Wading Tiger Swimming Dragon: A Study on Comparative Indo-Sino Naval Development

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Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, "India and China: From Trade to Peace?" Asian Perspective 31, no. 4 (2007), 108
Rajiv Sikri, "The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations," Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2011), 55
World Bank, "China," http://data.worldbank.org/country/china
"Manpower Fit for Military Service," http://www.globalfirepower.com/manpower-fit-for-military-service.asp; given the 1.3 billion person population and rapid aging, only approximately 600 million Chinese are available for military service
"The Growth of The Chinese Military," http://www.militaryeducation.org/chinese-military-growth/
"India Outpaces China in 2015 Economic Growth," BBC, February 8, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35519671
PTI, "General V K Singh takes over as new Indian Army chief," The Times of India, March 31, 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/General-V-K-Singh-takes-over-as-new-Indian-Army-chief-/articleshow/5746561.cms?referral=PM
Deutsche Bank Research, "The middle class in India," Deutsche Bank Research, February 15, 2010 http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000253735.pdf. Additionally, considering that in many developing countries, a person considered middle class in that country has the same standard of living as someone making a six-figure income in a developed country, India, in effect, has a population the size of the U.S. making a six-figure salary.
Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 88
John W. Garver, "The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations," India Review 1, no. 4 (October 2002), 25.
The concept of a security dilemma was originally introduced by John Herz in Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).
Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Politics," 1st edition (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2010), 111.
The Indian Defence Review is in English, while China Military Online is in Chinese, which I analyzed through the help of a translation service.
Garver, "Security Dilemma," 17.
Raju G. C. Thomas, "The Indian Navy in the Seventies," Pacific Affairs 48, no. 4 (Winter 1975-1976), 500, 502.
C. Uday Bhaskar, "The Indian Navy - Challenges of a 'Cinderella Service," The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord XXIV, Nos. 3 & 4 (Jul. & Oct. 2014), 75-81; Canadian Military History 23, Nos. 3 & 4 (Summer & Autumn 2014), 78.
PTI, "Navy Aiming at 200-ship Fleet by 2027," The New Indian Express, July 14, 2015, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Navy-Aiming-at-200-ship-Fleet-by-2027/2015/07/14/article2920149.ece
Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, "Indian Navy Force Structure Development Is Driven by Blue Water Maritime Strategy," Defense Media Network, June 1, 2012, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/indian-navy-force-structure-development-is-driven-by-blue-water-maritime-strategy/
Manu Pubby, "With Six New Nuclear Attack Submarines, India Officially Opens Up on its Undersea Aspirations," The Economic Times, July 15, 2015. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/with-six-new-nuclear-attack-submarines-india-officially-opens-up-on-its-undersea-aspirations/articleshow/48076623.cms
Sachin Kumar, "Modernization Plan of the Indian Navy," Naval Journey, December 19, 2013, http://navaljourney.com/modernization-plan-of-the-indian-navy/
Michelle Florcruz, "India Navy Warships: 200 Warships To Be Added By 2027 As Naval Expansion Planned," IBT, July 16, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/india-navy-warships-200-warships be-added-2027-naval-expansion-planned-2012063
Sachin Kumar.
Pubby.
Michelle Florcruz.
"Role of Navy," http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/role-navy
Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea 2nd Edition: China's Navy in the Twenty-First Century, (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 1-19, Yoshihara and Holmes, 27, 16; PLA-N scholars disagree about the goals and abilities of the Chinese Navy.
Cole, 145.
Senior Intelligence Officer- China. The People's Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics. Suitland MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009, 7.
Cole, 172-3.
Cole, 27.
Cole, 13.
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 2.
Senior Intelligence Officer- China. The People's Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics. Suitland MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009, 6.
Yoshihara and Holmes, 158.
Senior Intelligence Officer- China. The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, 7.
Senior Intelligence Officer- China. The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, 13.
Yana Leksyutina, "The First Chinese White Paper on Military Strategy: New Accents?" New Eastern Outlook, June 6, 2015, http://journal-neo.org/2015/06/06/the-first-chinese-white-paper-on-military-strategy-new-accents/
Yoshihara and Holmes, 159.
Leksyutina.
Indian youth illiteracy is at 10%. The overall Indian literacy rate is under 80%, Indian infrastructure is notoriously bad, and Indian defense spending is a fraction of Chinese defense spending. Indian life expectancy is below China's and the Indian health care system is reflective of that life expectancy disparity, the Indian economy is far smaller than China's, and India has a much higher HIV/AIDS prevalence than China. The Indian type of corruption, which is reliant on bribes paid for services and dealing with regulation, is halting growth, whereas Chinese corruption is structured in a way that gives a perverse incentive for growth to occur, as Chinese corruption makes the corrupt official benefit financially as economic progress progresses.
"Chinese Warships," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm
"Luyang II / Type 052C / Lanzhou Multirole Destroyer." \http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/luyang-ii.htm
"People's Liberation Army Navy - Air Force Branch." http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-af.htm
Senior Intelligence Officer- China. The People's Liberation Army-Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics. Suitland MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009, 28.
"Surface Ships," May 20, 2016, http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/surface-ships; "Submarines Active," May 20, 2016, http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/node/1145; "Aircrafts & Helicopters," May 20, 2016, http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/aircrafts-helicopters
Harsh V. Pant, "The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties," Current Politics and Economics, 24 no. 1 (Jun 2014), 3.
Abanti Bhattacharya, "Sixty Years of India–China Relations." Strategic Analysis 34, no. 5 (Sept 2010), 678.
Shen Dingli. "Building China-India Reconciliation." Asian Perspective 34, no. 4 (2010), 139.
Sikri, "The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations," Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2011), 55.
Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, "India and China: From Trade to Peace?" Asian Perspective 31, no. 4 (2007), 108.
Sikri, 56.
See for example, G. P. Manson, "Contending Nationalisms: China and India March into the Twenty-First Century," Asian Affairs: An American Review 37 (2010), 86.
Garver, "Security Dilemma," 9, 4.
Sikri, 58.
Garver, "Security Dilemma," 6.
Sikri, 55.
Bhattacharya, 679.
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "'Chindia' or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives on India-China Relations," Asian Perspective 35 (2011), 448.
Sikri, 61.
Surendra Kumar, India and the World: Through the Eyes of Indian Diplomats(New Delhi, Wisdom Tree, 2015), 5.
Jean Francois Huchet, "Emergence of a Pragmatic Indian-China Relationship," China Perspectives 3 (2008), 53.
Surendra Kumar, 5.
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "Chindia" or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives on India-China Relations," Asian Perspective 35 (2011), 450.
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, 450.
Shen Dingli, 150.
Felix K. Chang, "China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment," Orbis 56, no. 1, (2012), 20.
Yoshihara and Holmes, 88.
Yoshihara and Holmes, 159.
Yoshihara and Holmes, 88.
C. Uday Bhaskar, 80.
Yoshihara and Holmes, 175.
John W. Garver, 4.
Harsh V. Pant, "Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions Collide in the Indian Ocean," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1, no. 2 (2014), 187.
Garver, "Security Dilemma," 4.
Garver, "Security Dilemma," 25
Josy Joseph, "To counter China, Navy expands reach," The Hindu, October 3, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/to-counter-china-navy-expands-reach/article7716336.ece
James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "Strongman, Constable, or Free-Rider? India's "Monroe Doctrine" and Indian Naval Strategy," Comparative Strategy 28 no. 4, (2009), 345.
James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean," Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3, (2008), 386.
Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications," Strategic Analysis 32, no. 1, (2008), 4, 18-21.
R.S. Vasan, "India's Maritime Core Interests," Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3, (2012), 416; Harsh V. Pant, "Sino-Indian Maritime Ambitions Collide in the Indian Ocean," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1, no. 2 (2014), 193.
Harsh V. Pant, "The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties," Current Politics and Economics 24, no. 1 (June 2014), 23.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Indian Ambitions in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Rim: The Response of Global and Regional Powers," Journal of European Studies 28, no. 2 (Dec 2012), 23; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean," Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3, (2008), 369.
Pubby.
Bhattacharya, 678.
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, 55
Cole, 27
Chris Madsen, "The Long Goodbye: British Agency in the Creation of Navies for India and Pakistan," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no3 (2015), 463- 464
Xu Qi, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century," Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006)
Anil Kumar, "Battling the Dragon," Indian Defence Review, March 2012, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/battling-the-dragon/
PTI, "Navy Aiming at 200-ship Fleet by 2027," The New Indian Express, July 14, 2015, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Navy-Aiming-at-200-ship-Fleet-by-2027/2015/07/14/article2920149.ece
Anil Kumar
Anil Kumar; Sheldon-Duplaix; Maj Gen PK Chakravorty, "Disputes in the South China Sea," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2012, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/disputes-in-the-south-china-sea/; Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, "Facing the Dragon: is India prepared?" Indian Defence Review, Jan-Mar 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/facing-the-dragon-is-india-prepared/; Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, "Implications of China's Rise," Indian Defence Review, Jul-Sep 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/implications-of-chinas-rise/; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/china-a-new-kind-of-superpower-in-the-making/; Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes," Indian Defence Review, Jan-Mar 2009, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-chinese-conundrum-friends-and-foes/; Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense," Indian Defence Review, Apr-Jun 2009, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/an-analysis-of-chinas-white-papers-on-defense/
Anil Kumar; Sheldon-Duplaix; Katoch, "Facing the Dragon"; Thapliyal, "Implications"; Roy; Menon; Arpi, "An Analysis."
Anil Kumar; Sheldon-Duplaix
Anil Kumar; Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, "Taking on the Dragon," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2012, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/taking-on-the-dragon/; Chakravorty; Kanwal Sibal, "India and its neighbours," Indian Defence Review, Jan-Mar 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/india-and-its-neighbours/; Col Narender Kumar, "Unpredictable China: are we prepared?" Indian Defence Review, Apr-Jun 2009, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/unpredictable-china-are-we-prepared/; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making,"; Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes,"; Arpi, "An Analysis"; S Rajasimman, "China's Maritime Thrust in Africa," Indian Defence Review, Apr Jun 2009, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/chinas-maritime-thrust-in-africa/
Anil Kumar; Thapliyal, "Taking on the Dragon"; Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, "Facing the Dragon : is India prepared?"
Anil Kumar; Sheldon-Duplaix; Katoch, "Facing the Dragon"; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making"; Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes,"; Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense."
