Syria in a Dynamic Stalemate: Relief or Development

“People Want to Knock Down the Regime” People Will Create the ‘Order’

Syria in a Dynamic Stalemate: Relief or Development? Engaging With Communities’ Coping Strategies as Means to Endorse Good Governance in the Pursuit of Sustainable Recovery

Sawsan Abou Zainedin Development Planning Unit University College London A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Msc Urban Development Planning

1st September 2015

           

To the People who occupied the  streets chanting for knocking down  the ‘Regime’ so that they  themselves build the ‘Order’…   

 

 

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Table of Contents  Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... 4  List of figures ................................................................................................................................... 5  List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. 6  1.  Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 8  2.  Recovery in war-torn societies: Theoretical framework........................................................ 11  2.1. Terminology debates ....................................................................................................................... 11  2.2. 

Dimensions of recovery .............................................................................................................. 12 

2.3. 

Recovery in a time‐spectrum:  Means of engagement ............................................................... 17 

3.  Syria ....................................................................................................................................... 26  3.1. Root causes of the uprising .............................................................................................................. 26  3.2. The Syrian conflict: popular Revolution or Civil War? ..................................................................... 28  3.3. Impact of the conflict ....................................................................................................................... 28  3.4. Recovery spectrum within the Syrian conflict ................................................................................. 31  3.5. Medical CSOs in the Syrian conflict .................................................................................................. 33  3.6. Synergy in the Syrian context: ......................................................................................................... 35  4.  Conclusion: The way forward ................................................................................................ 42  End Notes ..................................................................................................................................... 50 

References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….52 

 

 



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Acknowledgments  

To Maggie Stephenson and Caren Levy; two great women To Barbara Lipietz, Rafaella Lima, and Christopher Yap  To all the DPUers, and in particular the UDPers; friends of happiness and tiredness To my FAMILY; the endless love and support And to my FRIENDS back home, and here in the exile To Chevening To Islamic Relief To UOSSM And most importantly, to Aous Almubarak, and all the thousands of Syrian braves who have chosen to hold out until the final breath…

 

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List of figures  

Figure 1    

Figure 2

 

Figure 3  

 

Phases of post-conflict recovery evolution as defined by Barakat & Zyck (2009) The new geopolitical order in Syria 2015 and the battle for control Daraya massacre, August 2012



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List of Acronyms CALL

Syria Co-ordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning

CBO

Community Based Organization

CSO  

Civil Society Organization

DFID

The UK Department For International Development

FSA

The Free Syrian Army

   

IAHE  

The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group

INGO

International Non-Governmental Organisation

IS

 

Islamic State

  LAC

Local Administration Council

LCC

Local Coordinating Committee

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA

The office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SAMS

The Syrian American Medical Society

UOSSM

The Union of Medical Care and Relief Organization

WHS

World Humanitarian Summit

 

 

 

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1. Introduction

“And we plant, where we settle, a fast growing plant, and harvest the dead. And we blow the color of the faraway in a flute; we sketch a neigh over the dirt corridor. And we write our names one stone at a time; O lightning brighten the night; brighten it a bit.

”

We love life if we can find our path to it

(Mahmoud Darwish, Palestinian poet)

Syria, 2011; Hundreds of thousands of insurgent citizens occupied the streets claiming their rights in freedom and dignity. “People want to knock down the regime!” they chanted. ‘The kingdom of silence’1 was finally shuddered. People, who have suffered the authoritarian regime for nearly five decades, had themselves struggling to redefine their roles again. The struggle, however, went beyond expectations. The regime, threatened by the collective power of the crowd, faced the insurgent uprising with brutal repression leading the situation into a violent conflict. The conflict was slowly catalysed by the conflictual religious dynamics in the region, turning into a sectarian-oriented war among the regional and international struggling powers (Slim&Trombetta,2014). Entering its fifth year soon, the conflict in Syria has generated tremendous devastation in all dimensions; socially, physically, economically, and institutionally. It has reproduced the already existing socio-economic fragmentation in new forms of inclusion and exclusion within the emerging power structures of the new geopolitical context. The complexity of the situation was directly reflected in the humanitarian response being overwhelmed by the urgency of the situation, and compromised by limited accessibility and security. Amidst this chaotic scene, people’s eagerness to sustain their lives has

 

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been invincible. They have been reconstructing their damaged lives however they can. They have been recovering every single day (Slim&Trombetta,2014).

Syria, however, is not an exception. Wherever war breaks out, it tends to leave a dramatic scene characterized by devastation on all dimensions. Humanitarian urgency in this context overshadows the scene, leaving very little room to think about long-term recovery. Even when it is acknowledged that humanitarian relief and sustainable recovery are two dynamics complimenting one another, they very often end up being arranged in a continuum whereby one is tackled after the other (BuchananSmith&Fabbri,2005). However, in times of war, where details of everyday-life are conceived within the horrors of war, people undergoing these horrors have no ears for deliberations about phasing their lives in such continuum (Barakat,2005b). They try to sustain their lives with all possible means, developing their own coping mechanisms that go beyond merely surviving to adapting to their ‘new normal’; their new present and new future. They do recover every single day.

It is from this very crucial reality that this research was initiated, arguing that postconflict recovery begins during the conflict, not in its aftermath. Driven by this belief, this paper attempts to understand the extent to which communities’ coping strategies in conflict situations can be built upon in the pursuit of sustainable recovery in order to reflect on the Syrian context. As such, this paper is developed in two parts; the first is a theoretical framework that starts with a review of the debates surrounding post-conflict recovery, defining its dimensions, and highlighting the role of good governance in sustaining the interaction between the various dimensions. It then moves to conceptualize recovery through a spectrum of relief and development in an attempt to highlight the necessity of containing communities coping strategies within collaborative structures that release humanitarian operations from their urgent relief perception towards more developmental aims. The discussion thereafter moves to address the extent to which such collaborative structures can be consolidated as means to endorse good governance in the pursuit of sustainable recovery. The second part of this paper is where the theoretical framework is being reflected on the Syrian context, assessing the

 

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extent to which communities coping strategies are being built upon in the hope for identifying ways forward towards setting the ground for a sustainable recovery.

For security reasons, field research was not conducted inside Syria. However, the research included a review of UN documents, policy documents, grey literature and academic publications; complemented by face-to-face and Skype interviews with people inside Syria and abroad. Interviewees included staff and volunteers of Syrian community-based organisations (CBOs), Syrian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international NGOs (INGOs), as well as academics and researchers engaged with the Syrian case. Moreover, the research gave account to social media platforms, giving the very crucial role they have played in the evolution of the uprising in light of the regime’s repression of other media platforms.

This paper will refer to UN agencies, INGOs, and donor organizations as the ‘formal humanitarian system’ or ‘international organisations’. While it is recognized that the different positions of these actors impose different challenges and duties over them, it is beyond the scope of this paper to make reference to this in details. Similarly, the paper acknowledges that Syrian CBOs and NGOs are diverse actors with different capacities, agendas, and duties. However, it will try to highlight this diversity where relevant, while using the monotheistic term of ‘Syrian organizations’ when less necessary.

 

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2. Recovery in war‐torn societies: Theoretical framework



“The war-wounded have to learn to walk again by walking!” (Sultan Barakat, 2005b:270)

2.1. Terminology debates Interventions initiated to rebuild war-torn societies have been addressed in contemporary debates using different terminology. ‘reconstruction’ gained considerable momentum although was criticized for implying a return to the ‘status quo ante’ without necessarily addressing the vulnerability factors which contributed to triggering the conflict in the first place. Its constructive urge, it is argued, could be misinterpreted in a way that ignores other dimensions in the process and thus, the need for a deconstructive dimension to the roots of vulnerability (Barakat&Zyck,2009). ‘Recovery’, which is already rooted in economic, social, medical and psychological realms, gained favour amidst these debates especially with its apparent non infrastructure-oriented connotations (Barakat&Zyck,2009). In addition to these which have mostly dominated the literature, other terms have entered the debate from different perspectives; ‘peacebuilding’ was introduced early in the 1990s by the UN with non-military, ‘preventive-diplomatic’ concerns, biased towards external interventions to avoid relapse into conflict (Krause&Jutersonke,2005). ‘Stabilisation’ thereafter, emerged in the context of ‘war on terror’ and thus has implied political and military objectives mainly related to reinforcing security (Elhawary, Foresti, & Pantuliano, 2010). On the other hand, ‘postconflict development’ was endorsed by the humanitarian community (early 1990s) especially in contexts of ‘protracted crises’ where cases do not reflect complex emergencies any more. Rather should be viewed as developmental challenges. This was mainly a response to the more politically oriented concerns and neo-liberal approaches of building post-conflict ‘failed states’ (Barbara,2008). This understanding has actually required shifting the debates from relief to development in the humanitarian realm, introducing new rehabilitative dimension to facilitate the transition. ‘Rehabilitation’

