Seminar: The Euthyphro Dilemma

What is the Euthyphro dilemma?
Critically examine the problems it raises.
Setting
The Dialogue shows Socrates and Euthyphro meeting outside the King Archons court. Socrates has been called to court on charges of impiety and corruption of the youth of Athens, by Miletus. Euthyphro is there to lay murder charges against his own father who killed a servant inadvertently who had been tied and gagged. This servant expired while awaiting the Interpreter, the official who is responsible for interpreting religious law.
Socrates is astonished that Euthyphro has the confidence to charge his own father of murder especially as the murdered person was not a family member but only a worker, when Athenian Law allows only relatives of the deceased to sue for murder. It was considered impious to indict a member of your own family.
Praising Euthyphro, Socrates states that by willing to prosecute his own father on so questionable a charge, Euthyphro must, therefore, be a great expert in religious matters. Euthyphro agrees, he is indeed knowledgeable and knows all there is to be known about holy matters so Socrates urges Euthyphro to teach him, so that it will aid him in his own defence against Miletus.
The Dialogue
Socrates wants to know the nature of piety. What is piety? At first, Euthyphro states that piety is persecuting religious wrong doers so that they may be judged and justice can ensue. Socrates is not happy with this conclusion as there are many other things that are pious, and so asks for a generalisation of piety which would cover all things pious. Socrates disagrees with Euthyphro`s next explanation, that piety is what is loved by the Gods, since not all the Gods agreed, and that what may be pious to Hera may not be to Zeus. So Euthyphro amended his claim slightly and states that piety is what is loved by ALL the Gods.
After some debate, Socrates states that piety "cannot simply be what is loved by the Gods, since it ends in a vicious circle, with the gods loving the pious because it is the pious, and the pious being the pious because the gods love it. And this in turn means, Socrates argues, that the pious and the god-beloved are not the same, for what makes the pious the pious is not what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved, that that which what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved is the fact that the gods love it, which isn`t the same as what makes the pious the pious".
Euthyphro goes on to suggest that piousness is a kind of justice, a give and take with the Gods, That we aid the Gods with our sacrifices and in turn the Gods answer our prayers. Socrates disagrees with this and asks how we aid the Gods, for if they are omnipotent they need no aid from us. Euthyphro`s final suggestion is that we do not aid the Gods with sacrifices, just simply gratify the Gods. But, Socrates again points out, that saying that holiness is gratifying the gods is similar to saying that holiness is what is approved of by the gods, which lands us back to our earlier question. Unable to find a better definition, and possibly frustrated by Socrates' questioning, Euthyphro then leaves purporting to have a prior engagement.
It has been argued by many scholars the importance of why Euthyphro left. If he had already been to court, his business concluded, then he may well have had another appointment. But if he arrived at the King Archons court awaiting to be seen to indict his father of murder, then by walking away from Socrates` questions he was also walking away from the court and the indictment of his father, which begs the question: Had Socrates put doubt into Euthyphro's mind as to what he intended to do, had he changed his view as to what was pious or impious especially with regards to indicting his Father of murder. Could it be that Socrates dialogue had actually altered the way Euthyphro now perceived his "knowledge" of the religious.
The dilemma
Put simply, the dilemma is; `Is what is good commanded by God BECAUSE it is morally good, or is it morally good just because it is commanded by God? `
1st Horn of the Dilemma
That which is good is commanded by God because it is good.
This implies that there are a set of moral standards that are independent of God`s will. If any action, either morally good or bad, is intrinsically good or bad, then God would be bound by those standards. Therefore, this affects the concept, and very nature, of God.
Firstly, God could not be omnipotent, because his power would be limited by any independent standards and could not, for instance, command an evil act to become a good one.
Secondly, God could not be seen as the supreme power. Moral standards, independent of God`s will, become superior to God`s will, and reduce God from law-giver to messenger, also bound by those same standards. It follows, logically, that if God is bound by those laws, then God`s goodness is only relative to the extent that he himself follows those rules.
