WHICH POLITICAL SYSTEM SHOULD TURKEY ADAPT? PRESIDENTIALISM vs. PARLIAMENTARISM

WHICH POLITICAL SYSTEM SHOULD TURKEY ADAPT? PRESIDENTIALISM vs. PARLIAMENTARISM

Serkan Kaya January 7, 2016

Which Political System Should Turkey Adapt? Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism Serkan Kaya

Abstract It is clear that the existing political structure of Turkey is not capable of offering a stable, flexible and resilient infrastructure which in return leads to a situation of uncertainties unless it is systematically revised accordingly. Therefore, unlike British case which evolved naturally throughout the centuries but similar to the US case, Turkish political structure needs a strong revisal and a redesign to adapt with both regional and global economic, social and security challenges. However, while designing the new political system, “one size fits all” approach should be abandoned; the unique problems of Turkish political system should be underlined; the existing bottlenecks of the structure should be clearly identified; the universal democratic norms should be the basis and a few alternative solutions should be offered, among which the best option should be applied with the approval of the society who should be very well informed about pros and cons of all those possible options. Throughout the paper, I will try to underline the pros and cons of both presidential and parliamentary systems and differences among them through annotations from several distinctive political scientists. In the popular discussions about the presidential system and its applicability to Turkey, the US case is generally given as a reference, therefore, it is also crucial to understand the evolution of the US presidentialism in order to understand whether it is a good fit for Turkish structure or not. In parallel, I will outline Turkey’s existing political system and finally offer the best option that can fit to Turkish conjuncture.

Turkey has been experiencing a turbulent political system since the very beginning of the formation of the Republic. Starting with an authoritarian one party regime, the political system of Turkey has evolved unnaturally thanks to military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 via coups and relatively softer interventions in 1997 and 2007, the aim of all of which were protecting the core state structure based on a unitary, nationalist, secularist and Kemalist elements against any 1

alteration or any attempt of alteration. Therefore, the main problem underscoring the Turkish political system has always been the efforts to safeguard the status quo with a military reinterpretation of the political structure each time rather than a civic evolution that keeps up with the domestic and global conjuncture. All these efforts made our political system so cumbersome that by the 1990s following the death of Turgut Özal, uncertainty of country’s prospects for managing its swirling foreign and domestic currents peaked resulting in the biggest economic crisis of Turkey in 2001. After the Second World War, the global conjuncture forced liberal democracies to strengthen the executive body of the government in order to cope with the challenges of economic/social collapse, rapid development, overpopulation, technological innovations, wars, turmoil, and terrorism. (Yanık, 94) Turkey, on the other hand, in the grip of a few terrorist organizations, with a critically important geopolitical position and an ethnically diverse and dense population has been facing those kinds of challenges both within the country and in global affairs to a great extent for decades. However, unlike liberal democracies, Turkey has never been able to revise its political structure accordingly because of military dominance on political architecture. Thanks to the policies followed by the Justice and Development Party since it’s coming to power in 2002, the military dominance on politics has been gradually diminished and lately military has been subordinated to the civic political authority. That transformation brought about the freely questioning of the political structure in Turkey and paved the way to the possibility of redesigning the system through a new constitution. It is clear that the existing political structure of Turkey is not capable of offering a stable, flexible and resilient infrastructure which in return leads to a situation of uncertainties unless it is systematically revised accordingly. Therefore, unlike British case which evolved naturally 2