Anil Kumar; Thapliyal, "Taking on the Dragon"; Katoch, "Facing the Dragon"; Chakravorty ;Col Narender Kumar, "Unpredictable China: are we prepared?"; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making"; Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense,"; S Rajasimman, "China's Maritime Thrust in Africa"; Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana, "China-India Maritime Rivalry," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2008, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/china-india-maritime-rivalry/
Chakravorty
Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense,"
Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes,"; Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense,"
See for example: Sheldon-Duplaix; Claude Arpi, "China: Friend or Foe?", Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2007, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/china-friend-or-foe/; Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes,"; Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense,"; S Rajasimman, "China's Maritime Thrust in Africa,"
See for example: Col Narender Kumar, "Unpredictable China: are we prepared?"; Kanwal Sibal, "India and its neighbours,"; Katoch, "Facing the Dragon"; Anil Kumar; Thapliyal, "Taking on the Dragon "; Chakravorty; Bharat Verma, "China's 'New Cold War' Puts Democracies in Danger," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chinas-new-cold-war-puts-democracies-in-danger; Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, "Lengthening Malevolent Chinese Shadow," Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2010, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/lengthening-malevolent-chinese-shadow/; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making,"
Anil Kumar; Thapliyal, "Taking on the Dragon"; Chakravorty; Sheldon-Duplaix; Katoch, "Facing the Dragon"; Claude Arpi, "China: Friend or Foe?"; Kanwal Sibal, "India and its neighbours"; Col Narender Kumar, "Unpredictable China: are we prepared?"; Thapliyal, "Implications"; Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, "Lengthening Malevolent Chinese Shadow,"; Bhaskar Roy, "China: a new kind of superpower in the making,"; Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes"; Claude Arpi, "The killers' mace of the dark visitors," Indian Defence Review, Jan-Mar 2009, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-killers-mace-of-the-dark-visitors/; Claude Arpi, "An Analysis of China's White Papers on Defense,"; S Rajasimman, "China's Maritime Thrust in Africa,"; Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana, "China-India Maritime Rivalry,"
Mohan Malik, "China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare," World Affairs Journal, July/August 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india-today-diplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare
See other notes
China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured," China Military Online, March 10, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-03/10/content_5803924.htm; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?" China Military Online, March 13, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2014-03/13/content_5808975.htm; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project," China Military Online, August, 27, 2014, http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2014-08/27/content_6113837.htm
China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured,"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project."
Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency," China Military Online, August 8, 2014, http://www/81.cn/jwgz/2014-08/04/content_6078330.htm; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured,"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"
Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles," China Military Online, March 31, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jmbl/2014-03/31/content_5833977.htm; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency,"; Zhang Luo Qing, "Russia and India Want to Lease a Second Nuclear Submarine," China Military Online, March 26, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2015-03/26_6415922.htm
China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles," China Military Online, November 3, 2014, http://www.81.cn/gjzx/2014-11/03/content_6209564.htm; China News, "India to Spend $5 Billion and Joint Research and Development of New Short-Range Anti-Aircraft Missiles Law," China Military Online, April 3, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2015-04/03/content_6427657.htm
China News, "India to Spend $5 Billion and Joint Research and Development of New Short-Range Anti-Aircraft Missiles Law"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak," China Military Online, May 29, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014-05/29/content_5922304.htm; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project,"
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles,"
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles,"
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles,"
China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project,"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship," China Military Online, July 14, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-07/14/content_6047275,
China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project,"
China News, "India to Spend $5 Billion and Joint Research and Development of New Short-Range Anti-Aircraft Missiles Law"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency,"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles"; Wang Fang, "We Expect the U.S. to Help: India's First Two Aircraft Carriers Will Use Electromagnetic Catapult," China Military Online, February 26, 2015, http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2015-02/26/content_6367875.htm; China News Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'Dhanush' Missile Can Be Loaded with Nuclear Warheads," China Military Online, April 4, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2015-04/14/content_6442176.htm; National Defense News, "India to Monitor the Entire Indian Ocean," China Military Online, April 2, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2015-04/02/content_6426393.htm
"India's First Domestic Scorpene Submarine Ship Domestic Waters," China Military Online, April 16 2015, http://www.81.cn/jmtt/2015-04/16/content_6446048; Niu Zhen, "India's Latest Destroyer Launched Cost About 29 Billion Yuan," China Military Online, April 21 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-04/21/content_6452541.htm; Zhang Luoqing. "Russia and India Want to Lease a Second Nuclear Submarine,"; "India Allocated 50 Billion Heavily to Build a Strong Fleet Plan Tedious," China Military Online, February 26, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-02/26/content_6368877 [NOTE: This article is considered negative even though the bulk of this article would seem alarmist. Given the nature of news outlets controlled by autocratic governments, the negative nature end of this article should not be taken at face value when taken into the context and the rest of the text of this article and China's history of rapid economic growth]; Wang Fang, "We Expect the U.S. to Help: India's First Two Aircraft Carriers Will Use Electromagnetic Catapult"; "U.S. Arms Sales to India to Discuss the Contract or the United States Navy Helicopter Production in India," China Military Online, February 24, 2015, http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2015-02/24/content_6364620.htm; Min Dong Xi, "India 'Vic Rama Tia' Aircraft Will be the First Installation of Air Defense Weapon System," China Military Online, May 8, 2015, http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2015-05/08/content_6480188.htm; "Indian Navy Intends to Purchase 50 Carrier-Based Unmanned Aerial Videos or a Temporary Operational Capability," China Military Online, March 4, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2015-03/04/content_6379459; "India to Monitor the Entire Indian Ocean"; "India to Spend $5 Billion and Joint Research and Development of New Short-Range Anti-Aircraft Missiles Law."; "India Successfully Test-Fired 'Dhanush' Missile Can Be Loaded with Nuclear Warheads"; "Foreign Media Said India Intends to Build Five Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups," China Military Online, February 25, 2015, http://www.81/cn/jwgz/2015-02/25/content_6366029
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; China News Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'Dhanush' Missile Can Be Loaded with Nuclear Warheads."
Reference News Network, "U.S. Arms Sales to India to Discuss the Contract or the United States Navy Helicopter Production in India"; China News, "Indian Navy Intends to Purchase 50 Carrier-Based Unmanned Aerial Videos or a Temporary Operational Capability"; Reference News Network, "India Receives the First Six P-8I Patrol Aircraft the U.S. Department of 'Poseidon' Revision," China Military Online, December 15, 2014, htttp://www.81.cn/bqtd/2014-12/15/content_6270037.htm
Reference News Network, "Foreign Media Said India Intends to Build Five Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups"; Wang Fang, "We Expect the U.S. to Help: India's First Two Aircraft Carriers Will Use Electromagnetic Catapult,"; Min Dong Xi, "India 'Vic Rama Tia' Aircraft Will be the First Installation of Air Defense Weapon System."
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'BrahMos' Cruise Missile, Anti-Ship," China Military Online, June 12, 2014, http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-06/12/content_5954582.htm; China News Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'Dhanush' Missile Can Be Loaded with Nuclear Warheads"; China News, "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles."
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'BrahMos' Cruise Missile, Anti-Ship."
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship,"; National Defense News, "India Kamo Tower Frigate: Stealth Submarine is the Highlight," China Military Online, July 22, 2014, http://www.81.cn/bqtd/2014-07/22/content_6057987.htm; "'Barak-8': The Indian Air Defense Weapon," China Military Online, December 12, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-12/12/content_6257617.htm
Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"
Sina, "India: Kamo Laporta Level Anti-Submarine Delivery Next Month," China Military Online, June 26, 2014, http://www.81.cn/bqtd/2014-06/26/content_6013690.htm; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project,"; China News, "The Third Indian Navy Ship Domestic Offshore Patrol Vessel Formal Service," China Military Online, March 11, 2014, http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-03/11/content_5805971.htm
Sina, "India: Kamo Laporta Level Anti-Submarine Delivery Next Month,"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship,"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project."
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship."
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship."
Sina, "India: Kamo Laporta Level Anti-Submarine Delivery Next Month."
China News, "The Third Indian Navy Ship Domestic Offshore Patrol Vessel Formal Service"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship,"; China Military Online, "India Used to Buy Russian Aircraft Carrier has Arrived in the 7th Naval Base in Southern India," China Military Online, Janurary 9, 2014, http://www.81.cn/gjzx/2014-01/09/content5726704.htm
National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "India Successfully Test-Fired 'BrahMos' Cruise Missile, Anti-Ship."
China Military Online, "India Used to Buy Russian Aircraft Carrier has Arrived in the 7th Naval Base in Southern India"; China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; China News, "The Third Indian Navy Ship Domestic Offshore Patrol Vessel Formal Service."
China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency,"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project."
China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured,"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project."
China News Network, "India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; Ministry of Defense Official Website, "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; Contemporary Navy Magazine, "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; National Defense News, "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; National Defense Science and Technology Information Network, "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship"; Reference News Network, "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; China Network, "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project."
"India Built the First Ship Domestic Nuclear Submarine Accident Caused by a Dead 2 Injured"; "India First Ship, 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project"; "India Kamo Tower Frigate: Stealth Submarine is the Highlight"; "India Successfully Test-Fired 'BrahMos' Cruise Missile, Anti-Ship"; "India Receives the First Six P-8I Patrol Aircraft the U.S. Department of 'Poseidon' Revisio"; "India Used to Buy Russian Aircraft Carrier has Arrived in the 7th Naval Base in Southern India"; "India's First Nuclear Submarine Ship Domestically: 20 Years of Research, is Still Experimental Boat?"; "Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates to Receive New Domestic First Ship"; "Indian Navy Submarine Force Generals Admit the Situation Bleak"; "Indian Navy Submarine Serious Ageing Russian Nuclear Submarine, Can Only Rent with Homemade Missiles"; "Indian-Made Nuclear Submarine 'Body Count,' Forthcoming Sea Trials can Carry 12 Missiles"; Sina, "India: Kamo Laporta Level Anti-Submarine Delivery Next Month."; "US Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency"; "'Barak-8': The Indian Air Defense Weapon"; "India First Ship 'Calcutta' Class Destroyer in Service System 'Uncompleted' Project," China Military Online, August 27, 2014, http://www.81.cn/wjsm//2014-8/27/content_6113837.htm; "India's Largest Naval Destroyer 'Calcutta' was Delivered to the Navy on the 16," China Military Online, August 15, 2014, http://www.81.cn/gjzx/2014-08/15/content_6096913.htm; "U.S. Media: Indian Navy Intends to Purchase Two Russian Submarine Emergency," China Military Online, August 4, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2014-08/04/content_6078330.htm; Zhang Wenqing, Zhang Pei, "Indian Navy Warships Costly: 'Calcutta,' and 'Carmona Tower,'" China Military Online, November 24, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-11/24/content_6238221.htm; Liu Jiangping, "India Leased Nuclear Submarine 'Ring Seal,' Cruising in the Indian Ocean Triggered a Chain Reaction," China Military Online, March 21, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-03/21/content_5821187.htm; Yin Dongdong, "India Plans to Build Four Dock Landing Ships Can Transport One Time Trip," China Military Online, January 17, 2014, http://www.81.cn/gjzx/2014-01/17/content_5738417.htm; "India to Receive Offshore Patrol Vessels," China Military Online, September 12, 2014, http://www.81.cn/hj/2014-09/12/content_6133736.htm; Roshan Ai, "India First Ship Domestic Strategic Nuclear Submarine Sea Trial or Re-Leased Nuclear Submarine," China Military Online, December 26, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2014-12/26/content_6285621.htm; "Russia and India to Develop New Anti-Ship Missiles to Offset the Advantage of the Chinese Aircraft Carrier," China Military Online, August 20, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2014-08/20/content_6103867.htm; "Russian Media: China and India Snapping Amur Submarines Capable of Destroying the United States the Most Powerful Nuclear Submarine," China Military Online, August 18, 2014, http://www.81.cn/jskj/2014-08/18/content_6100274.htm

After World War Two, the British were too exhausted from fighting the Axis to fight a new war for supremacy against the U.S., particularly, because it was obvious that the U.S. would win due to the overwhelming power of the U.S. Thus, the British peacefully allowed America to become the preeminent world power without a British military challenge. Thus, the U.S. might realize that it would be futile to fight the Chinese in a hegemonic war and as a result would let the Chinese become the world's preeminent power without a fight.
The Chinese Navy would be needed to defeat the U.S. Navy, as the U.S. Navy is an impediment to Chinese territorial revisionism, whereas the Indian Navy is not.
