Michela Summa: Spatio-Temporal Intertwining: Husserl’s Transcendental Aesthetic Marco Cavallaro
Husserl Studies ISSN 0167-9848 Volume 32 Number 1 Husserl Stud (2016) 32:91-99 DOI 10.1007/s10743-015-9178-0
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Author's personal copy Husserl Stud (2016) 32:91–99 DOI 10.1007/s10743-015-9178-0
Michela Summa: Spatio-Temporal Intertwining: Husserl’s Transcendental Aesthetic Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2014 (Phaenomenologica, Vol. 213), 347 pp. US-$129 (hardcover), US-$99 (eBook), ISBN 978-3-319-06236-5 Marco Cavallaro1
Published online: 19 November 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
That only together do temporal and spatial dimensions make up concrete sensible experience is a piece of more or less implicit knowledge that we all share in our everyday life, that is, before engaging in reflective analyses. That the same holds true when we engage in a phenomenological-transcendental inquiry into the conditions of possibility for sensible experience is much harder to prove, for what is at stake in this case is precisely the foundation of the essential structures of temporality and spatiality, as well as their intertwining, through evident intuitions. The latter is what Michela Summa strives for in Spatio-Temporal Intertwining. Husserl’s Transcendental Aesthetic. Her aim is to show the intrinsic boundaries of a parallel account of the two fundamental dimensions of experience, thereby paving the way for an understanding of their essential intertwining within the framework of a Husserlian phenomenological transcendental aesthetic. In the Introduction, Summa raises some concerns regarding accounts of Husserl’s theories of spatial and temporal constitution that either focus on one or the other aspect of the spatio-temporal dimension—thus taking time and space as two separate topics—or consider them as two different layers of experience that share analogical structures but are ontologically separated. The author proposes to study spatial and temporal dimensions as two non-independent parts of the complex whole constituted by sensible experience. This, however, is not meant to contradict Husserl’s ‘‘architectonic’’ of experience, for which the temporal dimension enjoys a certain primacy over the spatial dimension; rather, it is intended to show the original unitedness among the different layers as well as their interplay in the complex whole of experience. Thus, the leading hypothesis of the book is that singular layers & Marco Cavallaro
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Husserl-Archiv der Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln, Kerpener Str. 30, 50931 Cologne, Germany
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or strata can be described independently from each other, i.e. they can be analytically distinguished, although they cannot be deemed ontologically separate from each other (p. 5). The book is divided into three main sections. In the first section (Ch. 2–3), Summa discusses the aim, scope, and originality of Husserl’s project of a transcendental aesthetic, underlining similarities and differences with the approaches of Kant and Avenarius. The second section (Ch. 4–5) brings the parallelism between the forms of temporal and spatial constitution towards its limit. The shortcomings of such a parallel account emerge in the last section of the book (Ch. 6–8). According to Summa, the parallel falls short when it comes to providing a phenomenological description of three kinds of phenomena: individuation, perspectival givenness, and bodily experience. In what follows, I first offer a cursory summary of each section of the book. In the end, I shall discuss the critical points of Summa’s argument for the spatiotemporal intertwining.