throughout the centuries but similar to the US case, Turkish political structure needs a strong revisal and a redesign to adapt with both regional and global economic, social and security challenges. However, while designing the new political system, “one size fits all” approach should be abandoned; the unique problems of Turkish political system should be underlined; the existing bottlenecks of the structure should be clearly identified; the universal democratic norms should be the basis and a few alternative solutions should be offered, among which the best option should be applied with the approval of the society who should be very well informed about pros and cons of all those possible options. Throughout the paper, I will try to underline the pros and cons of both presidential and parliamentary systems and differences among them through annotations from several distinctive political scientists. In the popular discussions about the presidential system and its applicability to Turkey, the US case is generally given as a reference, therefore, it is also crucial to understand the evolution of the US presidentialism in order to understand whether it is a good fit for Turkish structure or not. In parallel, I will outline Turkey’s existing political system and finally offer the best option that can fit to Turkish conjuncture. By the year 2002, almost half of the democratic countries worldwide were being ruled by parliamentary systems (56 out of 114 countries). At the same time, two thirds of them were being ruled by presidential systems and one fifth of them were being ruled by hybrid or semipresidentialism. Vast majority of economically most developed countries except France and the US has embraced parliamentary systems as the core political system. (Sayarı, 77) Juan Linz also argues that the majority of the most stable democracies are governed by parliamentary regimes in which the executive body is comprised of the majority within the legislative body and that executive body can exist as long as that majority within the legislative body is maintained. (Linz, 3

11) On the other hand, he suggests that the US is the only democracy having a long history of constitutional continuity under a presidential system; the rest of the presidential systems were hybrid ones such as Finland and France except Chile who had also maintained a constitutional continuity under a presidential system but democratically failed in 1970s. Linz states that parliamentary system contributes more to the development and protection of democracy than presidential system does especially in those countries where there are deep political dissidences and a large number of political parties. (Linz, 12) To start with, according to Shugart and Carey presidential regimes differ from the common parliamentary type in that there are two agents of the electorate: an assembly and a president. In a parliamentary system, there is only one, the assembly, with the executive being an agent of assembly, rather than of voters directly. (Shugart and Carey, 1) Another main difference is the tenure of the leaders as Linz argues for both prime ministers in parliamentary systems and the presidents in presidential systems. The cabinet of a prime minister in the parliamentary system can be dissolved if the cabinet cannot get the vote of confidence from the legislative body: parliament. In theory, fall of a government before the end of its predetermined term through a vote of confidence is easier than to discharge the president from office, however, fall of government in parliamentary systems through a vote of confidence is generally seen in the unsteady coalition governments in divided societies. (Horowitz, 36) Those governments in parliamentary systems occupying the majority of seats in the parliament generally keep the executive body until their predetermined term is over. (Horowitz, 36) There can be publicly elected presidents in the parliamentary systems, however, those presidents cannot compete with the prime minister with regards to the execution of policies. In parliamentary systems, presidency position is more of a representative one which makes the president the head of the 4

state with no actual executive power but only with a veto power. Lijphart suggests the presidents in parliamentary systems to have very limited power and it should be a symbolic position which should not be obtained through popular election. Popular election provides democratic legitimacy to the president, which in return leads the presidents to take an active role in politics especially if their duties and authorities are not very well limited in the constitution. That may result in the conversion of parliamentary system into a semi-presidential system. (Lijphart, 56) On the other hand, in presidential systems, Linz argues the president is elected with a fixed term and he cannot be dismissed from the office unless he is charged with impeachment. Moreover, reelection of president is also limited, which makes it somehow ambiguous in circumstances that a good performing president will have to retire no matter how well he performed and no matter the electorate may still demand an additional term for him. Although, there might be internal party disciplines limiting the reelection of the prime minister, ministers in the cabinet, and members of parliament in parliamentary systems the same prime minister can lead the executive body as long as he gets the support of the electorate and his party. In presidential systems like that of the US, the president is not only the head of the state but also the head of the executive body unlike representative presidents in parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, there is a strict separation of powers within the US presidential system. Framers of the US presidential system were in effect replicating the essentials of a form of government that then existed in Britain, an executive with powers separated from the power of the elected assembly. (Shugart and Carey, 5) Unlike the political myth that US presidents have extensive executive powers, in reality this is not the case thanks to the strict separation of powers. For instance, the US Congress comprising of House of Representatives and the Senate, form the legislative body and this body has extensive enforcements on the policies followed by the 5