Mohan Malik, "China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare," World Affairs Journal, July/August 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india-today-diplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare
Wading Tiger Swimming Dragon:
A Study on Comparative Indo-Sino Naval Development

By Paul Weisko



Introduction

"India and China are brothers," said Nehru when it came to relations between China and India in the 1950s. However, in the next decade, the orders, "fire," "get down," and "advance," were the words that summed up the most important point of relations between China and India, namely the 1962 Sino-Indo Border Conflict. The conflict was a rout for India; yet, China did not push its victory too far, giving the defeated Indians back their guns and withdrawing from one of two of the disputed areas that they had fought over.
India's humiliation in 1962 could have positioned China as its greatest enemy. Yet the outcome of the conflict suggested continued moderation in Sino-Indian relations despite border differences. In the case of India, it had a much more pressing border dispute with its neighbor, Pakistan, which had a military that was very potent. As a result, India had to turn its attention to Pakistan and reduce focus on China. Neither India nor China had the means to fight each other. China was constrained by the distance between its main armed forces stockpiles and the Indian border, making it difficult to move enough arms to wage war in India. India's poverty, meanwhile, meant it could not focus the same amount of resources on China as it did on the more pressing issue of Pakistan's claims over Kashmir. Additionally, China was also far too preoccupied with tensions with the U.S. and their East Asian neighbors to be concerned over a desolate piece of land on the India-China border. Thus, India and China largely ignored each other for most of their early shared existence.
This would begin to change in the 2000s, when both countries became rich enough from globalization to build up their militaries. The rise of China is of course one of the most important international developments of the current era. The Chinese economy is the second largest in the world. While its economy is slowing down, economic growth during the slowdown is still around six percent. Additionally, the Chinese Navy is the second biggest navy in the world, alongside the world's largest army, in terms of the number of men and the total manpower available for military service (twice the population of the U.S., if one counts males and females). Additionally, the Chinese military budget has been growing by double-digit percentage points, while the portion of the GDP spent on the military is the same. More generally, the Chinese military industrial complex is rapidly improving in quality and independence from foreign sources of military hardware.
Although often given less attention than China, India is also an important up-and-coming country. The Indian economy is also rapidly growing, with the fastest growth rate of any major economy. Additionally, the Indian government is also a rapidly growing player in international affairs. The Indian army is currently the largest volunteer army in the world, and the Indian government is rapidly growing its military industrial base. While it is true that there is still massive poverty in India, and it is much more prevalent in India than it is in China, the amount of people lifted out of poverty in India is substantial while the Indian middle class is equivalent to the U.S. population.
As both nations have begun to rise, their navies are modernizing and competing over the same areas. Not surprisingly the navies of both countries originally focused mainly in the waters in their own littoral zone, the East and South China Sea in the case of China and the Indian Ocean for India. In recent years, though, China has increasingly begun to project its naval power into the Indian Ocean, driven most likely by the desire to protect transportation and communication sea lanes, which it sees as vital to its continued economic growth. The Indian Navy meanwhile has also extended its operations into the South China Sea, perhaps also driven by perceived economic interests but even more likely as a counter-response to Chinese naval expansion and as a way to signal their unease with Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean.
This thesis argues that the evidence I have collected shows that the Indians and Chinese are view each other through the lens of defensive realism, and predict that they will treat each other accordingly. Although this may certainly heighten tension between the two countries, I have nonetheless found, that, in the case of Chinese-Indian naval relations, the responses of the two navies are mainly characterized by defensive realism, as defined by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics. Realism as a general theory posits an anarchic international political system where states, as self-interested rational actors, must rely on themselves to ensure survival. There are differences, though, in how theorists see how nations respond to this situation. On one side, John Mearsheimer argues that states seek to maximize their power in an aggressive manner to attain political dominance, which is manifested by regional hegemony. Defensive realism, as proposed by Waltz, however, argues that a state seeking to establish security does not require the maximization of power, but can normally achieve this security through more moderate policies such as balancing and hedging. In the case of naval competition, then, while offensive realism proposes that states will try to build up their own navy in the hope of being able to destroy the other navies in their home areas, defensive realism suggests that countries would try to build up only enough arms to counter other countries' naval buildups.
This thesis argues that to the extent that both the Chinese and Indian view each other through the framework of a security dilemma, each side will be influenced by the other countries naval buildup to continue their own naval buildup. Insofar as the pattern of naval buildups on both sides appear to reflect approaches consistent with defensive realism, it should also be possible to predict the pattern of their future naval developments. Thus it can be predicted that China will continue grow its Navy to counter the Indian Navy, seeking to position more of its ships to be able to fight India in the Indian Ocean. More specifically, though, China will seek to build up its anti-submarine warfare assets in order to deal with any Indian nuclear threat. Meanwhile, India will respond by building up its navy to be able to repel China in the case of a naval conflict in the Indian Ocean.
This thesis will analyze the pattern of naval interactions between China and India, and in particular what each side is afraid of in these interactions, by examining authoritative press sources: the Indian Defence Review, and China Military Online. The articles are from the Indian Defence Review are from 2004 to 2013, which is the time from the announcement of The New Historic Missions and the time that I could not get any later articles from the Library of Congress. The articles from the China Military Online are from 2014-2015, which is the time that the Indian Navy announced its buildup to the time that the Chinese Navy shifted away from the New Historic Missions. The articles from the Indian Defence Review concern the Chinese Navy's development, and the articles taken from China Military Online concern the Indian Navy's development. These sources show how the two governments have viewed each other, and have reacted, in terms of a security dilemma. For example, one finding of this thesis is that Chinese papers changed their tone to a significant degree once the Indians launched a ballistic missile that could land a nuclear weapon on Beijing, resulting in turn in increased coverage on the Indian ballistic missile submarine. In contrast, the Indian defense press focused more broadly on general Chinese naval development, but with some specific attention to Chinese capacity to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This paper also assumes that the defense journals' coverage and patterns in coverage, and the fears or concerns revealed, will help to indicate how each navy may develop in the future. Considering that neither journal expressed a desire to start a war, or to dominate in the other navy's main area of operation, it seems apparent that defensive realism predominates the thinking of both of those navies.
There is much to gain from such a survey. It is clear that the two navies see each other through the lens of the security dilemma, and thus will continue to build up their navies. At the same time, as neither side would be able to win a total victory over the other in a naval battle due to the tyranny of distance, it is also likely that both sides will seek to avoid actual conflict. Even so, the increasing naval suspicions between India and China cannot be totally separated from the military tensions that also exist because there is still an active border dispute between the two countries. Although there is already a wealth of literature about the Indo-Sino border dispute, there is almost no scholarship on the Indo-Sino comparative naval development. This then justifies this study as a way not only to begin to understand what the two navies think about each other, but also to provide a more comprehensive foundation for a broader understanding of the security issues both countries will need to address.
For most countries, a strategic need is required to build a blue water navy. While there are multiple factors in the decisions of both countries to expand their blue water navies, the development of new strategic concerns between the two countries is clearly among these factors. First, China is building its navy is to be able to protect its resource supply lines, so China will need to extend its naval power into the Indian Ocean. Given that India is still smarting over its humiliation in the Himalayas by China, it is not surprising then that one motive for India in building up its navy is to counter China's naval buildup and its potential intrusion in Indian maritime space. Meanwhile, Chinese news articles seem to show a new perception of India as a potential threat, a change that seemed to accompany India's ability to land a nuclear weapon on Beijing.
A study using the lens of international security theory to see how the Chinese and Indian navies view each other is needed for many reasons. First, and most important of all, the emergence of China and India as up and coming nations impacts future world politics. Second, given that the vast majority of goods are transported by sea, the steadily expanding naval ambitions of both countries may have a particular effect on world trade. Finally, there is the increased danger of conflict as these two naval expansions begin to intersect in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Thus it is important not just to understand the important factors in the rise of these two nations, but also the strains and challenges that may appear in their interactions.
Methodology
This thesis starts with the assumption that one of the best, or at least most accessible, ways to understand the viewpoints of each navy toward the development of their counterpart is to look at the press associated with their respective militaries. This is because the Chinese and Indian navies do not comment directly every time a new warship by any other navy is launched. Instead, the press in the each country covers that event. Thus, this thesis will analyze the relationship between the Indian and Chinese navies by comparing aspects of newspapers affiliated with India's and China's navies in order to gain an understanding about how the two countries' navies view each other's naval development. The assumption is that official media coverage can betray the real views of the organization the media outlet represents. Thus, this thesis will study the relationship of the Indian and Chinese navies by analyzing articles regarding the other navy's development published in their own military affiliated newspapers.
As the main sources for this study, I have chosen the China Military Online and the Indian Defence Review. As the online version of the PLA Daily, China Military Online is probably the closest one can get to an official Chinese view of military matters. The Indian military, however, does not have an official newspaper available online. I have chosen those articles because the Indian Defence Review articles go from the year that the People's Liberation Army's New Historic Missions were announced by Hu Jintao to the latest year available from the Library of Congress. I analyzed the articles from the China Military Online from the year that the Indians announced their plans to increase the size of their navy to the time period that the PLA-N changed their strategy away from the New Historic Missions towards a more offensive oriented strategy. As a result, I have had to choose the most accessible publication associated with the Indian military, which is the Indian Defence Review. The Indian Defence Review is a quarterly publication written by recently retired high-ranking Indian officers and other prominent Indians who still have friends in high places in the Indian military. Thus, this publication probably represents the views of the Indian military, as that paper's contributors and editors could always call the military in Delhi for an opinion of the Indian government. As a result the writers would also be careful to avoid misrepresenting or criticizing the Indian military in ways that the current military officers do not do themselves, whether publically or privately. This is because the India Defence Review could lose connections or further access to Indian military points of view, which if they did lose, would mean that the Indian Defence Review would no longer be an authoritative source for the Indian defense establishment's point of view. Thus, it is clear that the Indian Defence Review is representative of the official Indian military in terms of its point of view. I should note that while there is a Chinese naval daily newspaper, I chose to use the China Military Online as a better match with the Indian Defence Review as there is no solely naval equivalent publication for the Indian military.
Overview of Navies
The Indian Navy
The history of the modern Indian Navy is not very well documented in scholarly works. Interestingly this is in contrast to much better documentation of historical pre-British India naval power from the development of Indian Ocean trade in the Middle Ages to the modern era. Even so, according to C. Uday Bhaskar, India, like China, does not have a very large maritime tradition compared to the tradition of using land armies. He maintains that, as the branch of the armed forces that has the least to do with the conflict with Pakistan, the Indians have tended to neglect the navy compared to the Indian Army and Indian Air Force throughout the navy's history, however, that does not mean that the Indian Navy did not play a role in India's wars with Pakistan.
The modern Indian Navy was born out of the Royal Indian Navy, set up by the British during the Raj in 1612. Unlike the modern day Indian military, which tends to be rather well disciplined, the Royal Indian Navy was not. When the British granted India its independence in 1947, they did not immediately realize that their former colony would not want to be subservient to the commonwealth and defend British interests. After the first war between India and Pakistan, the British became less keen on giving India ships such as carriers and cruisers as they came to realize that the Indians were not going to uphold British interests in the Indian Ocean but follow their own national interests.