 

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then entered the debates in the mid 1990s to address the issues of transition and focus on integrating relief agendas with long-term development aims (Green,1999). Recently, the term of ‘resilience’ is gaining more attention not only in post-conflict contexts, but generally with regards to the heightened sense of uncertainty and unpredictability. It could be said it is replacing sustainability in every day discourse (Davoudi et al.,2012) Despite the imprecision in terminology and the emphasis placed on different dimensions through different terms, it may be said that generally, the process of rebuilding war-torn societies is agreed upon as the process of creating conditions for social and economic development while facilitating transition to peaceful environment (e.g. Barakat& Zyck,2009; Krause & Jutersonke,2005). Following, is a theoretical discussion that aims to identify the main dimensions which have contributed to this understanding and shaped the discourse of post-conflict interventions as being debated in current terms. For the following theoretical discussion, this paper will refer to ‘post-conflict interventions’ using terms as being used in their original resources.

2.2. Dimensions of recovery Intervening in post-conflict contexts as being debated in the current discourse has undergone different junctures. Barakat and Zyck (2009) define the discourse evolution in four main phases through which dimensions of recovery have been built cumulatively (figure1). Although the events of September eleventh which introduced the last phase has also introduced new set of roles and actors, those dimensions remained clearly present in the debates (Barakat,2005a;Tschirgi,2004). In the throes of the Cold War (late 1970s-1980s), emphasis was mainly placed on liberal democratic policy and market-oriented economy as the catalyst for peace and recovery (Latin America as an example), while assuming that other aspects of vulnerability will be treated by NGOs and humanitarian assistance (Barakat,2005a; Gore,2000).

 

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        Figure 1: Phases of post‐conflict recovery evolution as defined by Barakat & Zyck (2009).

Later during the 1990s, marginalization of the state within the liberal agenda (Bromley, Hirst,&Thompson,2009), along with the loss of polarizing cold-war powers and the emergence of new countries accompanied by a sheer number of ethno-national conflicts (Barakat,2005a) have questioned the emerging countries’ capacities for sovereignty and paved for the rise of international administration (Former Yugoslavia as an example:Caplan,2005). There has been a growing understanding that reconstruction is only a temporary stage that should be viewed within a multi-generational process. Therefore, post-conflict recovery became part of the broader development agenda and the debates have become more concerned with the notion of relief-to-development continuum. Thus, although economic recovery was still promoted and driven by liberalization, social dimensions specially regarding identity and gender equity have become of great interest under the concepts of social justice and peacebuilding, and social safety nets have been introduced to protect the poor and most vulnerable in the face of the liberalized economy (Barakat&Zyck,2009; Tschirgi,2004).

 

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Amidst these debates, the issue of good governance has been raised especially with the increasing mandate of INGOs over the recovery process. This has evoked concerns regarding the fragility of the recipient state's institutional capacity when external assistance withdraws and thus led to promoting the concept of collaborative governance through which civil society organizations (CSOs) play vital roles next to public, private, and international organizations with strong emphasis on having the process locallyowned (Barakat,2005a; Barakat&Zyck,2009). The dramatic events of September eleventh thereafter (2002), led to a perception of insecure international system through which linkages were created between terrorism, culture, and religion. This has realigned aid interventions within the framework of counter-terrorism, and in some contexts the democratisation agenda and military (Particularly Afghanistan, Iraq, and recently Syria) (Barakat,2005a; Barakat&Zyck,2009; Tschirgi,2004). In all cases, alongside the way through which debates around postconflict recovery evolved, neutrality has proven a controversial concept. Aid neutrality was questioned seriously concerning the criticism of its ability to perpetuate conflicts especially when INGOs assumed more responsibility in managing humanitarian interventions. This has actually called for understanding the futility of searching for complete neutral space in humanitarian interventions and advocated for more human-rights based agenda through which aid is used as “a tool to promote peace and justice” (Fox,2011:277 in Barakat, 2005a:24). However, it is argued that ‘principled’ aid could be as controversial as neutral one, especially when interventions are designed by outsiders without thorough understanding of the dynamics shaping the conflict and their implications.

The dimensions mentioned above; economic growth; social justice; peacebuilding; and good governance, understood within a timeframe, have actually shaped the discourse of post-conflict recovery as being debated even though its implication has been influenced by counter-terrorism goals and the debates of ‘neutral’ and ‘principled’ aid. These

 

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dimensions, however, have been interpreted, reconceptualized, and restructured by different scholars through imitative structures in which they produce, reinforce and sustain each other. Safier,(1997) explains that “to respond in an effective, inclusive, and sustainable way to the often prolonged urban crises or irreconcilable cultural conflict means to combine together a range of alternatives to conflict that are positively reinforcing in their scope and scale”. Thus, he elaborates, the concept of urban reconstruction, especially in conflicts of inter-cultural dynamics, functions on a multidimensional basis that simultaneously and interconnectedly seek to rehabilitate the urban space as well as reintegrate the society and revitalize urban cultures while redirecting the economy and the political and organizational capacities through mobilizing local assets, promoting conciliation, and initiating participatory processes that go beyond consultation to address devolution and democratisation. Barakat(2005b) takes the debate further and illustrates that for post-war reconstruction, there is no moment when it begins or ends, it is not scaling up relief as this does not reflect the multidimensional nature of recovery. Reconstruction is a development process that goes beyond physical reproduction and entails economic, social, and psychological readjustment for the whole fabric of the society; It seeks to pursue a secure environment; consolidate reconciliation and justice; as well as promote social and economic equity; under one overarching vision constructed locally as means to initiate an agreement on governance. This, he elaborates, implies restoring and developing the capacity of human, material, and financial resources in order to manage the collective life. It is a holistic approach in which dimensions are addressed simultaneously even though the emphasis given to each varies at different stages. Moreover, Barakat & Zyck,(2009:1097-1080) in their attempt to address the evolution of post-conflict recovery suggest that in spite of the lack of cohesive theory around this discourse, among the best attempts to address sustainable recovery are the ideological and empirical claims that promote the re-establishment of the “shattered social contract”

 

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through just governance and equitable economic growth (Addison&Murshed,2001), while addressing the factors that lower the likelihood of reversion (Collier et al,2003) . From this perspective, one might conclude that the dimensions of recovery are in a constant interaction; reconciliation which Safier proposes as a driver to reintegrate societies, is introduced by Barakat as an aim in itself that cannot be rushed, and may take generations to be achieved. Even when initiated as a first step in reconstruction activities, “...it is often taken for purely pragmatic reasons, and should not be taken simplistically as a sign that people are reconciled and no longer harbour ‘deep-seated resentments’” (Barakat,2005b:255). Similarly is economic growth, which Addison and Murshed consider as means to rehabilitate social dynamics, while being emphasized by Safier and Barakat as a goal that can’t be achieved without mobilizing local assets (Safier), or addressing vulnerability factors which have initially contributed to triggering the conflict as well as those emerged by its legacy (Barakat). These arguments are not distinct however since all dimensions are emphasized to be entangled and considered in a timeframe that may shed light over them differently in different stages. However, what stands clear in the discussion is that ‘good governance’ has always been promoted as catalyst to reinforce other dimensions. Whether stated clearly (Addison & Murshed) or interpreted in a basic understanding as an overarching vision constructed locally in a participatory way (Barakat) or in more complicated structures of devolution and democratization (Safier),

it is seen essential for

progressing towards social justice, equitable growth and sustainable peace.

Sustainable recovery within this context can be identified as a multidimensional and multigenerational development process, driven by the needs to endorse good governance in order to progress towards sustainable peace, social justice, and equitable economic growth with a strong emphasis on having the process locally owned. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the interaction within the multidimensional aspect of recovery. Rather, it attempts to understand recovery within a

 

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time-spectrum, focusing on the means to endorse good governance in a locally owned manner within this spectrum as this appears to be the way forward.

