ONLINE
PUBLICATION
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. BRASIL
MIRIA M S A RA I V A September 2013 www.kas.de/brasil
The European Union as a Global Actor in Times of Crisis: Views from Outside This article focuses on the perception of
condition to overcome what is defined as spe-
the European Union as a normative power
cific national interests (or Hobbesian interests).
and how this influences the Brazilian impression of the European Union as an in-
However, this projection of principles and val-
ternational actor in the milestones of a
ues produced different results in the nineties
transforming
The
than it has today. International and regional
“times of crisis” we refer to here relate
situations are different. Since 1970, EU coun-
not only to the financial crises European
tries have been demonstrating a behavioral
countries are experiencing but also their
tendency based on a new way of linking the
consequences on the integration process
principles of domestic politics to external ac-
itself. Above all, they relate to the inter-
tions. EU actions when facing questions of in-
national dimension: a more fragmented
ternational politics were initially brought for-
global order marked by a deeper pluralism
ward by the European Political Cooperation,
in terms of ideas and behaviors, as well as
from the Treaty of the European Union, within
the emergence of new actors who seek to
the framework of a Common Foreign and Se-
influence international politics and modify
curity Policy, paved the way for this new be-
the balance of decision making regarding
havioral pattern. This internal/external link did
themes of a global dimension.
not express itself as a proposition of a world
international
order.
government in accordance with an internal democratic government (which would be the equivalent of a Kantian scheme of a confederaThe European Union as a normative power
tion), but was oriented to project their domestic political organization beyond Europe’s bor-
The projection of principles and values beyond
ders
its borders, based in its political and social
thought and its defense of some social stan-
(in
accordance
with
western
liberal
model and a western world vision, has been
dards). This behavior was then described as
one of the European Union’s main tools as a
civilian power.
global actor. These principles are directed towards the defense of the democratic regime,
This European behavior – as well as its world
human rights, social cohesion, economic liber-
vision – has its origin, on the one hand, in the
alization and regional integration. This move-
trajectory of action of European countries in
ment would stem from identification of the EU,
different multipolar scenarios in recent centu-
and European countries, with these principles
ries and, on the other hand, the success of its
of peace and international stability, as well as
political model and integration process. This
with a new conception of sovereignty. Accord-
would suggest confidence in the validity and
ing to this trajectory, in terms of politics and
efficacy of its principles and, in the landmarks
academia, the EU has been characterized as a
of international politics, also achieved through
normative power that acts as a diffuser of
their strategies.
ideas in different ways of a traditional state structure (even a federalist one) and in better
During the 1990s, this new type of EU procedure contributed significantly to the inclusion
2
and defense of the principles of democracy and
In order to reinforce multilateralism, dissemi-
human rights in the international agenda.
nate its principles and values, facilitate dia-
BRASIL
Moreover, this indirectly promoted the begin-
logue with internationally relevant countries
MIRIA M S A RA I V A
ning of a debate – though a mild one – about
and construct long term strategies and projects
the normative dimension of international rela-
with these countries, the EU has been substi-
tions. Examined from a constructivist perspec-
tuting its principal tool for interaction with
tive of structuring a new international order,
Southern countries during the 1990s –inter-
this European preoccupation with democracy
regionalism – for the establishment of strategic
promotion (not only from the Union or its
partnerships with emerging countries. These
member
non-
partnerships indicate a vast improvement in
governmental organizations and of imprecise
relation to previous dialogues since they in-
public opinion) projected in the construction of
clude a larger number of themes referring to
this order would contribute to the production of
global governance.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
September 2013 www.kas.de/brasil
states,
but
also
from
normative effects. The 2010 decade, however, presents different characteristics. A more fragmented scenario,
The Brazilian vision of Europe
marked by a moment of crisis and change due to multipolarization after September 11th and
In the context of these initiatives, in 2007 a
the United States invasion of Iraq, which ag-
strategic partnership was signed between the
gravated the economic dimension due to the
EU
financial crisis that occurred in the United
seemingly initially successful, has not demon-
States in 2008, that hit European countries
strated significant results. It is important to
even more forcefully. This context opened
highlight that Brazilian diplomacy perceptions
space for the rise of new actors –emerging
of the EU have not been clear. Europe has
countries – as well as alternative world vision’s
three distinct channels for relations with Brazil:
other than that of 1990’s predominant liberal-
from the country to the EU; bilateral relations
ism. The experience of a crisis in the core of
with one or more of EU’s member states; and
the European Union hampered projection of a
the EU with Mercosul. For Brazilian diplomacy,
European model, insofar as the financial crisis
from a realist perspective, some member
tore down the liberal strategy adopted until
states of the EU – especially Germany, France,
then and raised questions regarding the future
Spain and Portugal - are considered important
of the integration process.
partners, while the EU collectively is identified
and
Brazil.