In 1950, when the Indian cruiser Delhi took Nehru to the Bandung conference, Nehru became interested in investing in the navy. Yet that interest soon waned and later Indian governments did not have that same level of interest. Therefore, after Nehru's brief interest with the Indian Navy, the Indian Navy continued to be as neglected under the Indian government as they were by the British Raj. The Indian Navy began to receive more attention from the Indian government after the war with Pakistan during the 1960s, because the Indian Navy was unable to conduct combat operations when the Pakistani navy blockaded Indian naval ports, allowing the Pakistanis to attack Indian coastal targets. According to Raju Thomas, India's build-up of its navy before the 1973 war with Pakistan was vital in defeating Pakistan and in the creation of the state of Bangladesh. In this conflict the Indian Navy destroyed the Pakistani fleet, severing sea lines of communication between Pakistan and Bangladesh. After this, the Indians also used their navy to help prevent coups in their own backyard. The Indians also used their navy to blockade Karachi during the Kargil War, which John W. Garver believes to be one of the reasons why the Pakistanis withdrew to the status quo ante bellum.
As the Indians began to further invest in their navy, they also switched from buying British naval vessels to buying Soviet naval vessels, many of which are still in service today. However, Thomas claims that this was met with resistance within the Indian Navy, which was much closer to the British when it came to equipment and contacts than the Soviets— the reverse of the situation within the Indian Army and Air Force. Bhaskar reports that during the early 1990s, the Indian Navy fell into disregard once more during a financial crisis, and only recently has it begun to be a recipient of investment again.
Today, the Indian Navy is rapidly developing. The current goal of this development plan can be seen in the 2013 announcement by a Rear Admiral of plans to take the Indian Navy to two hundred ships from under 100 missile firing ships. This plan builds off the earlier 2005 Maritime Capability Perspective Plan that called for a 162-ship blue water navy. As part of this development, the Indian Navy is currently building up both ballistic missile and nuclear attack submarines. The Indians are also building up their aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates, thus helping to deal with a potential Chinese threat and fulfilling Indian naval doctrine with two aircraft carriers. The Indians are also building up their forces of support ships that could enhance the range of the Indian naval vessels. Russia is helping this buildup by constructing ships since the Indian shipyards can only turn out about four to five ships per year.
The Indian Navy is also getting new aircraft. These aircraft include carrier borne aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). The carrier borne aircraft will be bought from Russia or produced with local designs. The helicopters and remotely piloted aircraft, also known as UAVs will be sourced in a similar way, combining the purchase of foreign made vehicles with the development of weapons at home. However, the land-borne aircraft mainly tend to be bought from abroad for purposes of expediency, given India's inability to produce a good land-based maritime patrol aircraft, and for political purposes, such as building ties with the U.S. and the USSR, both of which sent India maritime patrol aircraft that are mainly only provided to very close allies. This allows India to make up for its equipment shortcomings while signaling to China that India has allies that are willing to supply it much more sophisticated equipment than other countries will provide to China, let alone what China can design itself.
The domestically designed carrier-born fighter has been long delayed and the Russian built MiG-29K aircraft is a much better aircraft for Indian carriers, but India is trying to become a defense producer, as opposed to a defense consumer. The practice of buying adequate aircraft for current use, while trying to produce an aircraft indigenously for future use, is a realistic strategy in working toward this goal. This strategy requires large amounts of money but this is something that the Indian government today can handle. While India is trying to match Chinese capability with these efforts, given the economic disparity between the two countries, it is highly unlikely that this will happen.
The recent expansion of the Indian Navy has allowed it to move beyond reactive responses to particular situations to a broader sense of its strategic objectives. The roles of the Indian Navy are 1) military, 2) diplomatic, 3) constabulary, and 4) benign (humanitarian). The first mission has been demonstrated in fighting with Pakistan during India's wars with Pakistan. The second one has been exercised via stopping coups in states within its backyard, such as the countering the coup against the Seychelles. The third mission has been demonstrated by patrols along the Indian coasts to prevent crime and terrorism. The fourth mission has been demonstrated by the relief provided during the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004.
The People's Liberation Army-Navy
The People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) is the naval armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. It is not a separate service from the Army in the way that the U.S. Navy is a separate service from the U.S. Army. This is because of the Chinese military's roots as a ground guerilla force, where naval forces could only play a limited supplementary role on largely domestic waterways. While there seems to be very little scholarship solely about the PLA-N's history, and the works that include PLA-N history largely do so within the context of the broader field of PLA studies, all of those general studies tend to agree about the general outline of the PLA-N's history (PLA-N history, in fact, seems to be the only place where all PLA-N scholars can agree).
While most of the pre-1949 Chinese Navy went with the Nationalists to Taiwan, there were a few ships that sided with the Communists and became the nucleus of the PLA-N. The PLA-N was originally created as an outgrowth of the doctrine of "People's War," and attempt to follow the "Active Defense" doctrine. The main concept of the PLA-N during the time it was created in 1949 was to defend the P.R.C. from coastal invasions. That type of war was derived from the guerilla warfare strategy used by Chinese Communist Party to defeat the Nationalists (GMD) during the Chinese Civil War. The People's War doctrine dictated that any war the Chinese would fight would be an invasion from a numerically smaller but technologically superior army. The invading force would be stopped by a numerically superior and technologically inferior Chinese army by human wave attacks and guerrilla warfare. The idea of Active Defense means that the Chinese Navy should be able to carry the fight to the enemy. However, the PLA-N was incapable of fighting Active Defense, so the PLA-N stayed in the People's War mode. This type of war did not allow for much power projection.
During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese scientific community was devastated and Chinese weapons design was set back by many years. However, the Cultural Revolution ended when Mao died, and so did the idea of People's War. As a result, the PLA-N was given a new doctrine stressing technological changes, which also made a shift to more Active Defense capabilities possible. After Mao died, Deng Xiaoping came to power and he set about reforming the PLA, including the PLA-N, particularly after the PLA suffered a humiliating defeat in the Sino-Vietnamese War.
During the late Deng period, a new head of the PLA-Navy, Liu Huaqing, also came to power, with a broader vision of growing the PLA-N. Liu was originally in the land forces, but he became a revolutionary naval commander. Liu decided to have the navy become a more important part of the Chinese military. Unlike previous navy heads, Liu had more power as he was a member of higher-ranking committees. Combined with the new military doctrines that now mostly focused on fighting local wars, the PLA Navy was becoming much more of an important asset than it once was. This fit right into Liu's vision of the future of the Chinese Navy. According to Yoshihara and Holmes, Liu Huaqing's vision for the Chinese Navy was for the PLA-N to become a great navy. This vision would become known as "offshore defense." "Offshore defense" was to be designed for the predominant PLA-N theory of the time, which called for fighting wars further offshore as opposed to fighting wars in China's coastal waters.
Today's PLA-N has changed drastically from the navy that Liu Huaqing left to his successor. The PLA-N today is retiring its older vessels that were only single mission platforms and have started to build vessels that can conduct multiple missions at the same time. The PLA-N is also building up its force projection capabilities with the production of amphibious ships and aircraft carriers.
From the establishment of the P.R.C., the most important mission the PLA-N has been to help take back Taiwan if there is a decision to do this by military force. However, if the P.R.C. tries to invade Taiwan, it would face a threat from the U.S. military. Thus, the PLA-N has been seeking to modernize to deal with any U.S. naval attacks. The PLA-N also has to be able to defend the P.R.C.'s sea lines of communication, which are vulnerable to the U.S. and other (including Indian) navies. These two concerns provide the main basis for the PLA-N's existence. However, there are another four new historic missions laid out by former leader Hu Jintao when he gave a speech in 2004 to PLA-N sailors. These missions are to safeguard the rule of the Communist Party; to help ensure China's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national development; to safeguard China's expanding national interests; and to help maintain world peace. These are the missions by which the PLA-N has been guided.
The first of these missions--to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP--is envisioned in broad ways, such as making sure that Taiwan does not become independent and that the economy continues to grow. This mission could also include participation in actions such as the Tiananmen Square massacre, especially since the legendary head of the PLA-N, Liu Huaqing, was in charge of martial law in Beijing after the massacre. The second mission has been achieved by the PLA-N by deterring Taiwan from becoming independent, as well as by conducting operations to support China's territorial claims in South China Sea island disputes. The third mission is mainly carried out by the PLA-N by guarding sea lines of communication, safeguarding any economic interests in the South China Sea regardless of military pressure. The fourth mission is fulfilled by conducting piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean off of Somalia and by evacuating its citizens from war-stricken areas.
These missions show movement away from earlier assumptions of the CCP that the PLA-N should mainly be a regional force. As of May 25, 2015, the PLA-N was told to branch out and defend P.R.C. sea-lanes. In taking on this mission, the PLA-N is logically pushed toward rivalry with the U.S. Navy. This is particularly true given the P.R.C.'s Malacca Dilemma--which is the P.R.C.'s fear that, if there is ever a war between the U.S. and China, the U.S. would be able to cut off choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, that the P.R.C. relies on to get the resources that keep the CCP in power by maintaining economic growth. If the Chinese ever surpass the U.S., they will have to deal with the Indian Navy next, which could very well also cut off the Straits of Malacca, or Straits of Hormuz, thus, the rivalry with the U.S. extends to its democratic partner India. Thus, the P.R.C. has decided as of this time that it must be able to defend its communications if it is cut off by either the US or India. While some people may posit that the Indians and the Americans would ally to counter China, I disagree. This is because given Indian economic, human development, and other relevant statistics, one would see that the Indians are not able to challenge China and might actually divert resources from American allies that are able to better help the U.S. efforts to counter China. Additionally, while one could point to the Indian Navy being able to choke off Chinese naval supplies in the Indian Ocean, any infrastructure buildup for use against the U.S. Navy could be used towards the Indian Navy, which, in a head to head matchup, the Chinese Navy would defeat without much modifications to their current fleet.
The PLA-N has some combat experience, but none of which is very recent or on a large scale. The PLA-N was used at the end of the civil war with the Nationalists in order to recapture the islands that were close to the P.R.C. coast, especially Hainan. The PLA-N has also had some conflicts with its Southeast Asian neighbors in battles over the disputed islands in that region. The PLA-N is still focused on the constant threat looming over the horizon in its current-day disputes over islands claimed by China and her neighbors. However, the naval actions demanded by this situation are still expected to be limited to only small-scale conflicts.
If the U.S. is unable to defeat the Chinese Navy if conflict erupts, the Indian Navy would then become a pressing concern for China. However, since India is not developed enough economically to help the U.S. deal with China any more than Japan was able to help Germany defeat the U.S. during World War Two, it would not make sense for the Indians to ally themselves against China with the U.S. if the Indians wanted to defeat China. Thus, it would be better for the Indians to let the U.S. deal with China so that they can focus on building their economy to the point of being able to have a navy to defeat China in the case that the U.S. is unable to defeat China's naval threat.
Comparison of Naval Capabilities
The Chinese Navy is currently equipped with many naval vessels with state of the art designs, and is rapidly decommissioning its outdated surface combat ships. The Chinese Navy has around seven nuclear attack submarines and five nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The Chinese Navy also has around fifty modern diesel electric submarines and seventeen outdated diesel electric submarines. The Chinese Navy also has a retrofitted aircraft carrier, which is used for training, as well as around fifty amphibious warfare ships. The inventory of the PLA-N also includes around twenty modern destroyers, and less than seven outdated destroyers. It also has thirty modern frigates, and less than twelve obsolete frigates. Finally, the Chinese Navy has twenty-four corvettes, sixty modern missile boats, less than thirty-five obsolete missile boats, and over one hundred old submarine chasers and gunboats. The Chinese also have around forty old minesweepers. It has seven modern replenishment ships. PLA-N auxiliary ships, which are ships that do not see combat but are vital for operation of the war effort (such as surveillance ships, supply ships, and barracks ships) are numerous and split about evenly between modern and obsolete designs.