2.3. Recovery in a time‐spectrum: Means of engagement Since has entered the development agenda in 1990s, post-conflict recovery has been more acknowledged as a multigenerational process that needs to be understood within a logical time-frame. Debates thereafter were more concerned with the required hybrid approaches drawn from the urgent relief strategies of humanitarian operations, and the long-term vision of development assistance under the concept of relief-to-development continuum. These debates were even reflected in the institutional and practical realms. The Vice President of External Affairs of the World Bank as then stated that: “Postconflict development is something that defies the exact boundaries of traditional forms of assistance: it is neither sustainable development nor is it humanitarian response” (Tschirgi,2004:6). In fact, there is a huge ambiguity with regards to linkages between humanitarian relief and sustainable development. The concept of relief-to-development continuum itself is a point of debate in humanitarian studies. This is mainly because of the ambiguous linkages which rest on the linear sequence perceived in the concept of the continuum. Theoretically, this was avoided by using the term ‘continguum’ to present that phases of response can co-exist simultaneously rather than sequentially (Brinkerhoff,2005). In practice, however, ‘continuum’ thinking implicitly underpinned most of the approaches and a ‘grey zone’ of rehabilitation was created in order to facilitate the transition (Buchanan-Smith & Fabbri,2005). This was translated into frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction that identify the transition from war to peace through three phases; The initial response; the transitional phase; and the final phase of fostering sustainability (e.g. African Union,2006; AUSA/CSIS Framework,2002). This argument is emulated through the distinctiveness between ‘humanitarian assistance’ as attributive to interventions ‘during the conflict’ and ‘reconstruction’ as to

 

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describe ‘post-conflict’ interventions. Elhawary et al.(2010) argue that post-conflict as a term does not necessarily imply that strife has come to an end. Transition from conflict to peace is never linear and is usually full of incidents and difficulties. Moreover, Barakat(2005a:12) argue that in most of cases today, “...conflict has existed for so long [that] it has become normative, with little collective-memory of the pre-conflict phase. In such a context, reconstruction cannot simply replace humanitarian assistance…. Continual adaptation and tradeoffs between reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to an ever-changing environment is necessary”. Amidst these debates, ‘developmental relief’ emerged as a term to escape the tricky use of the continuum. It emphasized the necessity of fulfilling developmental challenges by aid interventions in conflict environments and was put forward in the agendas of humanitarian responses (Boano et al.,2003; Buchanan-Smith&Fabbri,2005). This discussion however, remains a speculative one. The ambit of its theoretical debates is rarely the concern of affected people who suffer the horrors of conflict and struggle to find their ways forward. For them, planning for recovery starts from their wild eagerness to sustain their lives and adapt to their new normal. “At the local level recovery goes on regardless of macro-level deliberations or interventions. Whenever and wherever the conditions exist, people start rebuilding their lives but it is a painful and slow process with frequent set-backs” (Barakat,2005b:261). As such, the physical destruction and apparent lack of formal structures in post-conflict contexts do actually disguise lots of coping mechanisms developed by those struggling to survive inside the superficiality of the chaotic scene. Barakat(2005b:261) elaborates on this arguing that recognizing the agency of coping mechanisms and grounding the debates within their reality is crucial to understand the entanglement of relief and development. He says: “...further step in understanding the reconstruction and development process is the recognition that a key dimension in protracted conflicts is that while there will always be areas where levels of conflicts are too high to engage in any developmental activity, in others, the seeds of recovery are being sown and can be

 

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nurtured by local authorities and aid agencies. As the peace process gains momentum, the experience of developing recovery strategies in these contexts can be applied to others and enable the transitions from emergency to reconstruction and development programming”. Thus, if the ‘relief-to-development’ spectrum of the recovery process is not to be viewed as a sequent continuum rather as a whole of entangled dynamics that co-exist simultaneously and are articulated continuously with varied emphasis through different phases, engaging with it requires the fundamental understanding that: “…the reconstruction process is used as means to enhance exalted human values, harnessing the impressive survival capacities of the people that have brought them through war and seeing them as agents of development not simply passive recipients of aid” (Barakat,2005:252). As such, Barakat elaborates: “The starting point for assessing the capacity for recovery of any war-torn society is the recognition of the resilience and impressive survival abilities of those who have come through the trauma and hardship of violent conflict. It is important to discover and understand the various coping mechanisms (social, economic, and political) that have enabled them to survive...” (Barakat,2005b:262). With the acknowledgment that coping mechanisms occur on various levels, starting from individuals, up to more collective structures, Barakat elaborates that coping mechanisms, especially on a collective level, entail collaboration strategies among those developing them. Recognizing these strategies and building upon them by the correspondent authorities and international agencies will initiate collaborative structures that can play a crucial role in the recovery process. He continues: “...these, often informal and undervalued, collaborative structures can be the basis for the development of local institutions which are vital to the rebuilding of governance and civil society” (2005b:262), “and it is here that recovery and peacebuilding activities can be supported at a local level as a first step towards civil governance. (2005b:254). Hence, if rebuilding governance is agreed upon as the way to progress towards growth, justice, peace, and sustainability, recognizing the diverse and collaborative forms of

 

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communities coping strategies within the recovery spectrum and building upon them can be identified as the starting point in the way forward. How these structures can be consolidated as means to endorse good governance is what being explored further ahead.

2.4. Setting the ground for good governance The discussion above has illustrated that good governance, spanning from the simplest form of constructing a collective vision towards a more complicated structures of devotion and democratisation, is a catalyst for sustainable recovery. This argument echoes Barakat (2005b:265) who states that: “It is this transition from ‘government for’ to ‘governance with’ at all levels that is a condition of successful reconstruction and development”. In fact, the concept of ‘governance’ was developed as distinct from ‘government’ to refer to “...the relationship between civil society and the state, between rules and ruled, the government and the governed” (McCarney et al.,1995:95 in Abbott,1997:3). Abbott(1997:3) argue that, “Once this notion that governance should incorporate a relationship between the state and civil society is established, then it is possible to explore the notion of good governance”, which he mainly identifies as the ability of civic groups and individuals to fully participate in the decision-making structures of the state. While civil society as a concept is a broad one, it is mostly agreed upon as organizations built on “an institutional core constituted by voluntary associations outside the sphere of the state and the economy” (Flyvbjerg,1998:185). These organizations can range from cultural associations, to groups of concerned citizens and grassroots initiatives, all the way to political parties (Flyvbjerg,1998). With this definition, the collaborative forms of communities coping strategies in conflict situations can be considered as part of the civil society. As such, the struggle towards good governance although incorporates many different aspects, it fundamentally entails addressing the engagement of the collaborative forms of coping mechanisms within decision-making

 

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structures. However, the controversial application of this understanding in conflict contexts revolves mainly about the fragile structure of the state if it exists at all. When the question of good governance was raised in post-conflict realm, it was mainly because of the concerns regarding the increasing mandate of the international community over the recovery process. This, as discussed earlier, has evoked further concerns regarding the fragility of the recipient state’s capacity when external help withdraws. As a result, collaborative governance, through which CSOs play vital roles alongside public, private and international organizations, was promoted and highly advocated for. Barakat(2005b:264) reflects on this saying: “...in many developing countries affected by conflict, institutions of public administration are too weak (or simply non-existent) to immediately assume the full burden of their responsibilities”. This, he elaborates, can be addressed by “developing what may turn out to be a temporary system of collaborative local governance as means to build the capacity of the newly emerging local administrations”(2005b,265). These collaborative structures are a combination of governmental and non-governmental actors that mostly in postconflict contexts incorporate international organisations or ‘external’ stakeholders. However, Barakat(2005b:265) explains that for this process to be effective, “it is essential that once the system of government matures and new institutions and interests of civil society enter the system of governance, ‘external’ stakeholders withdraw from any involvement with internal governance and deal with national and local institutions on a strictly partnership basis”. Such collaborative structures of governance are acknowledged to be very difficult to consolidate. However, one way of addressing the means to entrench them is Levy’s notion of ‘reinforcing synergy’ (2007) which was developed in an attempt to address the way civil society organizations initiate ‘collective strategic action’ to support the process of social change towards more institutionally just societies. She argues that collective social action is created and sustained through creating synergy between the different stakeholders. Such synergy, in context of conflict where unbalanced and, in many cases, inconsistent power relations and diverse interests are in a constant evolving,

 

