PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON

PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON PAUL Department

VOESTERMANS

of Cultural Psychology, Psychological Laboratory, University Montessorilaan 3,6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands

of Nijmegen,

Abstract -

Psychological practice is the dimension of psychology that has had a strong influence on the modernization of practices in the field of mental health, education, family life, and so on. As a practical science psychology is quite vulnerable to ideological influences. To clarify the received view of psychology’s ideological impact, a distinction is made between a negative and a positive concept of ideology. In order to meet some of the objections against the received view it is proposed to subsume the positive concept under the concept of culture, which stresses non-propositional and non-argumentative aspects of behavior-organization. From this perspective much of psychology, particularly its practical side, has become an integral part of our culture and, therefore, cannot be ideologically criticized any more. Its impact can only be studied within the framework of culture theory. The advantages of a culture theory approach are detailed and a few interesting issues of further research are presented. Finally, it is pointed out that a culture theory approach has historigraphic consequences. Two sketchy examples are given of how to proceed with writing a history of psychological practice within the framework of culture theory. INTRODUCTION Psychology has

is predominantly

produced

system, something. Western

not

a practical

professionals .just What

world

because they feel,

who they

do think,

has

know become

and

act.

science

have

that

penetrated

something an integral

Of course,

during

the

past

everywhere

but

primarily

part

science

of the

in

100 the

because way

in general

people

years social

they

do

in the

has had this

impact. But whereas scientific in(ter)ventions, for instance, artificial fertilization in agriculture, or mid-ear microscopic surgery, or the use of artificial insulin in pregnancy control, have drawn respect and praise, psychological practice has been met with ambivalence; it is a continuous source of worries of an ethical and particularly of a political nature. Psychology is quite sensitive to ideological influences. That is particularly cleal in its two main areas of practice, assessing individual differences and therapy. Here psychology’s importance for the production of the apparatuses of social control is generally acknowledged. These influences are concealed. They remain unspoken for reasons we want to come to grips with in this paper. It is possible to bring the ideology to the fore, but only in the following rather abstract fashion. Differential psychology is known for its basic ideological tenet, that individuals differ in certain abilities, aptitudes, and traits in a non-compensatory way. In other words the individual differences tell something definite about the person’s 331

332

1’.

fi1tictioning. assessment not. Simply

Voes~el’nl;llrs

‘I‘he differences are suplmsed to exist it1 such ;I \v:I!’ ttiat theit is the assessment of so111ething the one person t1;ts and the otl1er t1;1s hecause it is t1v agi-eetllctit presupposetl that this itisrifficieticy catiiiot

f)e conil~etisatecl by ai-tific’ial tools, riot- by the possessioti admittance to, tot- exat11lde, clear-cut tioti-cotiil~etisatol‘) 1984, pp. 296-320). present society with Indeed, belong

we all think to the hard

tiiea11s such as ;I lotigei- training period 01‘ the use of of‘ mother trait, ttie ;issesstiictit it11pliea the tioti;1 certain type school or ;I p1tTiculatjot), etc. Such ;I assignment is scietitific;ill\, ill-ti111tidetl ((~011ld, ‘l‘his, liowever, hasn’t l~recliided ii &net-al de;ilitig it1 out persons itt tetmis of. fixed aptitucfes, ;tt)ilitics, atit traits.

at1out other persot cot-e of. sotiicotic’s

‘l‘lie ideology it1 ttiet-;ipy is ever1 l~syct1ological practices t tiati is the case

i11 terms of’ tiietital “l~tmoti;ilit~ .” tiiot-e 01~~~ed it1 psychometrics.