The Chinese Navy's missile arrangement has also seen great improvement. The Chinese anti-ship missiles are of first-rate design. These include the C-803, the YJ-18, and YJ-83 missiles. The Chinese also have world-class land attack cruise missiles, which include the CJ-10. The Chinese air defense missiles, which include the HQ-10, could use some improvement.
Chinese military aircraft include maritime bombers, such as the Xian H-6 and the JH-7. They include land-based fighters such as Russian built Sukhois and Chinese copies of those Russian aircraft. There are also Chinese carrier-borne fighter planes developed from a Russian carrier fighter plane. There are also trainers, patrol aircraft, and maritime helicopters of Russian, Chinese, and European origin.
In conclusion, overall, the Chinese Navy is very uneven in terms of quality. It has modern ship and missile designs, but its anti-submarine warfare capacity and the general quality of its sailors, and the training of said sailors, is still lacking. The Chinese naval aircraft designs are low quality, as their engines experience constant breakdowns. So far, its anti-submarine electronics are also not able to detect U.S. submarines. The Chinese Navy has recently added aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, missile boats, corvettes, submarines, and other ships to their registers. The PLA-N is also developing new missiles and radars, as well as aircraft.
While one could point to the seeming lack of specific preparations by the Chinese Navy for dealing with the Indian threat, one should note that the concerns driving Chinese naval development are broader than simply responding to Indian developments. If anything, meeting the naval challenge of the United States remains China's most obvious challenge for the PLA-N. At the same time, in regard to a specific material response to India's naval development it is important to remember that designing ships and building them does not happen overnight. The threat posed by the Indian Navy became apparent only a year before this paper was written, so the PLA-N might not have had enough time to respond to an Indian threat. Even so, there may be considerable overlap between broader Chinese naval developments and the specific needs for a response to potential Indian challenges. The evidence portrayed by this paper predicts that one will appear soon. I will assume that the Chinese would build up their navy to counter the threats that are covered by the Chinese defense newspaper that I am using, thus there would be an ASW component because of the change of tone after the nuclear tests and the heavy coverage on Indian submarines.
The Indian Navy is in many cases worse than the Chinese Navy. Despite its general weaknesses, though, the Indian Navy has an advantage over the Chinese Navy in terms of aircraft carriers and the quality of aircraft, which consist of Russian-built fighter aircraft, Israeli UAVs, Russian, British, and American designed helicopters, trainers, and patrol aircraft, and some domestically designed and built trainers and helicopters. General modernity of ship designs and missile quality are around even with China. However, the Indian Navy still has only fourteen submarines, ten destroyers, fourteen frigates, twenty amphibious warfare ships, twenty-four corvettes, six mine countermeasures ships, ten offshore patrol vessels, fifteen patrol vessels, and four replenishment ships. The Indian Navy has recently added a new aircraft carrier, as well as new frigates and destroyers, as well as new submarines and aircraft. However, the Indians are buying a large amount of their equipment from abroad.
Taken together, this is still a much smaller force than the Chinese Navy. As a result, it is pretty clear that without the Indian aircraft carriers, and probably even with the aircraft carriers, the Indian Navy would lose a head-to-head matchup against the Chinese Navy. However, due to geographic realities, the Indian Navy is unlikely to ever have a head-to-head matchup against the Chinese Navy given the fact that neither side, at least at this time, has enough replenishment ships to be able to have a head to head matchup instead of a lopsided engagement.
The Sino-Indian Relationship and Naval Development
According to Harsh V. Pant, the Chinese-Indian relationship is going to be important. China and India are two rising global superpowers. Additionally, both of those countries have massive reliance on the ocean for their growing economic livelihood, and both countries have economies within the top ten largest in the world. India and China both are rapidly building up their navies, and they are both increasing their overall military spending. All these factors provide a foundation for understanding the development of Chinese-Indian naval rivalry. There is also general consensus among the majority of scholarly works, as expressed by Abanti Bhattacharya among others, that the Indian-Chinese relationship is one plagued by "mistrust and acrimony." It is nonetheless also important to look beyond the present to see the complexity of Indian-Chinese relations that provides a context for specific naval relations.
Shen Dingli, for example, points out that China and India have lived peacefully with each other for thousands of years. In Shen's view, this history provides a possible foundation for reconciliation between the two countries today. Rajiv Sikri downplays this historical relationship, though, by noting that there was little contact between the Chinese and Indians because the Himalayas prevented much interaction; likewise the Silk Road passed through western China to central Asia and it never touched India. Other scholars in turn point out that the Silk Road had a branch that led off in India. Proof of contact between the two societies can be seen in the many Chinese customs that originated in India (particularly in regard to the spread of Buddhism from India to China). Later, the British takeover of India, unifying numerous states into one colony, resulted in more contact with China than India had before colonization. Nonetheless, the Himalayas remained the key in making sure that the Indians and Chinese had little contact despite their relative importance and size.
China and India did develop stronger ties in the modern era. As noted at the beginning of this thesis, it was in the 1950s, for example, that Nehru proclaimed that "India and China were brothers." China and India were also instrumental in the creation of the idea of, and important participants in, the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955. The Bandung conference was the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to create distance from the communist and capitalist camps of the Cold War. During the subsequent era of the ensuing "Bandung Spirit," the Chinese tried to be seen as the leaders of the third world. At the Bandung conference, the Chinese argued that all third world nations should follow the policies of nonintervention in internal affairs and that the countries of the third world should all be able to be allied with each other and help each other out. Building on the Bandung Spirit, the Chinese created a policy of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," namely: "Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-intervention in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." Those principles were used by Chinese diplomats numerous times when addressing their relations with India, creating at least some foundation for harmonious relations.
While India's relations with China were at first fairly good, many scholars have pointed out that there was always friction in these relations, which increased over time. In 1948, the Indians gained independence along with Pakistan. After the Indians and Pakistanis fought a war over Kashmir, in 1949, China fell under Communist rule. The Pakistani government then decided to make an alliance with China after the Chinese defeated India in 1962. The Chinese alliance with Pakistan forced India to split its military resources between Pakistani and Chinese threats. As a result, as John Garver notes, India would not be able to use its full force if drawn into a conflict with either country. Garver says that this division of India's military would have happened even without the alliance of Pakistan and China, but the alliance between Pakistan and China made this two-front situation even more dangerous. This was particularly true because the relationship between China and Pakistan has included arms transfers and nuclear technology.
Another area of tension, as noted by Sikri, was a conflict over China's policy in Tibet. As India sees Tibetan heritage as widely entwined with its own, there was a small amount of friction as soon as the P.R.C. took over Tibet. The sheltering of the Dalai Lama, after his escape from Tibet after the 1959 Tibet uprising, in India was in turn seen by China as undermining Chinese rule in Tibet. As a result, Sikri maintains that the Tibet issue was and is a major stumbling block in the Indian-Chinese relationship. Even so, Bhattacharya also notes that the Indians made concessions to China by saying that Tibet is part of China. Regardless, the Tibet issue remains a source of tension between the two countries.
Vincent Wang, and other authors, show that another issue that has created tensions between the Chinese and Indians is a boundary dispute over the McMahon line. The McMahon line was drawn by the British as a boundary between colonial India and Tibet, but it was a border that the Chinese Communists have never agreed to. There are two particular areas that are disputed by the Chinese. One of the areas is Arunachal Pradesh, near Assam, and the other is the Askai Chin, which is a piece of mountainous land that has little use. However, the Chinese wanted to build roads in both areas as part of a way to strengthen their control over those areas, both of which bordered Tibet. As a result, there was a war between the Chinese and India that ended in a humiliating defeat for the Indians in 1962. Some see this as the spark that turned the relationship between India and China increasingly negative.
During the border war with China, Jawaharlal Nehru was the leader of India. Scholarly evaluations of Nehru depict a leader working to address the actual challenges and conflicting interests that faced Indian-Chinese relations in this period. According to Surenda Kumar, Nehru was largely realistic, and this was reflected in his ideas about India's foreign policy and its relationship with other countries. At the same time, according to Kumar, Nehru fully believed in the idea of solidarity between the third world nations and that peaceful measures should replace conflict for settling disputes. This idea of peaceful resolution of disputes derived from India's peaceful independence movement, of which Nehru was proud, given the key part he played in it. However, other scholars maintain that he was naïve about India's relationship with China. This was perhaps true in regard to Nehru's belief that China would not go to war with India. Nonetheless, his policy of dealing with China through peaceful engagement was arguably also the only possible option given the military disparity between the Indian and Chinese armies.
Meanwhile, Kumar maintains that even though Nehru still hoped for a peaceful solution to the border dispute with China, other Indian leaders and the Chinese soon began to see each other with suspicion Tensions boiled over when Chinese forces fired on Indian border guards as these guards were placing border markers on the McMahon line. After that, there was a war that resulted in an extremely decisive Indian defeat. Despite being victorious, the Chinese did not annex all of the territory that they captured, suggesting some unwillingness to push the animosity to an extreme.
After the war ended, the Indians and Chinese experienced a freeze in relations. In the subsequent period, the Chinese and Indians had little trade with each other--only 200 million dollars in 1988. Accusations about one another's actions in Tibet abounded. And Mao called India a paper tiger. Little cooperation was possible under these circumstances.
One lesson to be drawn from this history is that Sino-Indian relations should not be simplistically interpreted as either antagonistic or peaceful. Rather, the nature of this relationship is one of back and forth, dependent on changing conditions. This has created room for scholars to differ on the fundamental nature of this relationship, and to cite this history to show both the potential for peace and the inevitability of conflict.
Despite the ups and down in Sino-Indian relations, the two navies until recently had no need to interact, since the Indian Navy was docked in the Indian Ocean while the Chinese Navy was docked in the Pacific Ocean. As both nations have risen militarily, economically, and politically, their navies are not only expanding and improving in quality, but have begun compete over the same area. In this regard, the literature on the possibilities of Chinese-Indian naval combat has tended to focus on the strategies of each country in the body of water regarded by the other country as their backyard, as well as looking in particular at the competing objectives of both countries in the Indian Ocean. Here the literature has tended to stress how Indian naval plans are determined by China's naval buildup. The end result, as this literature suggests, is that both China and India have begun to see each other as a threat in terms of their plans for the future of the Indian Ocean.
The starting point for most analyses is the growth and expansion of the Chinese Navy in recent years. Not unexpectedly, the Chinese Navy has begun to operate with increasing strength in the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy desires to increase its operational strength in the South China Sea for a few reasons. First is the fact that they have a border on the South China Sea, thus creating a need for its Navy to operate there because of geographic reality. Another reason why the PLA-N has increased operations on the South China Sea is because of the territorial disputes that have arisen between China and the South China Sea nations. As a result, he PLA-N is determined to build up its strength in that area to defend its claims.
The Chinese Navy's increasing capability in terms of power projection is also allowing the Chinese Navy to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean. According to Yoshihara and Holmes, in the view of the Chinese, it is vital for their navy to operate within the Indian Ocean in order to protect the sea lanes of transportation and communication needed to ensure that the Chinese economy continues to grow. This in turn allows the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the legitimacy that it gains through continued economic growth. However, according to Yoshihara and Holmes, there are choke points in the Indian Ocean that would require the Chinese to expand their footprint in the Indian Ocean. Not surprisingly, then, the Chinese perceive the presence of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean as a potential threat, both to the Indian Ocean shipping lanes and to the Chinese economy. The Chinese Navy believes it must be prepared in case a battle between the two countries occurs in this area. Meanwhile, to the extent that China feels like its trade routes are under threat, it focuses on building ports that could accommodate Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean as well as conducting actions, such as anti-piracy patrols, in the Indian Ocean. These actions obviously draw the attention, and the concern, of India.