As a consequence of this, God could only have limited freedom of will. He could not command anything opposed to these moral standards, and could only command acts that conformed to those rules. As Mark Murphy states, "if moral requirements existed prior to God's willing them, requirements that an impeccable God could not violate, God's liberty would be compromised." 1.
Finally, this leads on to the conclusion that there is morality without God. If God didn`t exist, morality would retain its authority. Something is good or bad because it is good or bad, not because it's loved or unloved by the Gods.
2nd Horn of the Dilemma
That which is good is good because it is commanded by God
This horn is also known as the Divine Command Theory; in essence, as Euthyphro first contends; what is moral is determined by what God commands, that God`s command is the only reason that an action is good and moral, and to be moral is to follow those commands. It would therefore be permissible, as put forward by William of Ockham, for God to command us not only to not love, but to hate, God 2 Thomas Hobbes took this one step further by reducing the justice of God to `absolute power.`3 This therefore leads to the conclusion, as put forward by William Paley, that all moral acts, either good or bad as commanded by God, are motivated and governed by self-interest, by a desire to enter `heaven` and avoid `hell` by complying with God`s commands. 4
However, this horn, since it is based on arbitrary rules, presents certain intrinsic problems.
Firstly, an arbitrary system of rules negates any rationalisation of morality, and would disallow any concept of morality being objective. "it is difficult to explain how true moral actions can exist if one acts only out of fear of God or in an attempt to be rewarded by him." 5
This arbitrariness, therefore, implies that God acts on whim, rather than wisdom and reason, and it follows that, depending on God`s command, anything could become either a good or bad action. As Ralph Cudforth once stated, "nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just, and righteous"6
Since, by this horn, morality comes from God`s command, it follows that any of God`s actions are morally good because God has commanded it. However, as C.S. Lewis puts it "if good is to be defined as what God commands, then the goodness of God Himself is emptied of meaning and the commands of an omnipotent fiend would have the same claim on us as those of the 'righteous Lord.'"7
Finally, this leads to the conclusion that, if all morality comes from God`s command, it follows that there is no morality without God, and if God doesn`t exist, then there is no morality.
Conclusion
The Euthyphro Dilemma has been debated and discussed by every philosopher and theologian up to the present day, touching on a variety of ideas such as free will, the nature of God, obligation and Plato`s Forms.
It can be argued that, within the confines of the dilemma and morality, the existence and relevance of God can be dismissed. For God to be seen as the omniscient, sovereign entity, his commands must therefore be unchanging, and any change would mean that he was wrong previously, which would in turn nullify his omniscience.
Without the perspective of God, morality is therefore an independent standard, and intrinsic to mankind in general.
"You won't find a society where people don't have some notion of fairness, don't put some value on loyalty and kindness, don't distinguish between acts of cruelty and innocent mistakes, don't categorize people as nasty or nice. These universals make evolutionary sense. Since natural selection works, at least in part, at a genetic level, there is a logic to being instinctively kind to our kin, whose survival and well-being promote the spread of our genes. More than that, it is often beneficial for humans to work together with other humans, which means that it would have been adaptive to evaluate the niceness and nastiness of other individuals. All this is reason to consider the innateness of at least basic moral concepts." Paul Bloom, Professor of Philosophy at Yale, NY Times `The Moral Life of Babies` May 5 2010

Bibliography
1. Murphy, Mark (2012). "Theological Voluntarism". In Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition ed.).
2. William of Ockham. Reportata 4.16; Also Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas by M.V.Doughertyp.163
3. Hobbes. "Of Liberty and Necessity" 12
4. Paley, William. "Principles" 2.3
5. Doomen, Jasper (2011). "Religion's Appeal". Philosophy and Theology 23 (1): 133–148.
6. Cudworth 1731, 1.1.5.
7 . Lewis, C. S. (1967) [1943]. "The Poison of Subjectivism". Christian Reflections.
Julie Harrison