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implies constructing and reconstructing a clear vision based on a ‘periodic consensus’ that attempts to reconcile the often ‘irreconcilable priorities’. There has to be an agreement to work in relationships of equality and trust at a particular moment and place regarding a particular issue. A form of what Sen(1990) terms ‘cooperative conflict’ where consensus is built, but may be challenged by any of the partners, given their different positions and thus the pressures on them. This understanding becomes more vital when the context lacks the presence of capable formal structures of local government. Barakat(2005b) argue that having non-state organizations working under an overarching vision within a local perspective of a strategic framework is essential to strengthen the state’s institutes as well as building civil society organizations. What remains crucial to facilitate the progress towards good governance is the ‘reciprocal equivalence’; relationships of trust and respect to be constructed between and among different actors to create genuine partnerships (Levy,2007). Even when the emerging structures of local stakeholders are perceived to be lacking the required capacity to build collaborative governance, they shouldn’t be underestimated as this will only lead to having the local agenda overruled and pursued within external conditionalities. This in turn, will overshadow the pressing need to strengthen the capacities of local actors and will hinder the process towards setting capable structures of collaborative governance to sustain the recovery process. Korten (1980 in (Barakat & Chard,2002) elaborates saying: successful programs are those which are built from and upon communities capabilities and their well-established socio-technical systems while opening new opportunities. Therefore, engaging with local stakeholders may entail a process of building capacities. This however “...should aim to develop local leadership, ‘community initiative and participation’ to ‘create a sense of ownership and empowerment’” (Edralin,1997 in Barakat&Chard,2002:821). In fact, capacity itself is a controversial term; Understanding local communities and dynamics and building programs out of them is an enormous effort that requires “time, resources, in- depth analysis and, critically, an acceptance that the solutions international agencies have in mind are not necessarily what the community will need or

 

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want’” (Barakat&Deely,2001:66 in Chard and Barakat,2002:829). This could actually be interpreted by stating that the international community is the one lacking the required capacity to make this enormous effort. Nevertheless, this gap between external and local stakeholders is directly reflected in signifying local vulnerability; “Whatever motivates this imbalance, the results are poor performance in terms of reconstruction on the ground because funding inputs are not effectively matched to needs or the capacity of local authorities and communities to absorb and manage them equitably. …Such inequalities of provision in a volatile society quick to suspect unfair treatment and discrimination can only serve to fuel the re-emergence of violence. The current conditions experienced by the Palestinian authorities, are a good illustrator of this point” (Barakat,2005b:258). From this perspective, Barakat (2005b:262) argue that: “There is no requirement for any one actor to be omniscient and every new post-war context brings with it the need for a learning process and pooling of knowledge by all concerned: local, national and international actors”. Thus, rather than having relationships where limitations of each actor are emphasized, it is the capabilities and potentials of each that should be recognized and built upon. This, is where the reciprocal equivalence between and among different actors becomes fundamental to sustain the synergy and hence builds the collaborative structures of governance which would ultimately help progressing towards sustainable recovery.

This process of going through synergy to endorse collaborative governance in pursuit of the sustainable recovery is actually reconceptualizing the whole context of conflict and post-conflict. On one hand, it is challenging the very frame of thinking through which ‘conflict’ and devastated structures left behind are perceived and dealt with, while on the other, it is a form of what Healey (1997:269-270) terms ‘the capacity to read the cracks'. “...a 'crack' in the power relations, a situation of contradiction and conflict, which encourages people to recognize that they need to reflect on what they are doing, that they need to work with different people, that they need to evolve different processes".

 

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Having developed this theoretical framework, next chapter attempts to reflect on the Syrian conflict, assessing the extent to which communities coping strategies are being built upon as means to endorse collaborative governance structures in the hope for identifying ways forward towards setting the ground for a sustainable recovery process.

 

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“I, the Syrian citizen Sahar Abou Zainedin, represented by the fingers with mangled nails; the corpses with stolen throats; the mosques with destroyed minarets; the martyr-donkeys; and all the smiling pictures that now hold black ribbons on the corner. Whoever has an agenda that pays those back shall have my vote.

”

(Sahar Abou Zainedin, 13/10/2011) Figure 3: Daraya massacre, August 2012

 

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3. Syria  

“Tens of wounded people are looking at you as if you are their only savior. You wish you can tear your body into thousand pieces, each goes to stitch a wound here, save a life there, wipe away a tear, or shroud a Martyr. You work hard; but inside, you feel like the world has come to an end. And suddenly a voice screams: “Quickly! Get the emergency room ready! The jet is striking for the second time! The jet is striking for the third time! The jet is striking for the tenth time!” Wounded people flock. Martyrs arise one after another.

”

(Douma massacre, 16/8/2015)    

3.1. Root causes of the uprising Prior to the uprising, the country was undergoing a systematic oppression represented by socio-economic fragmentation and ‘accumulation of dispossession’2 in an imbalanced structure of power relations that dates back to the current President’s father who took power in the Syrian Baath party in 1970s. The Syrian regime’s structure under this party has been characterized by formal and informal powers whose figures, especially informal ones, were controlling most of the Syrian government and operating “above and beyond their designated official statues or even outside of any institutional role” (Slim&Trombetta,2014:10). Within this context, the structure of the state has been very much associated with the political regime, and civil society organizations have

 

26 

been undergoing an authoritarian restriction with the Ba’th socialist model of popular organization (Khalaf,Ramadan,&Stolleis,2014; Slim&Trombetta,2014; Al-Zoubi,2015). When the current president, Bashar Al Assad, came to power in 2000, new features were developed in the ruling regime through which further accumulation of power around the presidential elite was consolidated while posturing with modern liberal reforms. These reforms were driving the country into a ‘two-speed economy’. There achieved a strong economic growth. Still, it was not inclusive. There were significant signs of increasing economic inequalities and weakening State institutions. Additionally, CSOs within these reforms were promised to be revived. However, they ended up presenting a network of ‘governmental non-governmental organisations set by the firstlady and assembled under the Syrian Trust for Development in an exclusionary form dealing

with

elite

and

high-educated

communities

(Khalaf

et

al.,2014;

Slim&Trombetta,2014; Al-Zoubi,2015). Generally, the context was a vulnerable one, characterised by; ‘oligarchy’ of some Alawi clans and Sunni businessmen; high repression of the society; stirring up sectarian and local rivalries; centre-periphery tensions; increasing inequalities; and lack of opportunities for youngsters in a conservative and patriarchal society dominated by violence with a supremacy of ‘local society’ over the civil one. On another level, the vulnerability of the context was also associated with Syria’s regional and international alliances and enmities whose stability could be threatened by Syria’s internal unrest. Within this context, the Arab Spring movement which pervaded the region had the Syrian Uprising initiated in 2011, driven by socio-economic dynamics in addition to political ones (Slim&Trombetta,2014).

 

27 

3.2. The Syrian conflict: popular Revolution or Civil War?  

The popular uprising which promptly crawled into most Syrian cities was faced by the regime’s brutal repression. This has actually led to militarizing the revolution in the face of the regime’s brutality. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed to fight against the regime although has never been unified or well coordinated. This has stimulated further violence and complicated the conflict more. Having the majority of the Syrian population as Muslim Sunni while the majority of the political elites in the regime are Alawites have brought the conflict into new dimension. Foreign jihadists entered the conflict and became a significant feature in its intensity and expansion. “Many thousands of Islamist fighters have entered Syria to fight against the Government [Arguably including the Islamic State (IS)3]. But tens of thousands of militants of various nationalities, and also Shia Lebanese and Iraqi jihadists, have arrived in Syria to support the Assad Government” (Slim&Trombetta,2014:14). This has ultimately reframed and sustained the Syrian revolution as a sectarian-oriented fight and driven the conflict into a regional and international complexity of power struggle. This struggle cannot be reduced to such religious elements only but also cannot be understood without considering them as they shape attitudes at the top levels as well as mobilise popular forces from the bottom. As such, humanitarian interventions have been influenced especially in light of counter terrorism legislations and linkages between religion and terrorism which have affected the perception of world stability.