This
partnership,
although
as an actor that systematically brings compliIn this scenario, differences of conceptions and
cations to Brazil in negotiations of more com-
priorities of principles such as democracy and
plex themes (such as commerce), in which the
human rights between the EU and emerging
European Commission is the main interlocutor.
countries appeared in some cases. The percep-
The perception of the EU as a normative inter-
tion of the EU as a normative power will no
national political actor has not yet been pre-
longer serve as a tacit consensus. On the other
cisely defined and, politically, Brazilian diplo-
hand, preferences for the adoption of different
macy has shown a preference for intergovern-
strategies in order to implement these princi-
mental relations.
ples will be prioritized over global security. A tension between respect for some principles
The strategic partnership between them in-
and respect for State sovereignty is evident
cludes formal reinforcement of multilateralism
during the handling of crisis situations (the
and the quest for collective action in the areas
most recent example being Syria). As an ag-
of human rights, poverty, the environment,
gravating element, at the same time that the
energy, Mercosul and stability in Latin America.
EU presents itself as a normative power of
An underlying explanation for this initiative
value diffusion, some European countries take
could be issues related to the idea of global
part in military initiatives that result in civilian
governance. On one side is Brazil’s active role
deaths.
in international themes such as the Doha Round; Brazil’s identification as a possible representative of Southern countries; the EU’s
3
quest for partnerships with emerging countries
ter by voting for an investigation into alleged
and the stagnation of EU-Mercosul political dia-
rights violations in Iran. However, this behav-
BRASIL
logue as a result of the incorporation of Vene-
ior has no continuity and this vote was not
MIRIA M S A RA I V A
zuela into the trade bloc. From the Brazilian
enough to realign Brazilian interests with Euro-
perspective, a strategic partnership could dee-
pean preferences on central issues of interna-
pen relations with an important economic actor
tional politics. As an example, the use of the
mainly in the field of investments and technol-
“responsibility to protect” doctrine is ques-
ogy transfer, as well as potentially provide in-
tioned by Brazilian diplomacy, who has been
ternational prestige and acknowledgement for
implementing another dimension in its dis-
the country and facilitate Brazil’s entrance into
course: “responsibility while protecting”.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
September 2013 www.kas.de/brasil
what Brazilian diplomacy understands as “diIn these areas, Brazilian strategy has oriented
rectory of the great”.
itself towards a soft revisionism of international The results of the strategic partnership, how-
institutions, which identifies more closely with
ever, were limited until the end of the Lula
the visions of other emerging countries. In this
administration. Annual summits managed to
field there are few expectations regarding mo-
establish commitments to deeper cooperation
difying the role of the EU in Brazilian foreign
in the fields of alternative energy and envi-
policy. Brazilian projection onto the interna-
ronmental change. The environment, however,
tional scene has been guided on the belief in
is a complicated issue for the Brazilian admini-
autonomy and universalism and Brazilian di-
stration, due to the fact that it faces strong
plomacy seeks to project the country on the
internal opposition and concessions in this area
international scene based upon its profile of
are difficult. In the field of international coop-
leadership among Southern countries. If there
eration, in 2008 Brazil and the EU signed a
are coincidences regarding roughly the defense
Joint Action Plan for the implementation of tri-
of multilateralism, European countries are per-
angular initiatives in African
ceived as more satisfied with the current dy-
countries. In
2010, EU negotiations with Mercosul countries
namic of international institutions.
restarted, but so far have not managed to achieve considerable results and the outlook is
Another area where there could have been mo-
grim.
re convergence is South America. During Lula’s administration, Brazilian presence in the region
Convergences on joint actions in multilateral
was augmented exponentially, not only in
fora have not been easy to achieve. If on the
terms of technological cooperation and invest-
one hand European countries were identified as
ment, but also as unifying power in the politi-
important allies in a review of international in-
cal arena. In this context, not only the EU but
stitutions, on the other, there was also visible
also Brazil would defend multilateralism in the
disagreement on important themes. There are
region, democratic regimes, social cohesion
some examples such as the UN vote regarding
and the fight against poverty. From a European
the Iranian nuclear program in 2010, as well
perspective, Brazil began to be seen as a pos-
as the cases of Libya and Syria during Dilma
sible leader of South American countries, ca-
Rousseff’s administration.