i11a11fficitw&s,

ttrat

by taket1-fi11~-gt-at1ttd ‘l‘tie basic ideologic;1l

f+atiie of psyctiothet-spy I tlel-ive t‘t-on1 the Iict tfiat iti actual ttier;il~eutic. practice 0111‘tiiel-arctii~ed society is newt- really calltd into cltiestioti. ‘l‘t1et.r always exist it1 ttie taniily, at school. or in the factory t-elatiotis of‘ doti1iti;1t1cc atitl sut1t111ssiot1, tie tmitter how disguised they at-e. (~otiseqr1et1tty. thewl)) d\vays is ;t c.opitig tiiec-hatiistii fin. l~rol~letiis wised 1)~ the t1iet-~1~c-tiic~1l st1uTut~e of the setting it1 which people livr ant1 work. Uncertaitlty f’ot- whatever reasot1s with respect to one’s possibility to fulfill the t-eqtiiretiietits it1 such ;I tiieral-ctiimd atid thercl’ot-e deti1at1ditig sitwtioii sotiietitiies t~rcotiies i1tit~earat~fe. It lvill sootirr or latct- Iw illttrxs” f)y usit1g tem1s like expet-ieticetl ;iticl s11t~secl11etitly diagt1osetl as “mental stress or deptcision. It1 other wotds, the lwrsot1 i-caflv t)elic\e t twrr is soniethitig wrong wit11 liim 01‘ hct- l~ersoti~illy. ‘l‘he t-quest ji1r iudi71iduu/ help ia tegititiiatd I)) etiiployi11g ttic illness 111et;1l~tiot~ oti botti ttir clict1t’a ;1t1d tiell~er’s side. One agwc’s to c-limigc the dysfutictiotial t)etiaviot-s ht- ttir, hettet- u4ttiout tiiucti t-ecogtiitioti of‘ what ~~it~ctttiist;tticcs ca11setl the tlat11;1g~. It1 ttiet-al)) ot1c tweives ;I certain atiiotttit of‘ support that does away, at lmst ti1oti1ct1t;1rit~, tlut-itig the ttierapeutic sessiotis, witti the fcclitig of it1sut‘ficiet1c-\~ or iticotiilw teticr. Pet-sotiat worth is tt~t11l~orat~il~~ atit at-tificialf\~ t~eit1st:illul. A bv-protl11ct m~dd IX that thy c.tiuit will gain sonic insight or t)uittl up sotw stt-ctigtli iti orclot to cope with the strcssitig situation. ‘l‘tic tttaiti itltwlogic~il fr;ttttrc of‘ l~~ytiottict~;tpy cati he sutiitiied up iti otte wtitctiw: ‘l‘tie l~~ot~lciii-sot~iti~~ involved tie,qlccts or t’vt‘~t ot~sc11res ;iltrtmativcs tt1;it c-oultl at1tl .drou/tl t)c t1rgoti~itc~l at tf1t. tr\7l of’ social itistitutiotis such ;is ttic f’at11ily. the scl1ool or tlic l’a(.toi-1,. llowc\w-, 2s is ttic c;isc with clift’~twitiat l~s~~ctiotogy. wc ;I II we usul to tlwt witti t111t11;111bcitigs it1 ant1 ~~s~~c~tiolo~ic~al tcrt11s 01’ the },t’cs~llc’~ 01‘ ;ltwtlce of tll~tltal defects tlistut~tt;itic.es. It is l~i-t511tiicd tt1at thcit- trmttnetit is IXISCYI011 ~0111~’t-t31 itidgtrt into lit1tiiati tiaturr. Otie itiil)oi~t;itit poit1t shoi1fd bc atltletl. 13ecause of ttita fact th;tt ttita itleoto~ic~at it1 tliffrt~ctiti;il psycholog) atitl 11t1tlet-l~it1t1it1~gs of’ ttir l)r;ictic:il ititrtnwitiotis thr client ant1 t tie psyc‘hofogist alike clitiical l~svchology arc li~tt~tlfy tliscei-tiihlt~. rfw//y Oclif~7~f, that tliw-r exist pet-sonal t1o11-cot11lm1satot~~ ti.;tits 10 tw ;1ssrsctt :111(t it1tlivicl11;il tiictit;il clistut~t~aticw 10 tw curctl. For tliis t~t~asoti sot11c’ sc~hol;11~s h;i\,c ;1t1at1clotitd ;I too simplistic view of’ idtv~fo~gy 21s twiti,q ;1 tii;ittt’r 01’ I’Asr~ cotisc~ioustirss atid t1;i~r l1oit1tc~l to ttit tlct that l’sv“tloloi$ tras tldlml 10

Psychological

practice

as a cultural

:+3:1

phenonlenon

constitute the very form of modern individuality we now witness (Venn, 1984). Psychology produces regulative devices and practices that mold men, women and children into discrete entities and thereby become objects ofintenwhon. They are detached from their social environments, and treated as if they are nothing but aggregates entities “have”

of all sorts of interal processes and their outward control. These a self, an identity, emotional disturbances, cognitive misattribu-

tions, and so on. No doubt that this is a form of deception, but there is an interesting issue here. Once the position is adopted that psychology constitutes modern individuality and its concomitant means of control and regulation, a certain degree of paralysis occurs. Indeed, if this view is correct, what can be done to escape from the ideological impact ! Almost nothing, so it seems. In this essay I intend to analyze in some detail a few intricacies of the ideology debate. I want to scrutinize what could be called the received view of ideology. I will also suggest a way out of the above paralyzing situation. With respect to the received view, I will detail by means ideology, the traditional, “negative” real contradictions within society,

of’ a short

historical

survey

two concepts

of

one that holds ideology to be a disguise of and the “positive” concept that portrays