The Indian Navy is clearly operating in the Indian Ocean for the same reason that China operates in the South China Sea—namely that India borders on the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the presence of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean is a geographic reality. The Indian Navy, asserts Yoshihara and Holmes, is a traditional regional power navy. Likewise, because of the size and power of the Indian Navy compared to other regional navies, John W. Garver notes that the Indian Navy sees the Indian Ocean region as India's backyard. As a result, Prant argues that, as China becomes more able to project naval power into the Indian Ocean, India will feel more threatened. Garver likewise maintains that the Indian Navy feels less safe because of the Chinese Navy's move towards the Indian Ocean. But this is especially true when it comes to China's concurrent movement towards closer relations with other countries that India sees as in its backyard. Thus, Chinese anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia were met with alarm in the Indian press. As a result, the Indians are building up their navy to be able to counter what they see the Chinese threat to the Indian Ocean—all the while still needing to prepare their military to defeat Pakistan in a war.
At the same time, the Indians are also operating in the South China Sea, perhaps attracted in part to the possibility of exploiting resources in the South China Sea that are useful for the growing Indian economy but also as a means of distracting China from its operations in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy is very worried about the growth and expanding range of the Chinese Navy. The Indian Navy is increasingly operating in the South China Sea as a way to signal their unease about China's operations in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the Indian Navy is also increasing its ties with the Vietnamese and the Australian navies, as they are the two of the best navies in the region around the South China Sea. As a result, the Indian Navy is also increasing ties with the Vietnamese and the Australian navies, as they are the two of the best navies in the region around the South China Sea. India is developing its ties with those nations to balance China, as predicted by defensive realism, to help India deter China by having China face more threats than they would have if they just faced India alone.
This is the basic framework of concerns and issues that inform various efforts to understand specific Indian and Chinese strategic naval policies. For example, Holmes and Yoshihara claim that the Indian Navy is trying to develop a Monroe doctrine in the Indian Ocean with the main goal of keeping China out. However, few scholars believe that India currently has the ability to keep out the Chinese Navy. Yet, some articles do point out that India has the advantage of geography, which, considering the limited ability of the Chinese to sustain a naval campaign at a distance, means that the Indian Navy could defeat the few ships that could get to the Indian Ocean. Some authors, especially Khurana, however, note the Indians view the Chinese String of Pearls, which is the building of Chinese ports in countries surrounding India to support a sea route connecting China to the Middle East, as a threat to this defense. Authors such as Pant and Vasan argue that the Chinese can use these ports to defend China's economic supply lines. Nonetheless, while the Chinese Navy could arguably use the ports that the Chinese obtained through the String of Pearls to resupply a larger fleet, the Indian military could potentially also destroy the ports that might give support to China's naval thrusts.
The Chinese String of Pearls strategy has a counterpart in India's Look East Policy. Just as the String of Pearls policy has been justified by China as mainly serving economic purposes, Prant points out that Look East originated as an economic effort by India to increase ties with the Southeast Asian countries. Nonetheless, Cheema and Erickson have argued that the Look East Policy was actually created by India to make China feel threatened, and that it has been successful in achieving this goal.
The result of these mutual concerns and challenges has been a naval arms race between the two countries, which has only added to pre-existing tensions and issues between the two countries in other areas. The relationship between the Chinese and Indian navies could very well be a naval rivalry not seen before in history given the sheer size of the two countries' populations. Since India and China are countries with rising military and economic power, one sees the importance of making sure that those two navies are fully analyzed in comparison to each other.
The military and naval tension between these two countries takes on an additional layer of importance because both countries are nuclear armed and are capable of launching nuclear weapons at each other's capital cities. At the same time, conflict between India and China has at least some potential to spread to a wider international situation. The Indians, being a liberal democracy with a large and successful diaspora community in the United States, might be able to get support from the U.S. of some sort if there was a war in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, since the U.S. is building its relationship with India, the Indians are getting weapons from the Americans that might be used against a potential Chinese enemy. The fact that there are tensions between two nuclear powers with a history of animosity could very well be akin to a Cold War situation.
Certainly other factors also play a role in the unfolding of Sino-Indian relations. Today, trade between the two countries is at an all-time high, even though, according to Bhattacharya, there is a trade imbalance between India and China that is heavily tilted in China's favor. India's main export to China is iron ore, while China is flooding India with cheap manufactured goods. Until recently, though, the Chinese have not seen India as part of their main foreign policy issue. In contrast, China is a very pressing topic in Indian foreign policy and media circles. The reason for this is not just the continuation of past tensions, but new concerns about potential naval conflict. In particular, many Indians decry China's development of a "String of Pearls" strategy, which India sees as an attempt by the Chinese Navy to encircle India. These Indians then argue that the Indian military must react to this threat. As a result, it could be argued that the growing peaceful relations might be temporary and could revert to a new Cold War.

Comparative Analysis of Military Journal Coverage
The history of the development of the Indian and Chinese navies has only recently become intertwined. Before the rise of China, the Indian and Chinese navies were two different types of navies. The Chinese Navy was coastal, with almost no oceangoing ships. Meanwhile, the Indian Navy had many oceangoing ships and was guided by the traditions of the Royal Navy. Yet, when the Chinese economy, and by extension the Communist Party, both became dependent on trade for their survival, the Chinese Navy was built up rapidly. The Indian Navy responded slowly to the development of the Chinese Navy. Yet, now the Indian Navy is being built up to deal with the Chinese Navy. However, had the Indian Navy not had a head start on the Chinese Navy in terms of oceangoing ships before the Chinese Navy modernized, it would have been difficult for the Indian Navy to catch up with the Chinese Navy even given current trends of Indian economic growth.
The patterns in Chinese and Indian coverage of each other's navies in their respective military publications are very illuminating and show that the Indian and Chinese navies view one another's development through the lens of a classic security dilemma. The development of the Chinese Navy, as covered by the Indian Defence Review, has largely focused on hardware. Specifically, the Indian Defence Review focused on A2/AD (anti access/area denial) weapons, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarines. This indicates that the Indians have focused on the things that also pose the most threat to the United States Navy, which is seen as the best navy in the world. India is focusing on those things because, if the PLA-N can beat the U.S. Navy, then the PLA-N can probably beat the Indian Navy. Hence, the PLA-N development would be a threat to the Indian Navy. However, what have received relatively scarce attention in comparison to their importance have been missile boats. This is probably because missile boats do not pose a direct threat to the Indian Navy in the same way that they do to the U.S. Navy. This further bolsters the argument that the Indian Navy views Chinese naval development in terms of a security dilemma. Anti-ship missiles were given a fair amount of coverage compared to other important parts of A2/AD, but were not very well covered in comparison to their importance (they were only in a few articles). This could be because the Indians see Chinese anti-ship missiles as something not to be very worried about given the Indians' extreme confidence in their own anti-ship missiles, which not only outrange Chinese anti-ship missiles, but, according to their makers, DRDO and NPO, are unstoppable due to their speed and altitude. The fact that such a missile was constructed, though, actually indicates that there was a perception of a threat to India coming from some entity stronger than Pakistan, given the hapless performance of the Pakistani Navy against Indian Navy before the development of Brahmos. This again suggests a response to Chinese developments.
The coverage of naval strategy in articles published by the Indian Defence Review was much larger compared to the attention to strategy afforded by the Chinese newspapers, with no coverage on the Indian Navy strategy in the Chinese newspapers. This could be because India is a much more open society in terms of its military than China. Discussion of military strategy is a rather sensitive topic in China because of their general trend towards secrecy in regards to military affairs and the need for order within the ranks of the strategists. As such, the fact that the Indian media talks about Chinese strategy, whereas the Chinese media does not talk about Indian strategy, does not necessarily mean that Indian strategic planning is not a concern for Chinese strategists. Detailed coverage of actual Indian responses to Chinese naval development was given scarce attention in the Indian Defence Review, even though there were many proposed responses to the Chinese naval developments. Potential actions cited in many articles included naval buildups and ways to defeat the Chinese Navy. But this could simply show that, at this stage, the retired Indian defense establishment has focused more on understanding China as a threat in preparation for more discussion of appropriate responses, or possibly because the retired Indian generals are not able to gain access to anything more than proposed responses. In the end, the fact that the Indian Navy is conducting a buildup that is far more extensive than what is needed to deal with the Pakistani navy suggests that the Indian Navy is currently responding to the perceived Chinese naval threat.
The next interesting part of the Indian Defence Review was the coverage on the development of the Chinese Navy regarding its hardware, including ships and planes. This again highlights how the Indians see the Chinese naval development as a threat. The proposed development of an Indian A2/AD program and the expansion of the Indian Navy in all areas, also indicate the reaction to the threat posed by China. However, the most unexpected thing in the Indian Defence Review coverage was attention to the expansion of Chinese activity in the South China Sea, as India has no border on the South China Sea. Indeed, the Indian Defence Review covered China's island building projects before they received substantial coverage in the Western media. This could be used as proof that the Indians saw Chinese attention to these islands as a threat based on either India's economic interests in the South China Sea or because it marked a movement of Chinese naval power closer to India's own sphere of influence. However, it could also be seen as a challenge to the Indian Look East Policy, which was designed originally as a way to boost trade with Southeast Asian countries and then it morphed into security ties. However, the Indian Navy could have no way challenged the Chinese Navy's island building with just the Indian Look East Policy, so, it seems that the former possibility is more likely.
The reportage in the Indian Defence Review has a tendency to lean a little more heavily toward the hardware side of the development of the Chinese Navy as opposed to the software side, which are elements such as training, tactics, and quality of sailors. While there is some coverage on the Chinese Navy's budget increases and the reasons for these budget increases (namely, recruiting better soldiers) there is little coverage of improvements in training, aside from exercises, of which there are numerous examples. Greater attention to hardware over software could simply mean that hardware is seen as a much clearer indicator of the nature of the Chinese threat, and ultimately what India will specifically need to deal with when responding to the threat posed by China. The coverage on exercises, however, does seem to indicate some effort to understand Chinese capability through performance, rather than just weaponry. This might be seen as a short-cut approach toward understanding the effects, if not the details, of software developments.
One particular focus regarding the coverage by the Indian Defence Review about the Chinese Navy's development was on the strategy behind this development. This reportage mostly focused on A2/AD, the South China Sea, and the String of Pearls. Each of these points may reflect different aspects of how the Chinese threat is perceived. Attention to A2/AD may in fact be linked to concerns that A2/AD is possibly creating a model that could be adopted by Pakistan. The focus on Chinese actions and strategies in the South China Sea could again be connected to possible threats to Indian economic interests. Finally the development of a chain of Chinese ports across the Indian Ocean clearly draws attention because these ports could threaten the Indian Navy directly by decreasing its geographical advantage. The Chinese ports could negate the shortage of replenishment ships that might be needed to operate in the Indian Ocean, as the entire Chinese fleet could refuel at ports in the Indian Ocean. These ports were built by the Chinese as deep water ports for civilian ships, which could be used by the Chinese Navy to refuel and repair their ships on their way to battle Indian Navy ships.