pable of contributing to greater stability in the region. Furthermore, there could be a more
Divergences also exist in regard to the IMF,
covert European interest in strengthening Bra-
whom Brazil pressured to raise its participation
zil’s leadership to counter Bolivarian socialism;
quota, in alliance with the BRICS. Regarding an
so as to boost Brazilian leadership and support
eventual nuclear disarming process, Brazilian
the “Brazilian path for Latin-American devel-
diplomacy has adopted a different position
opment that would conciliate market and state,
than the ones of France and the UK (countries
generating growth and promoting social inclu-
within the EU that have nuclear weapons).
sion”. However, despite expectation conver-
Concerning the defense of Human Rights, dur-
gences, for the Brazilian government to under-
ing Lula’s administration the issue was not
take a joint action with the EU in the region
considered as important as building partner-
would neither be necessary nor desirable. Bra-
ships with emerging partners. Rousseff’s ad-
zil has been acting autonomously in relation
ministration launched its position on this mat-
with its neighbors and a tacit alliance with the
4
EU could awaken suspicions and harm the con-
In conclusion, it is important that the EU and
struction of its leadership in the region. On the
the
BRASIL
other hand, if during the Lula administration –
whom Brazil shares common principles, as well
MIRIA M S A RA I V A
mostly due to the influence of the president’s
as motivations to seek an approach, but with
party – an approach for anti-liberal govern-
whom Brazilian diplomacy has differences re-
ments in the region was sought, with Dilma
garding strategies, perceptions and prefer-
Rousseff the European expectation that the
ences with respect to the current international
new government would decrease its support to
order. Brazil’s external view of the EU has not
these governments has been counterbalanced
coincided with European initiatives to contrib-
by the strengthening of the Itamaraty pres-
ute to multilateralism and the diffusion of
ence in the process of foreign policy formula-
norms. International leadership sought by Bra-
tion with its traditional principles of non-
zilian diplomacy has an individual characteris-
intervention.
tic, and the role of the country as a global pla-
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
September 2013 www.kas.de/brasil
European
countries
are
partners
with
yer is strongly founded in the autonomy and In the area of triangular cooperation, high-
universalism principles that guide Itamaraty.
lighted in the Joint Action Plan, there has been
Furthermore, the soft revisionism that has dri-
some progress. Brazilian cooperation with Afri-
ven Brazilian foreign policy is not found in the
can and South American countries with fewer
dissemination of EU norms, an important iden-
resources grew during the Lula administration,
tity. During a time of internal crisis in the EU
providing Brazilian with donor country status.
and an external one in a changing global order,
Besides the Joint Action Plan Brazil-EU, Brazil
with divergences, it’s important to think about
has already implemented triangular coopera-
new models of behavior and international inte-
tion initiatives during the last few years in Afri-
gration of both emerging countries and the Eu-
can countries with some member states. But, if
ropean Union. The way to cope with this new
on the one hand, triangular cooperation efforts
fragmented scenario is to not allow it to per-
extends the capabilities Brazilian international
petuate the patterns of the 1990s.
cooperation and provides international visibility to the country’s actions, on the other hand,
This article was written by Miriam Saraiva for
cooperation on development implemented by
the
the European Union and its member countries
nauer", which is published four times a year by
happens within the OECD, while Brazilian co-
the Konrad Adenauer Brazil Office.
Portuguese
Language
"Cadernos
Ade-
operation policy presents itself as alternative option, it is within the framework of South-
Miriam Saraiva is Professor at the International
South cooperation, which is formally exempt
Relations Department of the State University of
from compliance. The Brazilian government
Rio
seeks to detach itself from the profile of North-
[email protected]
South cooperation and there are divergent positions within the Brazilian formulators of foreign policy regarding the efficacy of this kind of trilateral cooperation. Finally, Brazilian expectations of increasing European investments in Brazil through the partnership have not been successful. The financial crisis undergone by some European countries (and the Euro Zone as a collective) hinders the structuring of economic projects on the short term.
Conclusion
de
Janeiro
(UERJ).
E-mail:
