, it is possible to deduce that it is possible to practice li and still not be fully ren. The author uses passage 15.32 from the Analects in a similar way, with respect to zhuang and yi. The author then goes on to part one of passage 12.1 in the Analects, where it seemed the most clear that Confucius was suggesting that li constituted ren. Using a different form of the same linguistic reinterpretation of characters, the author attacks the old interpretation of the character wei, which is reinterpreted as a "weak cause that necessitates but is not sufficient" instead of the strong "cause". This is repeated for the second part of the same passage, where he reinterpreted yi dan as "once" instead of "for one day" and gui ren as "moving towards ren" instead of "regarding as ren".
The author considers his analogy of cultural grammar a superior theory to that of Shun because it solves the problem of the cultural-specificity of li, represents ren as a combination of virtues and a superior personhood, offers a more coherent explanation considering the new interpretations of the passages in the Analects and allows for li to be a necessary yet not sufficient condition of ren thus allowing for small changes in the former across time and the occasional trumping of li by those who are ren. However the over-radicalization of acceptable norms is still my main reason for not completely being convinced by this analogy. The relationship between syntax and language mastery simply give too much "freedom" to syntax for it to be well-analogized to that of social norms and practices, which should be given proper moral restrictions to ensure a healthy society, not just in the evolution and change of the practices but also in practices themselves. Syntax just does not have this kind of strong restriction.
In conclusion, the author utilizes much linguistic reinterpretation of passages in the Analects as his basis for providing an alternative to Kwong-loi Shun's Constitution Thesis. While the analogy to cultural grammar is in a way poetic and somewhat less problematic compared to the Constitution Thesis, I still think that there is much radicalism implied by this interpretation and both interpretations of the author and Kwong-loi Shun should be considered in equal light for the best understanding of the relationship between ren and li, at least until more coherent theories appear in the future.