President. Without the support and approval of the Congress, the President cannot execute domestic and international policies. As a result, the US Presidents have to strike a balance with Congress in order to avoid any kind of bottlenecks. The Congress can pass a law and the President can veto it. That veto of President can be overruled if two thirds of both Senate and House of Representatives reapproves the law. The judges of the US Supreme Court are appointed by the President, however, those judges should also be approved by the Senate. Moreover, the Supreme Court can cancel the laws approved by the President if they are in contradiction with the constitution. The President appoints the US diplomats for foreign offices and those appointments should also be approved by the Congress. (Sayarı, 82-83) A very recent example of Iranian nuclear deal clearly shows how the President needs the support of the Congress in order to execute an international deal. In presidential systems, since both legislative and executive bodies are empowered by the popular vote, they may both assert that they are true representatives of the public. Linz points out that this conflict between legislative and executive bodies of presidential system can be quite severe if the majority of the legislative body is composed of the politicians having the opposite political stance against the president, which at the end results in a divided government. (Linz, 13) This kind of conflicts may lead to gridlock and cannot be easily fixed. Although there are some constitutional mechanisms to settle such conflicts, those mechanisms are so technical and complex that they have no impact in the eyes of the electorate. Such conflicts could only be solved by the intervention of military in many Latin American presidential systems. According to Linz, the US is the only exception in the sense that it is quite successful in the normalization of such conflicts because of dispersed, undisciplined and nonideological nature of political

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parties. The formation of modern political parties exacerbates that conflict between legislative and executive bodies of governments in socially and ideologically polarized countries. (Linz, 13) Parliamentary system because of its flexible executive structure may lead uncertainties and instability while the presidential system backs a strict executive body which might be an advantage to cope with the uncertainties and instability. Especially in those parliamentary regimes where there is no party in the parliament forming the majority government, parties have to enter into the coalition governments to form the executive body. That may result in long lasting negotiations, concessions and each party’s ambition to get the critical positions in the cabinet, which in return leads to weak executive bodies made up of ministers generally not being the masters of their domains who look for the short term political gains for the political parties they represent rather than a national outlook for the existing domestic and global challenges the country is facing. That is a major problem in countries where there is a socially, ethnically, religiously, and ideologically polarized society such as the one in Turkey. On the other hand, in presidential system, the President elects his own cabinet and while forming the cabinet he has to form one which includes the representatives of various interest groups in agriculture, trade, technology, workforce, etc. which means the President is not totally free while designating his own cabinet. (Horowitz, 37) Moreover, it is more likely that the cabinet of a President will consist of more technocrats who are the masters of their domains while this is not the case in coalition governments in parliamentary systems. As Linz argues, although presidential system offers a more strict executive body, in cases such as death of the president or wrong decisions taken by the president for complex problems related to national security or economics which deteriorates the existing conditions might make the presidential executive body more

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unpredictable and weaker whereas a prime minister has the tool of vote of confidence or going to early election in such cases. (Linz, 15) Linz describes the presidential system as inevitably problematic since it creates a structure where the winner takes all. (Linz, 16) In a parliamentary system in which there is no majority government, the distribution of the executive power among the parties in the parliament is a must, which makes the representation of all parties in the executive body possible while in the presidential system, those who lost the presidential seat will have no other option than waiting for the next election to be able to compete for the executive body, which in return increases the significance of the presidential elections and in parallel increases the tension and the polarization within the society. (Linz, 17) However, Horowitz objects Linz’s argument of zero sum game and points out that in presidential systems if legislative and executive branches are controlled by two different parties then that system does not create a zero sum game. (Horowitz, 33) Horowitz suggests that it is electoral systems which lead to zero sum games rather than political systems. (Horowitz, 34) He gives the Nigerian case as an example in which the electoral system was designed in a way that the winner had to get the two thirds of the votes in each of 19 states and also had to get the minimum 25% of all votes. That double requirement was basically for the presidential candidate to get the support of different ethnic groups and the main aim was to exclude the extremes and to elect a moderate and centralist president. That electoral system led the Nigerians to elect the president complying with moderate and centralist preferences while extremes were represented only in the parliament. (Horowitz, 35) Linz argues that in the countries where the votes are straying close to the center of the political spectrum and it is clear that the disloyal oppositions don’t constitute an important majority, it is very unlikely that any presidential candidate will attempt to collaborate with 8