3.3. Impact of the conflict The constant changing and intensifying landscape of the Syrian conflict has accelerated vulnerability and impoverishment amidst huge physical, social, and economic devastation. The structure of power has undergone dramatic changes translated in new forms of exclusion and inclusion under the claims of national loyalty and religious sincerity among others. New forms and figures of formal and informal powers have been articulated and practiced within the new geopolitical context. Institutional systems

 

28 

within this context have lost much of their credibility and in some areas have been completely suspended or ceased, while socio-economic vulnerability has been exacerbated by the legacy of the conflict. With sheer numbers of violent deaths and injuries, huge destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods, deliberate siege warfare, and massive forced displacement, fragmentation was no longer driven by socio-economic dynamics solely, rather has become reframed within the new geopolitical powers on the ground (Slim&Trombetta,2014; UNRWA,2014). The dramatically and constantly changing landscape of the conflict was directly reflected in the rapidly escalating needs in the humanitarian context. As the conflict intensified, the increasingly fragmented political control across the country made it extremely difficult to assess the needs, conduct relief operations, and deliver consistent and ‘principled’ humanitarian aid across the Syrian territories. Linkages created between many armed groups with the poles of terror in the world, mainly al Qaeda, have furthered the complexity of the situation with questions being raised regarding neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarian assistance, let alone speaking about early recovery to revive socio-economic dynamics (Khalaf et al.,2014; Slim& Trombetta,2014; Svoboda&Pantuliano,2015).

 

29 

   Figure2: The new geopolitical order in Syria 2015 and the battle for control   

 

 

30 

3.4. Recovery spectrum within the Syrian conflict Entering its fifth year soon, and being trapped in a ‘dynamic stalemate’ (Slim&Trombetta, 2014:60) with neither political progress nor military prevail, The Syrian conflict is being perceived as a protracted crises that arouses debates regarding the nature of humanitarian interventions in its context. It has in some cases been shifted from urgent categories into long-term development ones in the institutional arrangements of some organizations (Sharar Mahyub4, 2015, personal communication). Although this might not be translated in real shifts in the activities conducted on ground, it evokes Barakat’s concern about the necessity of tradeoffs between urgent relief and reconstruction as one cannot simply replace the other. Rather, opportunities to set the ground for sustainable recovery must be captured while relief assistance is being provided. In fact, regardless of these deliberations in the formal humanitarian system, the seeds of recovery, Barakat argue for, has already been planted on ground. People inside Syria have been developing their own coping strategies to sustain their lives in light of the very deteriorating living conditions; and strict limitations imposed over the formal humanitarian response. Coping mechanisms, ranging from very individual level up to more collective forms on household, neighborhood, regional, and in some cases national levels have been developed across different sectors; shelter and housing (REACH,2014; My House is Yours,2015); health (Unified Medical Office for Douma, 2015; UOSSM, 2015); education (Ghiras-Project, 2015;Taalim, 2015); transportation (Syria needs a bicycle,2015); livelihood (Save the Children,2015; Harb,2014), and even peacebuilding (CARNEGIE middle east center,2014), etc. However, the humanitarian assistance being compromised by limited information and assessments had the scope of interventions to be limited with little emphasis on capturing these mechanisms (Save the Children,2015; Svoboda &Pantuliano,2015).

Perhaps, the most preponderant coping strategy across most sectors has been the emerging civic groups organising to respond to the complexity of the very fragmented

 

31 

and violent context. In spite of the oppressive history of civic activism and its ‘immature’ nature, the new emerging civic groups have played a crucial role since the very beginning of the uprising. The mass protests which initiated the revolution were based on collective social movements, coordinated by ‘Local Coordinating Committees’ (LCCs) formed locally to organize the disobedience and respond to its consequences. As the revolution became more forceful and the conflict escalated, new CBOs, complemented and in some cases catalysed by Syrian Diaspora groups were being established to respond to the complexity. By the end of 2012, with many Syrian territories slipping out of the regime’s control, many civic organizations were established to fill in the gap left by the government withdrawal. Some of these were later locally institutionalized under the name of ‘Local Administration Councils’ (LACs) (AlZoubi,2015; Khalaf et al.,2014; Slim& Trombetta,2014; Svoboda &Pantuliano,2015). Gradually, a new de facto civil society has emerged and new structure of civic organizations working in parallel to local authorities has been established to support the function of different activities; from distributing humanitarian aid, providing medical and educational services, and managing infrastructure, to establishing social networks, and right-based

associations

(Khalaf

et

al.,

2014;

Slim&Trombetta,

2014;

Svoboda&Pantuliano, 2015; Al-Zoubi,2015). However, according to the office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): “Around 600 to 700 ‘local’ groups have been created since the start of the conflict. Much of their work is not necessarily captured by any coordination mechanism within the formal humanitarian sector, and yet they are playing a vital role in responding to needs that would only be met inadequately or not at all.” (Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015, p:iii). From this perspective, it could be argued that “the starting point for assessing the capacity for recovery” in the Syrian conflict is already in place and “the resilience and impressive survival abilities” of Syrian communities are awaiting to be engaged with (Barakat,2005b:262). Thus, although the context is trapped in a ‘dynamic stalemate’ and in spite of the intense violence requiring relief operations to be on standby, opportunities to set the ground for a sustainable recovery process are significantly present. The question remains however, to which extent these opportunities are being

 

32 

built upon by correspondent agencies in order to reinforce collaborative structures that can set the ground for sustainable recovery. A question in order to be answered will be discussed in the context of Syrian CSOs emerged to address the dire medical and health situation in the Syrian conflict. While the following discussion will mainly focus on relationships among medical organizations for time, scope, and data limitations, the logic of the assessment is developed in the hope of informing general understanding of the dynamics shaping the context. Also, for the same limitations, the author has chosen to mainly shed light on opposition-held areas; firstly, because organizations developing in these areas form the vast majority of Syrian NGOs (Al-Zoubi,2015); and secondly, because recovery in the Syrian conflict will most likely entail dealing with the emerging structures of governance (LACs) developing as alternatives to the regime’s authorities in these areas, since coming back under the previous government or collaborating with it do not sound as viable options for the time-being.

3.5. Medical CSOs in the Syrian conflict Medical sector is one of the very crucial, yet highly damaged sectors in the evolution of the Syrian conflict. During the first Quarter of 2015, it was reported that only 33.37% of public health centres were actually functioning and accessible. Health conditions are in a constant degradation with many diseases out-breaking in areas of high levels of conflict. Medical resources have become a specific target for warring parties and death rates increased dramatically not only because of direct war casualties, but also the collapse of the health system in Syria and the absence of a central health-care authority that is able to carry out the required functions to maintain the system. In response to this, medics have taken significant lead in the local relief response (Al-Zoubi,2015; PHR,2015; WHO & MoH,2015) Local doctors and practitioners faced by the dire medical and health situations had to respond within their own capacities (Slim&Trombetta,2014). They were challenged by the conflict’s intense difficulties of access and safety as well as the specific violence against medical aid workers. Yet, they proved tremendous courage facing these challenges; and managed to maintain the situation in an impressive way. Diaspora

 

33 

groups have had a very crucial role supporting local response. They started with a sense that ‘something needs to be done’, collecting fund for relief items and medicine. Their operations in the beginning were improvised with no formal structures as none of those groups had been involved in humanitarian work, neither expected the conflict to last as long as it has (Svoboda&Pantuliano,2015). However, Svoboda & Pantuliano(2015:10), state that: “What started as individual initiatives to alleviate some of the most pressing needs, primarily related to medical care, organically grew into something much more organised, structured and diverse in terms of activities”. Locally, ‘health directorates’ were formed in opposition-held areas5, providing medical services in a very decentralized way with an ‘artificial’ subordination to the LACs6 (Aous Almubarak,2015,personal communication)7 although practically act as local NGOs8 (Al-Zoubi,2015). Diaspora groups have also grown organically over time. With the frequent calls for help by local doctors, they started pooling information and resources and coordinating programming decisions. They registered themselves as NGOs9

and

engaged

formally

and

‘legally’

with

the

Syrian

context

(Svoboda&Pantuliano,2015). Currently, the major Syrian health service-providers operating in opposition-held areas are the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations (UOSSM), the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), the Syrian Expatriates Medical Association, and Shafaq. (AlZoubi,2015). These organizations are considered Syrian NGOs channeling their support to Syrian communities either directly, or through local health directorates. Since this paper aims to study the extent to which medical CSOs emerged as coping strategies are being built upon, it will focus on the collaborative structures of local health directorates and Syrian NGOs as they interact with the formal humanitarian system. This paper acknowledges the role of all medical Syrian NGOs responding to health deterioration in the Syrian conflict. Yet, for data limitation, it will only shed light on the role of UOSSM, one of the largest Syrian NGOs channeling support to Syria through local health directorates. UOSSM was founded in 2012 and is currently a federation of thirteen non-for-profit, non-governmental, humanitarian medical aid and relief

 

34 

organizations operating in Syria (Ahmad Rashed Al-Hafez10, 2015, personal communication).