1 Husserl’s Project of a Transcendental Aesthetic and his Appraisal of Kant and Avenarius In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl situates the project of a transcendental logic within that of transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental logic defines the logic of the world as it is given to experience, whose ‘‘Grundstufe’’ is constituted by the transcendental aesthetic, i.e. the science of the aesthetic a priori of sensible experience. Summa points out two keystones of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic: the concept of the world and the concept of ‘‘pure experience’’ (p. 16). Following Sommer (1985), Summa suggests in Ch. 2 that Husserl’s project apparently resembles the empiriocritical philosophy of Richard Avenarius. However, Avernarius’s attempt to uncover the structures of pure experience, i.e. experience considered independently of any theoretical speculation, is constrained within the boundaries of a naturalistic approach. As Husserl himself recognized (Hua XIII, p. 199; Hua VI, p. 198), Avenarius’s approach considers the relationship between human experience and the world in empirical terms and thus misses the step towards the transcendental inquiry into the constitution of experience (p. 25). In Chapter 3 Summa focuses on the relationship between Husserl and Kant. Her attempt is, in the first part, to appraise Husserl’s criticism of Kant’s transcendental aesthetic and, in the second part, to propose a reevaluation of Kant’s own theory of experience regarded as compatible with the tenets of Husserl’s phenomenological aesthetic. Both Husserl and Kant consider the transcendental as the investigation of the a priori conditions for possible experience and cognition (KrV, B 25f./A 11f.; Hua VII, p. 386). Nevertheless, they differ in the conception of the transcendental origins of experience. According to Husserl, Kant’s conception of the transcendental is debased by a set of unquestioned presuppositions. The first kind of presupposition is related to formal logic, as Kant failed to recognize that a radical transcendental critique should also address logic (Hua XVIII, p. 271f.). Kantian transcendentalism
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is further charged with having naively assumed that physical theories are an undisputed datum, and thus taking as its epistemological goal the philosophical legitimation of physics (Hua VII, p. 197f.). Lastly, Kant’s philosophy betrays the typical traits of a philosophical anthropologism. The anthropological presuppositions are rooted in Kant’s attempt to trace the a priori structures of objective knowledge back to the factual constitution of the human subject, thus basing the a priori on empirical, accidental conditions. According to Husserl, the Kantian anthropological interpretation of the transcendental becomes manifest in Kant’s understanding of universal validity as validity for everyone (Prolegomena, p. 298) as well as in his theory of the faculties of Gemu¨t, of the Ding an sich, and of the intellectus archetypus. On the relationship between Husserl and Kant, Summa generally tends to downplay the difference between the subjective and objective ground of the lawfulness of experience. According to De Palma (2001) and Pradelle (2000), Kant endorses a foundation of the a priori a parte subjecti in the given inner structures of the experiencing subject, whereas Husserl recognizes only a priori structures a parte objecti, i.e. as eidetic regularities immanent to the various regions of the experienced objects as such. Against such an interpretation, Summa argues that ‘‘the essential reasons that define the regularity of sensible displaying are not to be found in either the object or the subject alone. Rather they can only be given by the fundamental correlation of perceptual cognition and its objective correlate […], so that the laws that rule the contents cannot be considered apart from the subjective ones and vice versa’’ (p. 77). The a priori of correlation of transcendental aesthetic thus represents, in Summa’s reading, the place to begin a phenomenological inquiry into the spatio-temporal intertwining.
2 Potentialities and Limits of a Parallel Account of Temporality and Spatiality Once the first section has argued that space and time are the forms of the ‘‘appearing as such’’ (Hua XVI, p. 43; Hua Mat IV, p. 121) and not mere subjective conditions of experience, the second section of Summa’s book aims to show how Husserl conceives the intuitiveness of those a priori forms. Chapter 4 provides two motives that will ground the principle of spatio-temporal intertwining: on the one hand, the fact that time analyses borrow their vocabulary and metaphors from full-fledged spatio-temporal experience; on the other hand, the fact that the process of idealization at the basis of the constitution of geometric space is a temporal one. In that sense, the intuition of time and the intuition of space are strictly related to each other so that each is the condition of the other. Summa maintains that it is also possible to uncover such a chiasmatic structure on the noematic side of experience—that is, between the temporal and spatial thing. Yet, before being able to argue for it, she needs to take into consideration Husserl’s well-known account of the foundational priority of the res temporalis over the res extensa, which for Summa equals what Husserl coins the ‘‘phantom’’ as the ‘‘thing of phenomenological-transcendental aesthetic’’ (p. 112). Thanks to the univocal
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foundational relationship between res temporalis and phantom, Husserl maintains that it is possible to examine temporal objects apart from their spatial determinations and generally to consider spatial and temporal constitution as proceeding upon parallel and partially independent paths. According to Summa, this idea of parallelism is eventually ‘‘misleading’’ and a theory of constitution based upon such a parallel consideration of spatial and temporal constitution is ‘‘necessarily incomplete’’ (p. 114). Since temporality and spatiality do ‘‘encounter each other’’ in lived experience, the abstractive procedure of phenomenological analyses ‘‘should not be taken too seriously’’ (ibid.), i.e. in terms of an actual ontological divide. Nevertheless, Summa attributes to Husserl’s parallel account the methodological function of unveiling distinctive features of the temporal and spatial dimensions of sensible experience. Despite the foundational heterogeneity of temporal and spatial thing, Husserl in fact recognizes a parallel structure in both domains, which according to Summa amounts to the characterization of the temporal and spatial wholes in terms of ‘‘spreading-out’’ (Ausbreitung) in opposition to ‘‘extension’’ (Ausdehnung). The latter distinction is drawn from considering the possibility of ‘‘fragmentation’’ (Zerstu¨ckung) of the constitutive parts of a complex whole: extension is defined as a whole whose parts are ontologically independent from each other (partes extra partes); whereas spreadingout entails a continuum in which the single moments can only be abstractly separated. Following this distinction, Chapter 5 aims at showing that both temporal and spatial constitution are better understood in terms of spreading-out rather than extension. Notably, this means that temporal duration is not equivalent to an assemblage of independent parts but a continuum in which the singular moments are reciprocally interwoven through the temporal syntheses of retention and protention. Summa argues that a parallel conclusion holds for the dimension of intuitive space as well. More precisely, the reference is now to the multiple sensible layers in which a thing is normally perceived. Husserl conceives of the spatial determinations (figure and extension) as experientially interwoven with the visual and tactile qualities in the pre-phenomenal experience of the phantom so that sensible things should always be regarded as ‘‘aistheta koina’’ (p. 140). Again, the relationship between these different layers of sensible experience is, for Summa, not an extrinsic one but mirrors the structure of a spreading-out continuum.