disloyal oppositions. (Linz, 20) In situations where a few of votes will determine the winner of the elections, presidential candidates may attempt to get the support of extremes or disloyal oppositions. However, in parliamentary systems, the probability of loyal parties’ necessity to cooperate with disloyal oppositions or extremes can be higher in order to reach to a majority to form the executive body. In his book “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes”, Linz argues the importance of loyal parties’ problem solving capabilities in correlation with democratic stability. He suggests that the means of reacting against a crisis is one of the most significant factors that evaluates the efficacy and effectiveness of a democratic government. Once confronted with a crisis, the democratic regime should react very quickly and solve it without any support from disloyal opposition and to do so the loyal democratic parties have to reach a consensus and cooperate with each other. He further elaborates that the democratic regime should design itself in such a way that it should solve the problems by offering solutions acceptable to the majority of the population as quickly as possible. Losing time while trying to solve the problem will eventually lead the increasing numbers of the population to withdraw legitimacy from the system and support disloyal oppositions or advocate collaboration with them. (Linz 1978) However, while Linz only suggests the best way of political structure to be parliamentary coalitions in which all the groups within a society is represented more fairly and all those groups feel themselves attached to the political structure, the decision making processes under coalition governments make it almost impossible to cope with the crisis in societies where there is strict polarization with regards to the societal and electoral trends. Turkey is a very good example of those countries embodying such a polarized society in which the voting behavior and society as a whole is basically divided on ideology (right-left) and identity (religion, nationalism, and ethnicity) (Esmer 2015) Özbudun argues that in institutionalized democracies, although the

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decision making process may last longer, the institutional mechanisms and relatively long period of discussion decreases the possibility of making crucial mistakes and once the decisions are made, their implementation is quite straightforward. However, in delegative democracies in which the decisions are made by the President and his inner circle, the decision making process is relatively faster than that of institutional democracies, which may in return lead to sometimes catastrophic situations. (Özbudun, 71) Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean that decisions taken through institutional mechanisms are always right and those decisions do not lead to catastrophic results. Britain’s involvement in Iraq war on the basis of misleading intelligence and failure to prepare for the aftermath of the invasion is a good example of how states with parliamentary systems can take decisions resulting in the catastrophes. (Watt 2015) Another disadvantage of presidential systems for Linz is the President’s positioning himself as the sole representative of the society and he can justify his politics on the basis of people’s will while giving little or no importance to his opponents. Even worse, the President may cut across all boundaries and try to implement his policies based on his direct election through a majority of the electorate. The President may disregard, disrespect and even be hostile to opposition as a whole by depicting himself the legitimate representative of the electorate. (Linz, 22) Linz also accepts that in parliamentary systems where there are strict party disciplines in the party systems and when the prime minister controls the majority of parliamentary seats, this system has resemblance to presidentialism. (Linz, 23) That is what is being experienced since 2002 in Turkey where Justice and Development party has been ruling the government with majority of seats in the parliament and with a strict party discipline. Prime ministers in parliamentary systems with majority governments have more authority than the US President. (Lipset, 40) 10