3.6. Synergy in the Syrian context: Being established and developed as coping strategies to respond to deteriorating health conditions, local health directorates, substituting the governmental health system, and Syrian medical NGOs represent the core of what Barakat(2005b:264) call: “temporary system of collaborative local governance”. Therefore, building upon them becomes fundamental to build the synergy which can endorse more advanced system of collaborative governance in pursuit of the sustainable recovery. Local health directorates as well as medical Syrian NGOs both initiated their activities bound by the belief that everyone should have free access to health services without discrimination; thus, as they claim, by their aims to support health needs of affected people regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion or political affiliation. Under this vision, they identify themselves as independent bodies of Syrian medical professionals with no political or military affiliation. Rather, they perceive their work to be committed to humanitarian principles and medical ethical codes. (e.g. Unified Medical Office for Douma,2015; UOSSM,2015). This aim, being shared by other concerned international organisations, represents the collective intent that Levy(2007) emphasizes in the heart of generating and sustaining synergy. Within the complexity of the Syrian conflict, this collective intent reflects ambiguity in what it implies or how it is perceived by different actors. The authenticity of Syrian actors in terms of their neutrality, impartiality, and independence has been continuously questioned by the formal humanitarian system although the system itself is not immune from this criticism (Svoboda&pantuliano,2015:15). Still, Syrian groups have claimed that “they strive for impartiality; even if perhaps their actions were guided by solidarity more than by neutrality” (Svoboda&Pantuliano, 2015:15). Personal contacts, as they claim, can facilitate their access to certain communities but help is always provided to all in need. In all cases, this shared vision and collective intent, in spite of its ambiguity, has

 

35 

been the catalyst for developing ‘partnerships’ that counter the challenges of the Syrian context even if the ambiguity has in some cases hampered the embedded reciprocal recognition. In fact, within a dramatically evolving context such as the Syrian one, the constantly changing dynamics can easily impact the conceived relationships requiring redefining the collective intent and aims. This argument can be featured throughout the shifts within the international response to counter the difficulties of delivering ‘principled’ cross-line aid (Slim&Trombetta,2014:44) by looking to go cross-border, especially in Turkey11 (Slim&Trombetta,2014:46) in spite of the confusion about its legality under international law. Even though they shared a set of fundamental interests under their collective vision of delivering humanitarian aid, the different positions of different actors have posed different challenges to the process of shifting to cross-border aid. Western donors feared that their aid might fall into the hands of Islamist opposition forces, thus breaching counter-terror laws and political policy. The Turkish Government in turn, had their own concerns regarding registering NGOs to formally work cross-border as this might

work

against

their

interests

in

any

future

conflict

in

the

region

(Slim&Trombetta,2014:46). Syrian NGOs, and some INGOs were less reluctant about cross-border operations. However, the aforementioned concerns had hindered their work and slowed it down. Amidst these concerns, local Syrians, driven by the urgency of the situation, were crossing borders informally in order to carry the aid inside Syria. The Turkish officials were content to let Syrians cross the borders, and Syrians showed real bravery moving cross-borders and cross-lines as well as negotiating with different militias on the ground (Svoboda& Pantuliano:2014). It could be argued then that the cross-border aid was operating informally, but the escalating urgent situation called for more authentic collaboration to make a serious shift that corresponds to the increasing urgency (Slim&Trombetta,2014).

 

36 

The collective intent of delivering ‘principled’ aid in this context had to be reconstructed, and compromises had to be made. Eventually, the ‘irreconcilable priorities’ of the different actors were put together in a ‘periodic consensus’ articulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 2165 which legalized cross-border operations (AlZoubi,2015). NGOs, thereafter, had the courage to move ahead and formal crossborder partnerships were established and operated. This was either done by having Syrian ‘partners’ implementing programs on a ‘remote management’ model run by international organisations or by teaming up with Syrian ‘partners’ to carry out joint assessments and develop integrated ‘partnership’ model of implementation and monitoring

(Slim&Trombetta,2014). These ‘partnerships’ have been

skeptically

questioned as ‘genuine partnerships’ but at least, they were established in spite of the very complex and conflictual priorities embedding the context. However, if there is a genuine intent to reinforce the synergy between different stakeholders as means to develop the “temporary system of collaborative local governance” (Barakat, 2005b:264), Then skepticism with regards to the authenticity of the emerging partnerships has to be addressed. The ‘reciprocal equivalence’, which Levy(2007) emphasizes as means to build genuine partnerships, has to be built up. This, as Barakat (2005b) argue, is of a particular importance in the absence of formal authorities as in the Syrian context, as it is what will build the capacity for the newly emerging structures of governance. But this unfortunately can be said missing in the forms of relationships developing in Syria. The concerns regarding counter-terrorism legislation and laws of ‘principled’ humanitarian action have overruled the local agendas without deep understanding of the complexity of the Syrian context and in most cases, have increased the bureaucracy of

donor’s

conditionalities

for

supporting

Syrian

organisations

(Svoboda&Pantuliano,2015). Al-Zoubi, states that: many INGOs “impose their own system, disregarding the capacity of Syrian NGOs and their own established systems.” (2015:9). Moreover, there has been a perception of competition between international and

 

Syrian

NGOs

over

human

resources,

(Ailsa

Laxton12,2015,personal

37 

communication; Al-Zoubi,2015; Sharar Mahyub,2015,personal communication) as well as a mistrust between bilateral agencies and Syrian NGOs making the first reluctant to provide direct fund (Al-Zoubi,2015). With this in hand, finding the right partners of sufficient capacities and adherence to formal legality and conditionalities became the major challenge for initiating partnerships with Syrian organizations13. This in turn has stimulated competition between Syrian organizations themselves. Al-Zoubi argues that: “the scarcity of resources drives these [Syrian] organisations to compete for all types of resources, mainly of the human and financial kind.” (2015:8) Moreover, he elaborates, “many donors follow an approach that focuses only on one major partner, which forces medical NGOs to compete for donors.” (Al-Zoubi,2015:8) On another level, relationships between Syrian NGOs and INGOs on one hand and the local health directorates on the other, has been featuring similar obstacles. The latter however, play crucial roles on the ground; they have better understanding of their respective areas, better positions to negotiate military factions, and they usually play a mediator between NGOs and local communities. Still, they are usually perceived as “inadequate in terms of the required competencies“(Al-Zoubi,2015:10). Despite that, there have been cases when some Syrian NGOs and INGOs opted to give local organizations full control over projects, but results were not generally successful due to the acknowledged lack of capacity. There have not been genuine relationships that aim to enhance their competencies and capacities. Otherwise, local organizations have been fully marginalized or treated as service providers in better cases (Al-Zoubi,2015). It can be said then that rather than having relationships of trust and support that builds on each other’s strengths and potentials, there tend to have been a hierarchy shaping the forms of relationships between INGOs, Syrian NGOs, and local directorates even though in most cases it is not intended. While reasons behind this can be understood (mainly represented in the immature structure of the newly emerging Syrian organizations and their perceived relative lack of capacity) this issue has to be addressed, and reciprocal equivalence has to be built between and among the different actors in order to enforce the hoped for synergy.  

38 

It is from this perspective that Barakat (2005b:262) argue that being omniscient is unrealistic in such context. International organisations with their well established capacities cannot sustain their interventions without the in-depth understanding of the context which Syrian organizations have proven. Neither the latter can assume responsibility for handling complete projects without the support of the formal humanitarian system. However, while this fact is not intentionally ignored in the Syrian conflict, it has not yet been reflected in tangible steps on the ground (Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015). Capacity-building programs initiated by international organisations as means to address the aforementioned issues, have not yet been aimed at building systematic and institutional capacity that creates local leadership. Rather, they have been ad hoc, related to particular objectives, and in most cases directed to fulfill donor’s criteria. (Svoboda&Pantuliano, 2015; Al-Zoubi,2015) Thus, they ended up stimulating further competition and sustaining hierarchy among intended groups and actors. Moreover, not many efforts have been paid by the international system to better understand the local dynamics. Coordination meetings are being held in English, using jargons that might not be familiar to the outsiders of the humanitarian sector. Thus, they end up being exclusionary as most Syrian local directorates choose at times not to participate in these time-consuming meetings, with arguably no added value, especially in light of their scarce of human resources (Svoboda&Pantuliano,2015:18). However, in spite of the downsides of current relationships, the fundamental importance of recognizing the role of authentic collaborative structures between international organizations, Syrian NGOs, and local directorates is being acknowledged more and more. It could be argued that perhaps, another shift in the collective intent bringing these actors together is being conceived in order to consolidate efforts towards setting the ground for genuine partnerships that recognize Syrian local actors as the cornerstone for future recovery and thus, gradually enable them to assume their responsibilities when external assistance withdraws.