3 Individuation, Perspectival Givenness, and Bodily Experience If Section 2 expounds the boundaries of a parallel account of spatiality and temporality, Section 3 presents decisive arguments in favor of the intertwining of these two dimensions in concrete experience. Here, Summa pinpoints three loci that should best exemplify the meaning of the thesis of spatio-temporal intertwining: individuation, perspectival givenness, and bodily experience. As an eidetic science of the a priori structures of experience, phenomenology seems to have little to do with individuals and even less with individuating processes. However, as Summa reveals in Ch. 6, Husserl’s work contains sketches
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towards a linguistic, ontological, and phenomenological assessment of the problem of individuation. In the theory of meaning from the Logical Investigations, the individual is conceived either as the instantiation of a species (Besonderung) or with reference to the grammar of proper names. The meaning of a proper name, e.g. ‘‘Peter’’, is independent of the singular intuition of Peter here and now, for it is related to the identity of the individual Peter through the different, singular phases of its appearances. This fact permits Summa to draw a distinction between a strict form of individuation in the here and now (uniqueness in the sense of Einmaligkeit) and an individuation of what persists (das Beharrliche) through different times and places (as well as through qualitative differences). In his formal ontological analyses of the individual, Husserl thus pinpoints two individuating processes. On the one hand, the individual results from a filling-out (Ausfu¨llung) or de-formalization (Entformalisierung) of the formal categories (Hua III/1, pp. 31–33), whereby we reach the singular essence or tode ti of the individual. On the other hand, what makes the individual unique (einmalig) is its individuating position (Lage), which is not a moment of its essence (cf. D 8/28b-29a quoted on p. 158). This formal-ontological distinction does not yet show how individuality is phenomenologically constituted for consciousness. Summa argues that the uniqueness of the individual object derives from the singularity and uniqueness of each phase of its display, i.e. in the event (Ereignis) of its manifestation (Hua XXXIII, p. 291). Thus, drawing on Paci (1954; 1961), Summa considers irreversibility as the key notion in Husserl’s phenomenology of individuation. Irreversibility refers to the oriented, directional character of every process and to the a priori impossibility of its reversal (p. 168), and it must be taken as the condition for the uniqueness of individual objects as well as of individual subjectivity. Another phenomenon that for Summa supports the principle of spatio-temporal intertwining is represented by perspectival givenness in spatial and temporal experience. Perspective plays an a priori necessary function in our perception of spatial things. To perceive such things perspectivally means that one can only perceive their sides from a certain position in space. The space in which the object is given in its perspectival adumbration has the oriented character of a lived spatiality, in which relations of proximity and remoteness (Entfernung) are bound to the subjective point of view and thus may not be reduced to measurable objective distance (Abstand). Perspectival givenness plays a crucial role also in temporal experience, as Summa shows. Although Husserl points out in Ideas I that it would make no sense to talk about perspectival appearance regarding non-spatial being (Hua III/1, p. 88), he also explicitly admits a form of temporal perspective (cf. Hua X, pp. 25, 361). The latter concerns the specific temporal modes of givenness of the immanent object, i.e. its being past, present, or future (Hua X, p. 364). The now constitutes the zero-point of temporal orientation and, at the same time, the maximum of intuitive fullness. This strong parallelism between intuitiveness and temporal as well as spatial perspective, which can be found in some early manuscripts on time consciousness, is later called into question by Husserl through the understanding of perspectival givenness in terms of affective phenomena (Hua XI, p. 172). The relationship between intuitive fullness and remoteness cannot be merely quantitative or proportional, in the sense that the more an object is remote