The representation of various interest groups in different political parties in countries which are ruled by presidential systems makes it possible to establish an alliance between differently affiliated party members on specific issues. Local interests are represented exceptionally as the local representatives have to get the support of the local electorate to be reelected. For this end, they may use their votes, from time to time, against the president or their party’s general inclination. On the other, a member of parliament in a parliamentary system, because of disciplined party formations, cannot vote against his/her party’s overall inclination. (Lipset, 40) In such systems where the majority government rules the country, the prime minister and his cabinet actually gather both legislative and executive powers, which is also the case in Turkey since 2002. Özbudun also argues that while parliamentary systems create strong party structures, presidential systems are more prone to creating weaker party structures as is the case with the US and Canada. (Özbudun 2015) Lijphart suggests the main problematic of political structure can be solved via power sharing and group autonomy. He argues that power sharing enables all significant groups in the society to participate in the executive body while group autonomy enables those significant groups in the society to govern themselves on issues such as education and culture. (Lijphart, 46) Those two main terms: power sharing and group autonomy are the first and foremost characteristics of a consociational democracy. However, as Szymanski argues, in Turkey there is a strong central government giving almost no space to regional or local authorities to govern themselves in an autonomic way. The existence of such a centralized state power with the governor and sub-governer’s appointment via the central government makes it impossible to offer group autonomy in Turkey. (Szymanski, 123)

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Understanding the existing political structure of Turkey is very crucial in order to determine what the system is and is not. Parliamentarism in Turkey was born as a political system in which an assembly was constructed to represent localities coexisted with a ministry that gradually shifted from control of monarch to the control of assembly itself. In that regard, Turkey has an extensive know-how about parliamentary system as its parliamentary history dates back to late 1876 when the first seed of parliamentarianism was planted in the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire. However, it was 1909 when the Empire passed to the parliamentary monarchy after the announcement of the Second Constitutionalism (II. Meşrutiyet). 1921 constitution granted the legislative and executive bodies under the patronage of the Grand Assembly by fusing the power of the monarch and gathered all the power in the hands of the Grand Assembly. During the Ottoman reign, the workings of Parliament were to an extent, the use by delegation of the powers of the ruler in the legislative process. Whereas, with 1921 constitution, all authority was vested in Parliament itself. (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) 1924 constitution paved the way to a hybrid system on the one hand allocating all the executive and legislative powers to the Grand Assembly and on other hand forming a new government style on the basis of parliamentarism. The judicial and executive powers were clearly separated. Independent courts exercised judiciary powers on behalf of the nation. The 1924 Constitution was amended in 1937, the six main principles of the Republican Peoples' Party program: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism, also being enshrined in the Constitution itself as basic qualities of the state. The 1924 Constitution represented a mixed system somewhere between parliamentary governments and a parliamentary model, however, 1961 constitution brought about the pure

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parliamentary system into Turkish political structure with the major changes as following: (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) 1. The Legislature became bi-cameral Parliament. One chamber was the National Assembly consisting of 450 deputies elected by popular vote. The other was the Republican Senate, composed of 150 Senators elected by popular vote, as well as fifteen Senators who were appointed by the President, in additional to which the members of the National Unity Committee and former Presidents of the Republic are lifetime Senators. 2. In the functioning of the legislative process, the National Assembly had final say over the two houses. 3. In the exercise of executive power, the President symbolically represented the unity and integrity of the State. 4. The Prime Minister and other Ministers made up the Council of Ministers, who bore political responsibility in the use of executive power. 5. The Prime Minister was appointed by the President from among the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 6. The Ministers were appointed by the Prime Minister and presented to the President for his ratification. 7. The 1961 Constitution fully separated the judiciary from the executive and the legislature, thereby clearly operating the separation of powers principle. The formation of short-lived coalition and minority governments, existence of political parties in the parliament only adhering to their interest without any compromise and deadlocks in the parliamentary processes especially after the period starting with the 1977 general election led to the strict questioning of the parliamentary system. As a result the military made a coup d’état in 13