 

39 

In the Syria Co-ordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning (CALL) initiative; a study commissioned by the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group (IAHE) in order to enhance the quality and use of evaluative activities, and increase learning and knowledge sharing for improved humanitarian response, Slim and Trombetta (2014:58) have stated that: “One eventual upside to the deep levels of localism inherent in Syrian humanitarian response may arise if local structures can emerge as professional and legitimate bottom-up authorities. Such localism could provide useful models for international humanitarian action’s global search for improved localization and community empowerment”. Moreover, the SAMS 15th annual international conference, held in July 2015, has brought together a group of local, Syrian, and international medical organizations mainly discussing the issues of leadership and quality Improvement in healthcare and medical relief. Debates were focused towards building institutional capacities while maintaining humanitarian ones (SAMS, 2015). Al-Zoubi, in this conference, has stated that: “The current role of Syrian civil society medical organizations is to contribute to rebuilding the health system which has been damaged by this damned war. Everyone has to develop strategies for genuine partnerships with local councils, local organizations, and health directorates to transfer all resources to the local level, thereby gradually enabling it to take its role.” (Al-Zoubi14,2015, personal communication) This statement echoes Barakat’s argument (2005) which emphasizes informal collaborative structures emerging in conflict situations as means of social, economic, or political coping mechanisms to be the basis for reviving civil society and rebuilding governance. Thus, it re-conceptualizes the context through which these collaborative structures have emerged. In a context such as the Syrian one where structures of power and institutional orders are being reframed by the means of conflict, there is a room for the newly emerging civil society to redefine its role in the governance structures. Here, one can argue that actors involved in the medical humanitarian response have actually recognised this room and extended their vision from delivering principled aid to enabling local medical structures to redefine their roles in governance

 

40 

systems. By so doing, they have actually set the ground for development processes that release humanitarian operations from their urgent relief perception towards more sustainable aims. They reframed the context they are operating within from a chaotic one which suffers huge destruction and lacks the necessary formal orders into an opportunity to restructure the previous systems, which in the first place have contributed to triggering the conflict, and reproduce them as systems of collaborative governance that ultimately can work towards a sustainable recovery process.

 

41 

4. Conclusion: The way forward

“And we love life if we can find our path to it. We dance in between martyrs and raise a minaret for violet or palm trees. We love life if we can find our path to it. And we steal from the silkworm a thread to build a sky and fence in this departure. We open the garden gate for the jasmine to step out on the streets as a beautiful day.

”

We love life if we can find our path to it

(Mahmoud Darwish, Palestinian poet) 

The discussion in this paper has highlighted that although the context in the Syrian conflict is trapped in a ‘dynamic stalemate’ and in spite of the intense violence requiring relief operations to be on standby, the impressive survival strategies and coping mechanisms developed by Syrian communities are significantly present as opportunities to be built upon in order set the ground for a sustainable recovery process. The most evident out of these mechanisms is arguable civil society groups organising to respond to the complexity of the very fragmented context in light of the limitation imposed over the formal humanitarian system. When trying to assess the extent to which these coping mechanisms are being recognized and built upon, specifically in the domain of medical and healthcare operations on which the research has focused for time, scope, and data limitations, the research has revealed that the collective intent to support health needs with no discrimination is already bounding emerging Syrian organisations with the formal humanitarian system under one shared vision. Thus, the core for reinforcing synergy between these actors is in place although its interpretations can be ambiguous in different contexts. Still, despite the perceived ambiguity which has slowed down the  

42 

progress in different cases, this collective intent has proven a fundamental catalyst in reconstructing the conflictual priorities of different actors bringing them under one periodic consensus to sustain the humanitarian response in an effective way. This periodic consensus has stimulated new partnerships between Syrian and international organizations. However, these partnerships have unfortunately been questioned as genuine ones. The dynamics of the emerging partnerships can be said missing the ‘reciprocal equivalence’. They tend to have been built in a hierarchical way lacking mutual trust, and motives to support and build on potential capacities. This is mainly because of the perceived law competency of Syrian organizations -especially community-based onesfor assuming responsibility. Even when capacity-building has been conducted as means to tackle this issue, it ended up being ad hoc, related to particular objectives, and in most cases directed to fulfill donor’s criteria rather than aimed at building systematic and institutional capacity that creates local leadership.

However, a new shift in the

collective intent bringing the different actors together is arguably being conceived as means to create genuine partnerships. Deliberations are being pushed towards empowering Syrian local structures to gradually enable them assuming their role in rebuilding the health system from the bottom up in the hope for associating collaborative structures for good governance. The practical terms of this new vision are yet to be defined. Still the ‘opportunity’ within this chaotic devastated scene for restructuring power relations and redefining roles in the governance structures is arguably being recognized and hopefully will be built upon. As such, it could be argued that communities coping strategies in healthcare sector at the Syrian conflict are well recognised although more efforts should be consolidated to genuinely build upon them in collaborative structures that can set the ground for sustainable recovery. This discussion however, can be generally reflected on the Syrian context, especially in opposition-held areas. Irrespective of the particular characteristics featuring different sectors, the concepts discussed above with regards of having relationships that build on each other’s potentials in the hope of establishing collaborative structures that empower

 

43 

local actors and enable them assuming their responsibility in future governance systems are crucial to be understood and applied in any initiative intervening in the Syrian context. As long as the context has been reconceptualized into a space for opportunities; and ‘cracks’ have been identified in the emerging power structures, then there is definitely a chance to ‘widen these cracks’ into real potential for change through which civil society can redefine its role. For this, precedents; which levy (2007) identifies as the key for developing strategies in any collective social action, have to be set. Collaborative structures between Syrian CBOs, Syrian NGOs, and INGOs through which relations are built on trust and reciprocal recognition of each other’s potentials and constraints have to be developed. To a certain extent, it could be argued that one precedent, Tamkeen Project, has already been started although it is yet to be evaluated in order to better understand what both intended and unintended outcomes are being achieved. Tamkeen is a program funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) supporting emerging local governance in Syria through a consortium of Syrian CBOs, LACs, and NGOs working in partnership with local communities to deliver essential services and to foster open governance. Through this collaborative structure, communities get to select and deliver projects focusing on rehabilitating service delivery and reinforcing resilience and self-sufficiency. All concerned actors receive training tailored to needed skills, while the international partner gives support for improving efficiency and effectiveness (Alzoabi,2015; Tamkeen,2015).

Such precedent can make a shift to create pilot projects that can be scaled up into strategic programmes. This however, has to be scaled up both vertically and horizontally through ‘public learning’ as well as dialogue and advocacy (Levy,2007). Networks have to be created where learning is shared and exchanged between and among different actors. It has to be supported through institutional frameworks for formal and informal learning; the thing that might eventually lead to structural change in the way recovery projects are initiated during and after the conflict when local

 

44 

governance structures are more mature to assume more responsibility while international organizations gradually withdraw. Scaling up such precedent has also to be reflected in the institutional and organisational development of the collaborative structures themselves. This will entail releasing the process of ‘capacity building’ from its connotation as aimed at developing communities weak capacity to endorse the understanding of reciprocal equivalence where each actor has their potentials and constraints and. Thus, the process of public learning through this perspective will aim to develop the institutional capacity for all actors as they interact with each others. Finally, such precedent has to be reflected in the process of monitoring and evaluation. In the programme of Tamkeen, DFID has initiated an evaluation process to better understand the achieved outcomes in order to inform future programmes. Still, this is being solely conducted by international organizations (IMC worldwide,2015). While this can be understood for the time being, giving the weak capacity of the created collaborative structure, it could be argued that the structure itself should have been involved in the process as means of enhancing participatory monitoring and evaluation that goes beyond its traditional forms to reinforce the process of public learning in a reflexive way. Once collaborative structures are established in such a way that genuinely reinforces synergy and empowers local groups to assume their responsibilities in the hoped for governance systems, the aforementioned dimensions of recovery will have been better consolidated, not least because the context has been set to address the root causes which have already contributed to triggering the conflict in Syria. Having the governance structures growing from the bottom up with an evident present for the civil society is fundamentally a step towards tackling the socio-economic fragmentation and vulnerability factors; both the ones contributed to triggering the conflict and the ones exacerbated by its legacy. Yet, the way forward is much more complicated as these factors are very much associated with power structures and so are dimensions of