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(in spatial or temporal respects), the more its intuitive fullness decreases. Summa clarifies this point on the example of occurring memories, which presuppose an affective force of past experiences reaching into the present situation. The discussion of perspectival display leads Summa to an inquiry into the different modes of teleology functioning in perception. Following a suggestion of Pradelle (2000, pp. 173f.), the author distinguishes between the teleology of adequateness and the teleology of optimal givenness. The former is driven by a quantitative principle, namely, the tendency towards an infinite multiplication of possible perspectives in and through which the perceptual thing can appear; the latter expresses a tendency towards optimal appearance of singular profiles. According to Summa, what distinguishes these modes of teleology is precisely the different forms of interest that guide the unfolding of perception. A striving for optimal appearance denotes a practical interest and a finite goal, whereas perfect adequateness is a regulative idea of theoretically oriented cognition. Recognizing a teleology of adequateness already at the level of perceptual experiences does not imply for Summa, as it does for Pradelle, the projection of the idealizing interest of scientific thought upon perception. In contrast, Summa interprets the cognitively oriented tendency towards adequate givenness not as an external goal superimposed on perceptual experience but as inhering in the inner dynamics of perception itself (p. 223). The experience of the lived-body forms an essential part of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic. Summa’s thesis of spatio-temporal intertwining finds its ultimate evidence in the foundational relationship between spatiality, temporality, and bodily experience. Accordingly, if time is nothing but an abstract form without sensible contents that convey our experience of space, these contents, in turn, cannot be conceived apart from the experience of a bodily subject (pp. 248f., 298). In the final chapter, Summa offers an account of the spatio-temporality of the lived-body as organ of perception and movement, as well as a clarification of the various forms of bodily self-awareness. Drawing on Husserl’s well-known definition of the body as the zero-point of orientation, Summa starts by underlining the functional role of the lived-body in perception as the condition of possibility for the constitution of an oriented and anisotropic lived spatiality. In every perceptual activity, I am implicitly aware (intentio obliqua) of my bodily ‘‘being here’’ and, at the same time, explicitly aware (intentio recta) of the perceived object as ‘‘being there’’. Further, Summa characterizes psycho-physical conditionality in terms of an ‘‘if…then’’ relation that lacks the strong necessity of physio-causal conditionality. The discussion of psycho-physical conditionality is also linked to the problem of normality and the ortho-aesthetic. Husserl in fact conceives of a process of normalization that already emerges at the level of solipsistic bodily experience. The author suggests two criteria to define this type of normality: optimal perceptual givenness, which establishes a hierarchy among different bodily conditions of appearing of the perceived thing, on the one hand, and concordance (Einstimmigkeit) among different experiences of the same thing (Hua XIII, p. 364), on the other. Normality cannot be derived from a quasi-statistical calculation, nor is it merely reducible to the factual state of one’s own body; instead it results from the constant negotiation and confrontation of normal and anomalous situations at the
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level of bodily experience, which implies the correlative structure of the subject and the world (p. 272f.). Further evidence of the body’s function as an organ of perception is provided by the phenomenon of bodily movement. The lived-body is not a static point of view on the world, but the source of possible movements and actions. Hence, Summa endorses a dynamization of the understanding of the zeropoint. Bodily movement is a necessary condition for the constitution of threedimensional space as well as objective movement and rest. The former is not understood as the locomotion of an object in objective space; rather, it amounts to the subjectively lived through experience of movement, which Husserl baptizes ‘‘kinesthesis’’ and distinguishes from presenting sensations, i.e. sensations that are apprehended as qualities of the perceived thing. Kinesthesia are one form of bodily self-awareness or, as Summa also calls it, the ‘‘aesthetic of the lived-body’’ (p. 279). Husserl indeed distinguishes between perspectivating and non-perspectivating kinesthesia. The former are connected with the experience of the perceived thing— thus making possible the experience of objective movement and rest; whereas the latter inform the inner experience of our bodily movements. The pre-thematic bodily awareness relates to my faculty of bodily movement (kina¨sthetisches Vermo¨gen), i.e. to the realm of practical possibilities of the ‘‘I can’’. Not every movement, however, presupposes a will to act. Husserl also considers playful movements whose aim lies in the activity itself, such as the instinctual kickingkinesthesia of babies (Hua Mat VIII, p. 328). A further category that frames the experience of bodily self-awareness is constituted by the so-called ‘‘sensings’’ (Empfindnisse) or localized sensations. These are ‘‘effect properties’’, which are virtually always there, but are actualized thanks to an action on the body. Sensings are a correlate property of every kind of sensation, not another class of bodily sensations (p. 282). Their occurrence allows the ambiguity and reflexivity of bodily self-awareness to emerge. First, in the experience of touching a material thing, the same