1980 and the country was ruled by military during the period between 1980 and 1982 while military tutelage continued under the presidency of coup leader until 1989. One of the justifications of the1980 military coup was the deadlocks on the parliamentary system and as a result 1982 constitution written under the imposition of the military authority found the solution in increasing the power of the President of the Republic so that he can mediate among the political parties in cases of deadlocks and strict disagreements. With the 104th article of the 1982 Constitution, The President of the Republic of Turkey granted extensive legislative, executive and judicial powers as following: (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey) “The President of the Republic is the head of the State. In this capacity, he/she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation; he/she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of the State. To this end, the duties he/she shall perform, and the powers he/she shall exercise, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles of the Constitution are as follows: a) Those relating to legislation: To deliver, if he/she deems it necessary, the opening speech of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the first day of the legislative year, To summon the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, when necessary, To promulgate laws, To send laws back to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to be reconsidered, To submit to referendum, if he/she deems it necessary, laws regarding amendment to the Constitution. To appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment part of whole or certain provisions of laws, decrees having the force of law and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content, To decide to renew elections for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. b) Those relating the executive: To appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his/her resignation, To appoint and dismiss ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, To preside over the Council of Ministers or to call the Council of Ministers to meet under his/her chairpersonship whenever he/she deems it necessary, To accredit representatives of the Turkish State to foreign states and to receive the representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey, To ratify and promulgate international treaties,

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To represent the Office of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, To decide on the use of the Turkish Armed Forces, To appoint the Chief of the General Staff, To call the National Security Council to meet, To preside over the National Security Council, To proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force of law, by the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his/her chairpersonship, To sign decrees, To remit or commute the sentences imposed on certain individuals, on grounds of chronic illness, disability or old age, To appoint the members and the chairperson of the State Supervisory Council, To instruct the State Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, investigations and inspections, To appoint the members of the Council of Higher Education, To appoint president of universities. c) Those relating to the judiciary: To appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the High Military Court of Appeals, the members of High Military Administrative Court and the members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. The President of the Republic shall also exercise powers of election and appointment, and perform the other duties conferred on him/her by the Constitution and laws”.

By doing so, a hybrid model of government keeping all parliamentary mechanisms intact while expanding the power of the President emerged. (Yazıcı, 87-88) On top of all those legislative, executive and judicial powers, with Article 105 of the Constitution, the President is held unaccountable for his actions as stated following: “All presidential decrees, except those which the President of the Republic is empowered to enact individually without the signatures of the Prime Minister and the minister concerned in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and other laws, shall be signed by the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned; the Prime Minister and the minister concerned shall be accountable for these decrees.”

As a consequence, as Yazıcı argues, 1982 constitution had created a quasi semi-presidential system with a strong presidential office. In parliamentary systems, the executive body is

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comprised of cabinet and the head of state i.e. president, however, the president cannot act on his own as all his decisions has to be approved by the relevant minister and the prime minister simultaneously. Therefore, in parliamentary systems, although the executive body is composed of two components, there is no dual executive structure that exists in semi-presidential systems. The reinforcement of presidential office with executive, legislative and judicial powers led conflicts between the Presidents such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the parliamentary majority/governments. The democratic legitimacy of the President of the Republic was enhanced when the Grand National Assembly enacted an amendment to the constitution in 2007 making it possible the election of the President by popular vote. (Yazıcı, 105) Yazıcı’s observation of conversion of parliamentary system to a quasi semi-presidential system can be supported by Lijphart’s argument stating that popular election provides democratic legitimacy to the president, which in return leads the presidents to take an active role in politics especially if their duties and authorities are not very well limited in the constitution; that may result in the conversion of parliamentary system into a semi-presidential system. (Lijphart, 56) Turkey fits into the premier presidentialism model in Shugart and Carey’s classification of presidential systems, which is described as a type in which the president has certain significant powers, but the cabinet is only responsible to the assembly. (Shugart and Carey, 15) The existing ill-defined hybrid political structure of Turkey makes it difficult to foresee stability of the political institutions and as a result leads all political parties to compete on the grounds of short term politics to win numerous seats in the parliament without any long term national vision and strategy. This is certainly an inefficient system in which elections turn more on the provision of particularistic services to constituents than on policy. Such a legislative 16