ideology as a way of viewing the world as it is to us, because of the manner in which our wants and needs inescapably dictate it. Next I will draw a few consequences of the way the positive view has put the traditional view of ideology under serious attack. I will highlight some strong features of the positive concept of ideology, particularly the fruitful idea of the inherent social nature of all human endeavors upon which social constructivism and the social representation research have drawn heavily. Because of some flaws in the social constructivists’ and social representationists’ position with respect to the science and practice of psychology itself, some compelling arguments are given to abandon the concept of ideology altogether in favor of the concept of culture. I will propose to incorporate the issues dealt with in the theory of ideology, particularly those concerning the inherently social nature of human being’s psychic make-up, into the cal practice is viewed as a cultural analysis. Finally, history of psychological THE

culture theory approach. In this approach psychologicultural phenomenon which needs to be subjected to a some implications are drawn for the writing of the practice. NEGATIVE

VIEW

OF IDEOLO(;Y

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the first to push science as an antidote to superstition. Understanding nature is the best way to combat fear and to exert power, he claimed. By setting nature apart as something to be controlled, two domains were separated in Bacon’s philosophy: ‘I‘he order of things, on the one hand, and the order of social intercourse, on the other. ‘I‘he former was to be controlled by technical science, the latter by faith. In fact, this split was an important step which led to progress in all sorts of practical-mainly economic, military, and technical-areas. It should be emphasized that the exploration of nature started out as a modest claim, held within limits by firmly fixed beliefs about the supernatural, from which rules guiding peoples lives were derived. For quite some time, both domains, though separated, were kept in a state of

?I:34

P. Voesterrnans

balance as a consequence of the belief in the pre-ordained Divine Order, still unshaken in Bacon’s days. Yet, it didn’t stay that way. Gradually, that which ruled the order of things penetrated into the order of social intercourse. In the name of the very same principle that enabled man to control nature so fruitfully, social life was also to be controlled. Although this was a rather un-Baconian proposition, Bacon’s list of idols occasioned this process. This process continued during the Enlightenment and in nineteenth-century natural science. Prepared at first by /KS Idlo~~~,prs, the unshaken belief in the possibility of a rational order hased on science finally took a firm hold on the effort to incorporate man into the natural world (Adorno 8c Horkheimer, 1972). The science of biology presented itself as the first candidate for putting a11 end to religiously inspired paternalism in matters of social intercourse (Voestermans, 198X). We now know that in those earlier days the stock of’ knowledge of this science was insufficient for devising such a rational order fi)r the conduct of everyday life. ‘l‘his means that, in hindsight, not just l,hilosol,hic~il. but also practical objections could be made against a science which \vrongly claimed a task for which it%was not equipped. A good case in point is the movement of’eugenics. Biological knowledge of‘the hereditary mechanisms at that time did Ilot allow fi)lthe propagation of‘ humat breeding progran~s (_Jxob, I!IH’L; l’ascluino, 1980). In the second half of‘the nineteenth century, however, very few criticized the claims of‘ the natural scieIicrs. Marx was not among them, even though his sensitivity to false claims was exceptionally high. ‘I‘he problematic nature of I hew claims became obsc-ured hy the fact that a highly visible enemy MQISattackt~d: ‘1‘11~ church and other so c;llled I)ourgeois and oppressive fijrces in society that kept the lower strata in a position that precluded access to common goods. For it was clear that this bourgeois pob~ei- was rxerted despite the Gdence that .\cic,t/l//ic. l’uw, 1’. 7.5). Mall) IIlOl‘C progress had made goods incrt7isirigly availhle (Chse. food. and similar sorts 01 people co~rld have ohtailied good health, lodging, things, if’only the right mc;lsures had bee11 taken. While searching for the reason ti)i- this inherent contracliction in the rationalized order of thr itinrteentlicentury moderti wor1d (i.?.. that scientific l~rogrt5s had niatlr goocls availat)l~ 10 many, yet in fact only a select few rc&ved them) hlarx hit upon the inil~ot~tatic~ view of itt~ology 1~2s of’ ideology as false consciousness and thus. the negative obscuring social f’orce whicli born. Ile viewed ideolog) as a l~araniount According to orthodox hlarxists’ views itleolog>, permeated the entire. culttlre. possessed detectable properties and it was necessary to ana1yr.e its mechanisms it1 terms of what Ma-x called historical nlatehlisn~. I le presented it as new form 01’ science. KemarkaMy enough. M/I~UII scieIlce was exemptc(l I)!, Marx f‘rom l)eitlg an accomplice. Economics-at that time, in a way, the only social scieticc ~ivailable-