The tone of the Indian Defence Review about Chinese Naval development changed as time went by. This can be shown most clearly by the titles of articles. The articles published from 2006-2009 mostly had analytical titles and, with one exception, were also analytical pieces (of the five articles from 2006-2009, four were articles with an analytical tone that had a goal of explaining the Chinese Navy's development and actions). However, by the year 2010, the article titles and the content of the articles became increasingly alarmist, jingoistic, and in most cases, both. The articles were mostly from Indian MPs, former Indian military officers, and current scholars from all over the world, with opinion pieces dominating (ninety percent of the articles became alarmist after 2010, which was an increase from eighty percent that were analytical before 2010). Incidentally, in 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, by saying that it would take a long time to resolve the China-India border dispute, thus quashing of any near term resolution to border issues could explain why there is such a large uptick in the number of alarmist articles in the Indian Defence Review. More interestingly, the shift in the types of articles began during the run-up of the widely anticipated event that the statement by Wen was made. This shows that the Indian military establishment saw the rise of the Chinese Navy in a much more alarming light when there was also an increased threat from the Chinese military. This again highlights the way in which the Indians were reflecting their perception of a broader security dilemma created by Chinese actions.
The analysis of these articles gives us important insights into what Indian military intellectuals are thinking. Clearly, they are afraid of China. In particular, they are afraid of China's naval development in terms of A2/AD and equipment modernization. However, these thinkers are also afraid of Chinese intentions and the strategies derived from them. This clearly is an example of one-half of the security dilemma: a clear indication that India is aware, and afraid, of China's naval development. The analysis of the Indian journal articles also reveals that the Indian thinkers appear aware of the threat posed by China in all areas, indeed in a more comprehensive way than, as will be seen below, how the Chinese attend to Indian naval development. Finally, these articles show that India, unlike China, has begun to develop counterstrategies towards a perceived threat. This is a clear reflection of the second half of a security dilemma—a response to a perceived threat from a potential enemy. This is shown by the suggestion of creating its own A2/AD or building up ties with the U.S., both of which are responses consistent with defensive realism.
The articles from the Chinese Military press about the development of the Indian Navy are an interesting contrast to the articles on the Chinese Navy by the Indian Defence Review. There are actually a greater number of articles written about the Indian Navy by the Chinese Military press than the other way around. It is possible however that this difference simply reflects greater overall coverage by a daily newspaper in contrast to a quarterly publication and not because the Chinese see the Indian naval development as a greater threat.
In their coverage before January 2015, Chinese articles, at times, convey a mostly dismissive attitude towards the Indian Navy. Many Chinese articles, for example, focus on the Indian Navy's acquisition failures. The failures reported relate mainly to submarines, specifically problems with India's indigenously designed ballistic missile submarine, and delays in the acquisition of French designed, conventionally powered submarines. The Chinese articles also talk about the Indian Navy needing to lease a Russian nuclear powered submarine and other conventional Russian submarines. The Chinese articles also talk much about the failure of the Indian Navy to develop adequate missiles. This was demonstrated by the coverage of the Indian sub-launched ballistic missile only being able to fly 700 km. Additionally, the Indian Navy's failures in getting adequate naval air defense missiles was trumpeted by the Chinese defense media.
Other types of actions of the Indian Navy are also significantly covered in the China Military Online. The first area is delays. This seems in part an effort by the Chinese to actually downplay the Indian threat by focusing on development difficulties. The China Military Online focused on the delays in India's naval development in several instances. One is the delay in submarine development, particularly nuclear submarines. At this time, all of India's submarine projects are undergoing delays. In theory, it would make sense for the Chinese to focus more on Indian nuclear submarine delays, because unlike the Israeli, North Korean, or Chinese diesel electric submarines, Indian diesel electric submarines are not equipped with nuclear missiles, yet once finished, they would pose problems for the Chinese if they tried to fight the Indians in the Indian Ocean. Another type of delay covered was that of the new Indian air defense destroyer. The main focus was on slowdowns in the actual construction of the destroyer, but there was also substantial coverage of the delays in the development of the missiles of the said destroyer, even though the state of the art radar, which is one of the most important components of an air defense destroyer, is only beginning to be fielded as well. The switch away from this focus on delays after India's nuclear test suggests a change in P.R.C. views on Indian naval development toward a sense that India was finally posing a threat to the Chinese Navy.
More recently, there has been a change in the tone of the articles of the China Military Online. Prior to 2015, two-thirds of the articles were negative and very dismissive of the Indian Navy. But, since early 2015, there were only two negative articles about the Indian Navy (two out of fifteen articles were unfavorable [thirteen percent]), and one of those articles was extremely alarmist for all but two sentences in a one-page article. One possible explanation of why the Chinese articles suddenly changed tack is that during the month of January 2015 the Indians launched a nuclear missile that had the capacity to reach Beijing. As a result, the Indian military suddenly became a threat to the Chinese capital, and thus, the tone of the Chinese articles on the Indian navy switched. This suggests the Chinese viewing Indian naval development along with other preparation as a threat in terms of a security dilemma.
The types of equipment covered by the Chinese media is much more eclectic than the equipment covered by the Indian media. For example, besides considerable discussion of India's endeavors to acquire submarines, noted above, the Chinese defense media also covered the development of Indian aircraft carriers, especially its air wing. Additionally, there seemed to be coverage given not just to the Indian designed and built carrier, but also to a Russian built Indian carrier. Thus, it seems the Chinese have come to view the Indian naval development as a threat even though the Indian media was more comprehensive in terms of all aspects of the Chinese naval threat.
The Chinese military press also covered India's missiles. One of the missiles in question was the Indian-Russian designed anti-ship missile, the Brahmos. Another is the joint Israeli-Indian designed Barak 8 air defense missile, which is heavily delayed, a fact that has been harped on repeatedly by the Chinese media. In particular, the media heavily documented how the Indian sub-launched ballistic missile only had a 700 km range, but also noted that its replacement was going to have a range at least twice as long.
Ships are another part of the Indian naval development that is covered by China Military Online. The China Military Online particularly discusses two main types of ships being built by the Indian Navy: destroyers and corvettes. Its articles note, in particular, that the Indian Navy's best destroyer is currently top of the line. It is an air defense destroyer that has stealth capacity with an advanced Israeli designed air defense system. However, the anti-submarine corvettes mentioned are not by any means fancy.They have limited anti-ship capability as well as limited anti-aircraft capability. However, those anti-submarine corvettes would be of interest to the Chinese Navy, since one of the most capable parts of the Chinese Navy is its submarine service. So any anti-submarine assets would be of note. This attention thus again seems founded on recognition of a very specific aspect of the security dilemma between the two countries when it comes to submarines and submarine hunting.
The coverage by China Military Online on Indian strategies, whether designed to counter Chinese or Pakistani incursions, are non-existent. This could possibly be because the China Military Online is a newspaper, as opposed to a journal where strategies would be more likely covered. Another possibility is that the Chinese may feel that they understand the Indian strategy as it would theoretically be similar to the American strategy, since both the U.S. and Indian navies are carrier based. One other possible reason could be that the Chinese military might not even care about Indian strategy since they may calculate that, as of this point in time, they would simply need to avoid any battle with the Indian Navy. This is partly because the Chinese would lose, given that the Chinese could not get enough ships far enough into the Indian Ocean to fight the Indian Navy with a fair shot at winning. Regardless, the focus of the Chinese newspaper on naval hardware modernization does suggest that the Chinese perceive a threat from India. If there was not a threat, it is arguable that the switch in the tone of coverage on the Indian Navy after the nuclear missile test would be non-existent.
Introductions of new technology was another type of action covered by the China Military Online, with a particular focus on the introductions of destroyers and the anti-submarine corvettes, aircraft carriers, and aircraft for the carriers. The China Military Online covered the development of many Indian weapons, including the development of the Brahmos missile. The change in coverage of weapons could be due to the fact that the Chinese press is doing what any press would do: cover the most recent and scary thing the most. This coverage indicates the extent to which the Chinese view Indian naval technology development with interest. The urgency given to coverage of new Indian weapons after the missile test in 2015 seems again to show the heightened sense of India as a threat.
The sources quoted in articles in the China Military Online are much different from the sources for the articles in the Indian Defence Review. The sources for the Chinese news outlet are from newspapers all over the world. The amount of factual coverage versus opinion pieces is also very interesting. In comparison to the Indian Defence Review, which was more focused on opinions, with facts mainly presented to back up those opinions, the Chinese newspaper was almost all factual coverage. However, the very interesting thing about these facts is that many times, the facts were still used to indicate opinions, but, unlike the Indian Defence Review, the Chinese articles did not actually argue anything in particular. This was especially true when the Chinese newspaper was reporting the failures of the Indian military. That there were so many "factual" articles about Indian naval failures reflected the opinion of the Chinese defense media was that the Indian Navy should not be taken seriously. Tellingly, more recently the absence of such stories that report Indian naval failures, and a new focus on stories on Indian successes, shows that the Chinese military opinion has shifted toward seeing the Indian Navy as being much more capable than the Chinese originally thought.
The general tendency of the Chinese newspaper is to react toward the Indian Navy's development, as opposed to talking about how Chinese naval development will deal with India. No articles talk about how the Chinese Navy plans to fight the Indian Navy. However, unlike the Indian Defence Review, the Chinese newspaper did not have any articles that were alarmist toward the actions of the Indian Navy and thus urging the Chinese Navy to take action against the Indian Navy. There was more of a tendency to show the Indians as a threat after the 2015 missile test. But Chinese coverage was calmer than the Indian coverage. This may suggest that, while seeing an Indian threat, there is still no sense that it is a threat that needs direct and immediate attention. This is an indication of how Chinese actions have largely fit into the pattern in keeping with the theory of defensive realism.
There are a few interesting things when it comes to what is being left out. The Chinese newspapers did not mention Pakistan when talking about Indian naval developments. This is especially interesting when they talked about the Indian sub-launched ballistic missile only having a 700 km range. The implication is that the Chinese were being dismissive of Indian capabilities. But the Chinese newspaper forgot to mention that Pakistan, India's main enemy and neighbor, has many important targets within 700 km of the Pakistani coastline.
As mentioned before, the Chinese newspaper also left out strategy. This is very interesting since naval development is useless without strategy, or naval personnel development. And, unlike the Indian Defence Review, there was no urgency expressed in the Chinese newspaper. In fact, until 2015, the Chinese newspaper was largely dismissive of the Indian Navy (fifteen unfavorable towards the Indian Navy to ten favorable towards the Indian Navy [sixty percent]). Only after 2015 did the Chinese newspaper stop being dismissive. Even so, there was still no real sense of urgency in the reports after 2015. Yet, as I have also said before, just because strategy is not covered does not mean that strategists are not working behind the scenes to counter a country they see as a threat. What is suggested, though, is that while the Chinese do approach the Indian threat from a perspective of a security dilemma, they also follow a pattern in their responses as predicted by defensive realism. If they see a real threat, the threat only results in relatively moderate responses rather than the perception of a full arms race with India
Another feature reflecting the predictive capacity of these theoretical insights is the use of signals. While not all security dilemmas involve signaling, all signaling indicates a security dilemma when it comes to an arms race. Even as India's ballistic missile test might have been seen by Beijing as a signal from India of their growing perception of the Chinese threat, the dropping of the dismissive tone in the Chinese newspaper might be intended as a sign that China received this message created by the Indian nuclear test and signaled by that they now also take India seriously as a threat. At the same time, the extent to which Chinese articles do not talk about how their navy plans to counter the rise of the Indian Navy could be an effort by China to avoid provoking its rival from adopting additional counter strategies.