sensations lend themselves to a twofold apprehension: as presenting sensations and as sensings. Second, the phenomenon of the touching-touched hand experientially testifies to the double reality of the body as Leibko¨rper, i.e. its being at the same time an object for and the subject of perception. Another element of the aesthetic of the lived-body according to Summa is exemplified by the phenomenon of body memory. Although Husserl does not employ this concept, Summa argues that his account of bodily experience offers some important clues to describe the effectiveness of retained and sedimented bodily experiences in shaping actual experience. Summa’s strong thesis here, according to which any form of implicit memory is rooted in bodily self-experience (p. 298), is a corollary of the more general thesis of the book that holds the intertwining of spatiality, temporality, and bodily experience. In contrast to presentifying memories, implicit memories account for the pre-objective presence of the past in present experience. They can operate as pre-thematic ‘‘beliefs’’ which we immediately recognize as ours and become therefore a sort of ‘‘secondary sensibility’’ (Hua XXIII, p. 554). Two kinds of syntheses ground the functioning of implicit memories: the retentional–protentional synthesis and the associative and affective synthesis. In this sense, sedimented experiences exert, through the
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so-called ‘‘awakening that radiates back’’ (ru¨ckstrahlende Weckung), an affective impact into the present situation, influencing for instance the way we look at things and classify objects into different experiential categories (types). To summarize, the highest merit of Summa’s book is to offer a variety of meticulous analyses—most of them grounded on an attentive reading of the unpublished D manuscripts—into almost every aspect of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic, thereby filling in a substantial lacuna in the English literature on the founder of phenomenology. This richness of detail, however, sometimes distracts the reader from the main argument. It is not clear, for instance, whether Summa’s thesis of the spatio-temporal intertwining should be understood in methodological or in ontological terms. If it concerns the method of phenomenology, and thus argues that a separate consideration of spatiality and temporality impedes a phenomenological description of a certain set of experiences, then it is surprising to find at some points an appreciation of the ‘‘heuristic potential’’ of the analytic distinction between time and space (pp. 5, 319). Moreover, it is questionable whether the acceptance of the intertwining must necessarily imply a total dismissal of the parallel account. On the contrary, Summa seems to recognize the principal motives for such intertwining in the parallel structures of space and time, as when she examines in section three the experiences of individuation and perspectival givenness. On the other hand, the thesis often seems aimed against the ontological divide between spatiality and temporality, as one can see from the recurring references made in the text to the Husserlian distinction between independent and non-independent parts of a complex whole (pp. 4, 298, 318). Against this ontological corollary of Summa’s main thesis of spatio-temporal intertwining, one might argue that a fundamental difference between the spatial and temporal dimensions can be noticed in their respective process of individuation. Summa’s reference to Paci’s theory of the irreversibility of being is indeed compelling when it comes to describing the individuating mode of temporal objectivities. Yet I cannot see how the same principle holds true for the individuation of spatial objects. Spatiality is indeed a dimension in which reversibility, instead of irreversibility, plays a crucial role. Spatial position individuates an object in the field of spatial experience, and it is reversible in the sense that I can move from one place to another and then turn to my original position, or someone else can occupy my previous position in a subsequent moment. This fact not only invalidates the principle of the parallel account but also undermines the thesis of spatio-temporal intertwining by showing, to follow Summa’s analogy, that a property of the non-independent part ‘‘time’’ (i.e. irreversibility) is non-compatible with another property of the non-independent part ‘‘space’’ (i.e. reversibility). If two elements display mutually exclusive features, they cannot be parts of the same complex whole. Hence, the thesis of spatiotemporal intertwining calls at least for a slight revision. Despite these minor qualms about Summa’s argumentation, the book is indispensable for anyone interested in any aspect of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic. In addition, the text offers many clues to re-interpreting Kant’s transcendentalism in a phenomenological manner, and in this sense it should be
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counted as a substantial contribution not only to Husserlian but also to Kantian scholarship.
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