process is also likely to be inefficient, as members of parliament seek to be able to bring back to their districts projects, jobs, or other services that will help them be reelected. Turkey needs a more powerful executive body that can cope with the complex technological, social, economic and security problems as the geopolitical situation of the country makes it compulsory to make decisions which should be long term and be based on the national strategies rather than short term benefits. For this end, the country needs to revise the political structure in accordance with the motivation to have a strong and predictable executive body along with the representation of all groups within the society in the parliament. On top of that, the independence of judicial body has to be taken granted as the powers of both executive and legislative bodies fuse, the judicial body stands as the only body to provide checks and balances among bodies forming the state structure. In a political conjuncture where there are strict political polarization within the society, no compromises among political parties, large number of political parties with strict disciplined structures, severe national security problems, unreliable judicial workings and unpredictable economical dynamics with an ethnically, ideologically, and religiously diverse population, the executive stability is the most important factor so long as all different groups within the society are represented in the legislative body. As Shugart and Carey suggests assemblies, or at least lower houses of assemblies, are intended to be the representative of the population. A typical democratic assembly is elected for the purpose of giving voice to the interests of localities or to the diversity of ideological or other partisan divisions in the polity and the society. That is, assemblies are ordinarily expected to be parochial in nature. Executives, on the other hand, are charged with acting to address policy questions that affect the broader interests of the nation, as well as to articulate national goals. (Shugart and Carey, 3-4) For this end, I suggest two 17

alternative solutions for Turkey’s new political structure which will ensure that the formation of executive body will be both rapid and effective giving almost no space to the formation of coalition governments, the history of which are quite problematic . The first one is the return to the classical parliamentary model with single member district plurality voting system as applied in Britain. The second is the semi presidential system as applied in France. Regarding the presidential system as applied in the US, I believe it is not a good fit for Turkish political structure as it requires a very strong culture of compromise and consensus among very weakly disciplined major political parties of the whole structure. Besides, absence of civic societies and organization and representation of civic elements in the society under the umbrella of political parties in Turkey also makes it quite difficult to reach a consensus on many societal issues. In many ways, the adaptation of Turkish political culture, structure and institutions into a presidential system as applied in the US would make it even more difficult to sustain and will most probably create unprecedented challenges along the way which would lead to an undemocratic evolution again. As Sayarı argues, in the absence of an effective checks and balances system and judicial independence, a presidential system with colossal powers in the hand of the president would probably strengthen authoritarianism rather than democracy. (Sayarı, 85) Both semi presidential system as applied in France and parliamentary system with single member district plurality as applied in Britain result in strong executive bodies latter being the most adaptable to the Turkish political system. As Shugart and Carey discusses, parliamentarism virtually requires that a choice be made; either there will be an efficient choice of policy options to be addressed by the executive or there will be a broadly representative assembly, or a compromise must be struck. With only one agent of electorate, it is not feasible to have both efficient and representative elections in the same system. Having an elected president, 18

on the other hand, at least holds out the promise of serving both ends through elections. (Shugart and Carey, 8) British model is relatively good at solving national problems as the system forces the elections to be performed on politicians’ positions on national issues with a sharp diminution of local representation while in multipartism as applied in Turkey, coalition or minority governments are likely to prevail although it is more representative than the British model. However, maximizing representativeness through proportional representation as applied in Turkey almost ensures minimizing cabinet durability, since parliamentary confidence means that the cabinet must assuage the interests of diverse parties. Thus multiparty parliamentarism enhances representativeness and consequently the role of the assembly; it limits the possibility that the executive can articulate national policy goals transcending parochial partisan interests. (Shugart and Carey, 11-12) Therefore, Turkey should embrace the British model and formulize a strict constitutional solution for the independence and well-functioning of the judiciary.

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