In the end, the key takeaway from the Chinese media is how they clearly saw the Indian military establishment as unthreatening until the Indians launched a ballistic missile that could reach Beijing. This reflects a beginning of a stronger perception of a security dilemma as the Chinese now felt that they were threatened by India. While one could point out that the articles in 2015 never mentioned a counter strategy to India's actions, this may well be that there was simply not enough time to react. One would expect that Chinese articles moving forward will show the ways that China has begun to respond to this security dilemma and possibly build up its navy by increasing its ability to get ships to fight the Indian Navy. The relatively greater Chinese coverage of hardware as opposed to strategy is also seems to show that the Chinese do not see Indian strategies as conveying a threat as much as Indian weapons do. Due to the secretive nature of the Chinese military, the Chinese military could very well be focusing on Indian naval strategy behind the scenes. Hence, the focus of Chinese newspaper articles on technology may actually provide a stronger way for them to track, and convey, their sense of urgency about threat from the Indian Navy, as technology is much more appealing than strategy.
Predictions
The Indian and Chinese navies clearly see each other as a threat as demonstrated by the articles analyzed in this thesis. Additionally, given how the Indians and Chinese are only covering the parts of the navy that indicate that there is an effort to counter these specific parts as opposed to destroying the entire navy, hence fulfilling the aspect of defensive realism that states that navies that operate under defensive realism do not try to defeat the whole enemy navy, but rather focus on specific parts of a navy that are needed to ensure that the state maximizes security and not power as defined earlier in the paper. If one uses defensive realism as a guide and acknowledges that, based on my research, a security dilemma exists, one would see that the Indians and Chinese would only build up weapons that would be designed to increase their "security" and not their "power." Additionally, the buildup of the navies under defensive realism would indicate that the buildup would be reactive and not designed to destroy the enemy outright in an attack in their home turf, but rather focus on specific parts of a navy which are needed to ensure that the state maximizes security. In particular, defensive realism would predict that the Indian and Chinese navies would try to counter individual actions and would act in a measured way rather than trying to destroy the entire navy in that navy's home ocean. However, since the Chinese are only now beginning to see the Indians as a threat, they haven't had enough time to have responded in a way that registers as an outright response to the threat posed by the Indian Navy. Additionally, the fact that the Chinese and Indians are focusing their development of weapons and coverage of weapons on the types of weapons that are countering weapons that the other side are building as opposed to trying become a hegemon in the other country's area of operations. Defensive realism would indicate that because India and China are currently in an arms race caused by each other's military buildup, India and China would be building up their security and not their power. Nonetheless, this paper predicts that China will build up its navy to counter specific elements of the Indian Navy by getting more of its ships ready to fight India in the Indian Ocean, as well as increasing its anti-submarine warfare capabilities in order to defeat Indian ballistic missile submarines if and when the U.S. naval threat is neutralized (India, given its economic statistics, would not be able to help the U.S. any more than the Japanese any more helped the Germans beat the Allies during the Second World War)—which could happen by the defeat of the U.S. Navy in a fight in the seas close to China or by the Chinese growing so large that the U.S. knows that resistance would be futile, a la Britain and the U.S. after the Second World War. Meanwhile India will respond by building up its navy to be able to defeat China by building up its surface combatants and by trying to develop an A2/AD capability.
The Chinese Navy, as of now, would be unable to project sufficient force to defeat the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean, and the Indian Navy has insufficient forces to defeat the Chinese Navy in the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the Indian and Chinese navies are not going to be fighting each other any time soon. However, the Indians and Chinese are both rapidly growing powers and at some point will to have to reckon with each other. As a result, the Indian and Chinese navies will have continual buildups ahead of them, and given the economic disparity between India and China, it seems that the Chinese will be able to build their navy faster than the Indians.
However, war is not in the interest of either country because of the potential destructive effect of two major economies fighting each other. Even if the Chinese could neutralize the U.S., they would require as many replenishment ships as the U.S., if not more, to fight the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean, as the Chinese tend to focus more on non-aircraft carrier surface combatants than the U.S. does. Since the Chinese Navy does not need to fight the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean to survive, the buildup of supply ships to fight the Indian Navy is an unneeded expense. This is because the Indian military won't threaten the survival of China, unless nuclear weapons are involved. The Chinese One Belt One Road policy of creating a new way to eliminate reliance on the seas would mean that the Indian Navy would be unable to cut off all goods from China, so the Chinese Navy would not really need to battle the Indian Navy to have security. As a result, the Indian Navy is only posing a threat to China through nuclear submarines. As a result, this means that, according to defensive realism, the Chinese would not need to destroy the entire Indian Navy to survive. Additionally, the Chinese military does not pose a risk to the survival to India with conventional means.
Thus, there is no threat to the survival of either country posed by the other navy, and according to defensive realism, there is no pressing reason for the Chinese and Indian navies to fight each other. As a result, there is a question of why the Chinese and Indian navies view each other as threats. I think that it is perfectly clear in my research that the Indians view the Chinese Navy as a threat because of the fact that China is a rising military superpower on its borders and has a border dispute with India. If the border dispute erupts into a conflict and then it involves a naval dispute, India could very well be cut off. The Chinese view the Indians as a threat because Indian nuclear weapons can destroy Beijing, and India has not articulated a no-first-use policy. As a result, the Chinese will build up their navy to deal with Indian naval threats (if and when they have suppressed the threat of the American navy) with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare and supply ships. Meanwhile, the Indians will continue to build up their navy to deal with Chinese naval buildup.
The impact of the continued buildup on each of these two countries will be disproportionate. As of now, the Indians cannot really afford to have an arms race with China. India has a GDP that hovers around half of China's, and its poor go without healthcare and one in ten of its youth are unable to read. As a result, India has far better things to spend its money on than an aircraft carrier that it will be unlikely to ever use against China or Pakistan. Additionally, given the low productivity of Indian shipyards, many of India's new ships will be built in foreign countries, thus negating any benefits that domestic defense spending might have on the domestic industrial base.
The impact of China's buildup of its navy will have less of a negative impact on China than it does on India. The Chinese economy can afford to spend money on its navy, which, unlike the Indian Navy, is useful for ensuring its economic survival, as there are realistic threats to Chinese economic well-being posed by other navies. As a result, the Chinese naval buildup has little adverse effect on the Chinese economy, as they can afford a buildup, and most of China's defense production takes place in China, avoiding foreign spending on major defense projects, unlike India. The effect of India's buildup on China, due to the fact that China can afford a naval buildup like the one it is conducting now, is, aside from the fear of a nuclear weapon being launched from an Indian submarine landing on Beijing, negligible. However, if such a nuclear weapon lands on Beijing from an Indian submarine, it would be disastrous. While the threat right now is from land-based ICBMs, the Indians are currently developing SLBMs with a significant range that would allow Indian nuclear submarines with reasonable security to land a nuclear missile on Beijing. The Indians, to counter the PLA-N, will probably try to develop an A2/AD system for the Indian Ocean and build up a surface fleet, which is what the Chinese are doing for the Pacific Ocean.
However, there might be some issues with the predictions in this thesis. A more pressing threat from the U.S. Navy for China might cause the Chinese to put the Indian threat on the back burner. Additionally, the Chinese might not follow defensive realism due to the various pressures in Chinese society and the secretive nature of the Chinese military, which makes it hard to discern what the Chinese military goals are. The Indian economy is also known for its false starts, so it remains to be seen if the Indian economy will keep growing at a rate to support the Indian Navy's growth goals. A change in the Indian government might be an issue in terms of keeping a consistent policy when it comes to Indian Naval growth and foreign policy.
Conclusion
Defensive realism is the idea that states live in a dangerous world, and that states must maximize their "security" in order for them to survive. Unlike offensive realism, defensive realism does not dictate that states maximize their "power." Right now, both India and China are nuclear powers capable of obliterating each other's capitals. As a result, security is very much on the minds of those two countries. Nonetheless, the balance of power created by mutually assured destruction by nuclear conflict ironically reduces the possibility that either side will see a need for all-out war in conventional terms. At the same time, both of those countries have major powers in their regions that could pose a problem for their territorial integrity; Pakistan wants to gain control of all of Kashmir, and the U.S. wants to ensure that Taiwan remains de facto independent of China. Such concerns will continue to distract either side from seeing the other as a pressing threat to their ultimate security.
Before 2010, the writers of the Indian Defence Review viewed China mainly as a curiosity; after 2010 though they began to see China as a threat. This is easily demonstrated by the Indian Defence Review's article's headlines about China going from quizzical to alarmist. It is not insignificant that the Indian Defence Review had such a drastic shift in the year that the border dispute in the Himalayan Mountains with China flared up with the then-Chinese premier quashing any hopes of a near-term resolution for the dispute. In contrast, this alarm did not happen during the 2008 financial crisis when the Chinese seemed to be the new supreme power of the world. As a result, it is clear that the change in Indian attitudes were linked to actual security developments, and, under defensive realism, countries do not worry about each other until there is a tangible military risk. Prior to this real military conflict India appeared not to be concerned with goings-on in China.
The Chinese also originally viewed India as a country that did not pose much of a threat until there was a tangible military development. This was also clearly seen in the change in the tone of their articles on the Indian Navy around the time that the Indian military demonstrated their capability to land a nuclear warhead on Beijing. With the test of the Agni-V, the Indians showed capability of destroying Beijing. This new perception of India as a threat also seemed to create a new Chinese anxiety over the Indian Navy. While one could argue that the Indian Navy cannot yet land a nuclear weapon on Beijing, the ability of the Indians to launch a land based missile that can reach Beijing made India's missile program for nuclear submarines gain much more credibility in the eyes of the Chinese writers. At the same time, the Chinese response to this threat has been mainly measured against India's actual capabilities.
While the two countries are in danger of experiencing nuclear attacks, they are not in danger of being wholly conquered by the other country, or any other country for that matter. As a result, offensive realism, which states that countries are power maximizers, would not really apply in the case of China and India in terms of how they view each other's naval build-up. This is because offensive realism says that states only feel secure when they have regional hegemony. However, at this point in time, both China and India already exert considerable influence in their own region and neither stands in the way of the other in acquiring regional hegemony.
A key part of defensive realism is the security dilemma, which says that countries build up their militaries in order to deal with a threat from another country. This is important for a few reasons. First, the Chinese and Indian navies are rapidly becoming a part of a greater power projection for both countries. Both countries might eventually come to blows somewhere, such as over the Himalayan border disputes. Even if the dispute was on land, though, a naval battle might also ensue if one side had a good enough navy to carry over adequate force projection to the other side. As a result, the Chinese and Indian navies are keen on building up a navy able to beat back the other.
However, because countries are assumed to have bad intentions towards each other, signaling would be useful for dealing with ambiguity if those intentions were less bad. As a result, if there were a way to signal what each country thinks of the other navy, it would be possible to see if there is a security dilemma in a more exact way than guessing. The articles in Chinese Military Online and the Indian Defence Review are important because they provide a more exact way to gauge the views of each country. Based on the articles used in this thesis, it seems clear that if the navies view each other's development through defensive realism, then the Chinese and Indian navies will engage in an arms race that is limited and not designed for complete domination in the other country's home ocean. Thus, the Chinese will build up anti-submarine warfare capabilities and supply ships, while the Indians will build up A2/AD and surface warfare capabilities. These actions reflect measured responses to the security dilemma the two countries face that fall mainly in line with defensive realism predictions.


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