 

45 

recovery to which the efforts are being directed. Social justice, inclusive economic growth, and peacebuilding are all to be viewed with lenses of power politics especially in light of the very fragmented geo-political context and the new forms of power relations articulated within. Power relations are in no means represented by military dominance only. Power has to be understood as a whole of entangled relations articulated through complex mechanisms (Few,2002). The religious and sectarian dimension spinning the context in the Syrian conflict is also being articulated in the politics of power and new forms of oppression are being practiced in the name of religion. So are the claims of the revolutionary loyalty amidst the debates of how the uprising started and how it evolved; what has been done and what should have been done. This gets even exacerbated when coupled with the identity politics in which gender, ethnicity, race, tribes, class, educational-level, and sexual-orientation are all dimensions of further oppression. As such, the Syrian context can arguably be introduced as Healey explains: “a site of struggle between class forces for control of the management of the urban environment” (Healey, 1992:143). With the acknowledgment that the struggle is beyond class in the Syrian context, recovery becomes fundamentally as Healey argues, by searching for “a less one-dimensional view of conflict and cleavage in society and a more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of the experience of urban life and environment” (Healey,1992:143-144). Actually, according to Laurie Nathan, a society without ‘conflict’ is a myth (Heleta,2013:6). Different identities and ideologies are in constant struggle to coexist and ‘conflict’ is what being called for increasingly as a catalyst for good governance in shaping relations among different agencies (e.g. Foucault in Flyvbjerg, 1998; Mouffe,1997). It is the point where such diversity is locked in an imbalanced structure of power with institutionalized inequality and systematic oppression where conflict breaks down into violence and war starts. It is actually a delicate context reflected by Sandercock’s argument: “To my mind the most beguiling formulation of planning...is Patsy Healey’s notion of ‘managing our co-existence in shared space’” (2000:13). Thus, in the aftermath of conflict, Safier (1997:33) notes that the needs for

 

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reconstruction cannot be addressed without understanding “...how will the future of collective cultural relations be arranged after a period of often traumatic breakdown in the most basic civilised behaviour between the organised identity groups that share the urban space to be reconstructed?”. Reflecting these debates on the Syrian conflict, one might argue that Syrian CSOs along with the LACs, which are the main actors to sustain governance structures in the recovery process, are in a way or another part of the ongoing conflict through their affiliation to different identities and thus to various power categories. From this perspective, if the hoped for governance system ends up being a process to establish new political legitimacy for the most powerful actors without accommodating the diverse identities, then it will end up reproducing the status quo in the country (Roy,2009) in a very fragile context that will sooner or later breaks out into violent conflict again. From this perspective, the real challenge for the way forward becomes in the search for the ‘room of manoeuvre’ (Safier,2002 in Levy,2007) where people can consciously and collectively work to achieve just governance. It must not be forgotten that a just society is not a society that creates just rules; it’s a society that creates the conditions to continuously rethink the meaning of justice. It’s a society that prevents the replication of one particular set of interests of those who have more power in the name of religion, law, or even arms. This, as levy (2007:21) concludes, can only be by adopting the “contested notion of the cumulative effect of ‘micro transformations’”; the idea of ‘a thousand tiny empowerment’ which is, as Sandercock (1999 in Levy,2007:21) comments: “the only acceptable path to social change”. With all of this in mind, the author of this paper acknowledges her biases to the Syrian revolution; as well as her faith in the Syrian people who stood up for their rights and to whom she belongs. She argues that those who started the revolution chanting “People want to knock down the regime” did not go out with the aims of replacing one regime with another. ‘Regime’ is a hierarchical authoritarian government enforcing strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom (Oxford dictionaries,2015). Rather, people stood up asking for an ‘Order’; a state in which laws and rules regulating

 

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public behaviour are observed (Oxford dictionaries,2015); a state of governance where freedom, dignity and justice are honored. Irrespective of war opportunists, People are still continuously demonstrating against the new oppressive powers on the ground as well as against the new ‘representative’ structures of the opposition which are neither fulfilling their duties nor people’s ambitions (Almubarak,2015). These popular demonstrations, squeezed in the middle of the dualistic conceptualization of the Syrian conflict as ‘Asadism’ and ‘Jihadism’, are the beacon for the way forward. This dualistic conceptualization, in fact, is what the Syrian regime has striven for since the very beginning of the uprising as it allowed it to present itself as “the only possible alternative to chaos, destruction, and Qadedist terror” (Slim&Trombetta,2014:26). The author through this paper has attempted to argue that the alternative is already there; it is within people who have already stood up for their rights, and have not yet stopped; People who have undergone the barbarian repression of the regime and then the oppression of the newly emerging powers in the new geopolitical system, and have not yet stopped; People who under no circumstances will stop until they restructure the system themselves; People who occupied the streets chanting for knocking down the ‘Regime’ so that they themselves build the ‘Order’.

 

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End Notes                                                              1   Commonly used term to describe the violence of freedom of expression in the authoritarian regime in Syria. 2

A concept presented by David Harvey to describe the centralization of wealth and power in the

hands of a few by dispossessing the public of their wealth. 3

Many analysts argue that the Islamic State is seen to be working alongside the Syrian

Government as its main interest is not weakening the regime’s structure rather to eliminate the non-Islamist front in the revolution and thus, having common causes with the regime itself. 4

Sharar Mahyub, Regional Desk Coordinator of Middle East, Islamic Relief IR

5

In the Eastern Gouta of Damascus, some doctors did not join the local directorate. Rather they

formed the ‘Union of Free Syrian Doctors’ with an explicit Islamic agenda. This union is very active in the Eastern Gouta and it can be said that it competes with the health directorate. Their funding sources are not really transparent. (Aous Almubarak, 2015, personal communication) 6

Institutionally, health directorates have been developed in hierarchical structures starting from

the very local units, all the way to a unified national unit (in Douma for example: the Revolutionary Medical Office in Douma subordinates the Unified Revolutionary Medical Office in Eastern Gouta which in turn subordinates the Unified Revolutionary Medical Office in Syria. However, local units are also supposed to be subordinating LACs within their regions. Still, this relationship is said to be artificial mainly because of the legacy of the socio-economic fragmented society which positions doctors above ‘ordinary’ people. Since LACs are mainly grassroots organizations of ‘ordinary’ people, doctors tend to not accept the subordination relationship. Rather, health directorates assign a representative who attends the LACs meetings and reflects on them (Aous Almubarak, 2015, personal communications) 7

Aous Almubarak, Syrian Doctor living in the besieged Eastern Gouta (Damascus eastern

suburbs), Syria

 

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                                                                                                                                                                                                 8 There is no genuine supervising authority to which health directorates have to report, and they apply for funding directly to donors, very much like an NGO. 9

 “There is an evident ambiguity regarding the term ‘Syrian NGOs’. The major ‘Syrian’ health

organisations are not registered in Syria, “...and hence legally they belong to the country of their registration. On the other hand, Physicians Across Continents (PAC) (Turkey) is considered a Syrian organisation because it is largely dominated by Syrian nationals and has joined the Syrian NGO Alliance” (Al-Zoubi, 2015). Also, health directorates act very much like NGOs. For the sake of this paper, Syrian medical NGOs are considered to be those led by Syrians, operate inside Syria only and define themselves as NGOs (i.e. excluding health directorates).   10

Ahmad Rashed Al-Hafez, Information & Quality Management, Union of Syrian Medical Relief

Organizations UOSSM 11

 “Operations from Iraqi Kurdistan areas are still very limited...The Jordanian government controls its borders strictly to prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters and to limit the number of refugees. These control measures have been strictly imposed on NGOs too… Lebanese government is not as cooperative as it should be. All Syrian medical NGOs risk having their staff arrested or deported, and there is no way to use Security Council Resolution 2165 to allow for cross-border operations into Syria, which means that no medical supplies whatsoever enter Syria from Lebanon” (Al-Zoubi, 2015:12).

 

12

Ailsa Laxton, Regional Desk Coordinator of Middle East, Islamic Relief IR.

13

 e.g. “Some INGOs have asked for medical insurance for staff inside Syria. Others ask for proper staff hiring procedures, including the public announcement of vacant posts and interviews in IS-controlled and besieged areas” (Al-Zoubi, 2015:9).

 

 Zedoun Al-Zoubi, CEO, Union of Syrian Medical Relief Organizations UOSSM.

14

       

 

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